



REJUVENATING PANCASILA DEMOCRACY TO COUNTER EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

Dr. Ryantori^{1,*}

¹FISIP Universitas Prof. Dr. Moestopo (Beragama), Jl. Hang Lekir I/8 Jakarta Pusat

*ryantori4@dsn.moestopo.ac.id

ABSTRACT

The phenomenon of transnational terrorism marks a new era of global security and political issues. An appropriate comprehensive response should be developed that takes into account the fact that transnational terrorism involves many nonmilitary, social factors. Nationally, Indonesia has to face it as a real challenge that should be dealt with comprehensively. Yet, this phenomenon cannot be contained domestically but it should be responded to regionally and even globally. One great modality Indonesia has already have is Pancasila democracy. It has its own roots that emphasized the harmony between individual and communal interests. Gotong royong (mutual cooperation) is one of the underpinnings of Indonesian society that has to be preserved. Indonesia with its bebas aktif foreign policy - a “free and active” approach to international relations that champions activism on the world stage has been monitoring and anticipated terrorism and extremism. Now, Indonesian foreign policy over the next five years under President Joko Widodo will be focused on three priorities: maintaining Indonesia’s sovereignty, enhancing the protection of Indonesian citizens, and intensifying economic diplomacy. The last is the most promising priority if Indonesia can set up a good economic scheme. In order to support its claim to a greater role in the world, or at least in Asia, as peacemaker and mediator, Indonesia generated a set of arguments that highlighted its distinctive attributes and credentials. With those all, what can Indonesia gain? Counterring transnational terrorism, harmonizing community, and then prosperity for the nation.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Pancasila Democracy, Transnational Terrorism

INTRODUCTION

When we talk about democracy in this modern era, western democracy comes into surface immediately. The defining characteristics of such democracy (sometimes called ‘liberal democracy’) include a commitment to fundamental freedoms, within a framework

of laws designed to prevent their abuse, such as freedom to practice one's own religion; freedom of speech; freedom of association; freedom to publish; and equality before the law.

It is important to distinguish from the beginning between democracy as means and democracy as goals. The most fundamental of the goals of democracy are probably four in number. Firstly, to make the rulers accountable and answerable for their actions and policies. Secondly to make the citizens effective participants in choosing those rulers and in regulating their actions. Thirdly, to make the society as open and the economy as transparent as possible; and fourthly to make the social order fundamentally just and equitable to the greatest number possible. Accountable rulers, actively participating citizens, open society and social justice – those are the four fundamental ends of democracy. (Birch, 2001)

However, the way to achieve these goals has elicited different means. For examples, in making the rulers more accountable some democracies (like the United States) have chosen separation of powers and checks and balances, while other democracies (like the United Kingdom) have chosen the more concentrated notion of sovereignty of parliament. These are different means towards making the executive branch more accountable and answerable in its use of power. The same situation occurs related to freedom of the press and speech. The United States has a highly permissive legal system on freedom of speech, but more restrictive public opinion. The United Kingdom has a more restrictive legal system on freedom of the press, but a more tolerant public opinion. (Hensley, 2001; Feldman, 1993)

There are some Islamic societies which have made explicit commitments to some of the values identified as those relating to Western societies. Many of these derive from a number of attempts to develop the concepts of traditional Islam to take account of the changes in Western societies which have led to modernisation. In this context, democracy stands on first line. One good example of those Islamic societies is Indonesia.

Indonesia is the world's third largest democracy after India and the United States of America. Since the authoritarian regime of President Suharto collapsed in 1998, the most immediately visible change in Indonesian politics has been the implementation of an extensive regulatory framework that directs both executive and legislative elections. In April 2009 Indonesia conducted the third legislative election of the post-Suharto era. As in 1999 and 2004, the recent election featured a nationwide legislative election for the national parliament, the senate-like Regional Representatives Assembly, and for the parliaments at the provincial, district and municipal level. Furthermore, direct elections

for regents and mayors were held in 486 out of 510 regencies and municipalities and governor elections in 15 out of 33 provinces throughout the last few years. By the end of 2008, all the leaders of sub-national executive governments had been directly elected by the Indonesian people. Finally, presidential election took place in 1999, 2004, and 2009. (Buehler, 2009)

As the most Muslim-populous country in the world, Indonesia can play a significant role in efforts to promote democratization in the Islamic World. The nation is a real-world example of the compatibility of Islam and democracy, one that could serve as a model for countries in the wider Islamic world.

Yet, there is important question related to the phenomena above. If the goals of democracy are the same while the means for achieving them differ, are there Indonesian means of achieving those same four goals of accountability of rulers, participation of the citizens, openness of the society and greater social justice? That is the challenge facing constitution makers in Indonesia – how to keep the democratic goals constant while looking for democratic means more appropriate to people. To further discuss about it, this paper will focus on Islam vs Democracy in Indonesia, the concept of Theo-Democracy, and Pancasila Democracy.

METHOD

In this study, the approach used is a qualitative approach with the development of a descriptive framework for organizing case studies. That is, the data collected is data that comes from official documents, interview scripts, field notes, personal documents, and other supporting documents. Thus, this study will describe the empirical reality behind the phenomenon in depth, detail, and thoroughly.

Document review is an attempt to collect data by reading, collecting books, official documents, personal documents such as journals, newspapers, and literature from the results of previous research.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

West vs Islam \approx Democracy vs Islam ?

The debate over the relationship between Islam and democracy rests not only on Islamic doctrine but also on history. Even, we can trace back to the debate over the

relations between Islam and the West. Samuel P. Huntington (1993: 222-239) in "The Clash of Civilizations?" offers his hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world.

A civilization itself in Huntington's term is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity.

To back up his hypothesis, Huntington gives six reasons. First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy.

Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations.

Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity.

Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.

Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. A person can be half-French

and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.

Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization.

Moreover, Huntington gives additional explanation by showing a phenomenon that is groups or states belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support from other members of their own civilization. This is known as civilization commonality.

According to Huntington's hypothesis, can we say that the uncondusive relationship between Islam and the West today shows the clash of civilizations? John L. Esposito (2000) in "Political Islam and the West" says not. He says that Huntington's position emphasizes religious and cultural differences over similarities and equates political, economic, and cultural differences with confrontation. Areas of cooperation and the fact that most countries are primarily, although not solely, driven by national and regional interest are overlooked in his analysis.

He adds that the creation of an imagined monolithic Islam has resulted in a religious reductionism that views political conflicts in Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Indonesia, Nigeria, Chechnya, and Sudan as religious conflict. Although communities in these areas may be broadly identified in religious or confessional terms, like the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland or the Hindu (Tamil) and Buddhist communities in Sri Lanka, local disputes and civil wars have more to do with political, ethnic, socioeconomic issues than religion.

The challenge, Esposito says, in an increasingly interdependent world is recognition of both competing and common interests. American policy towards Japan or Saudi Arabia is not based on shared culture, religion, or civilization but on national or group interest. Cooperation can result from common religious and ethnic backgrounds; however it often is derived from common national and strategic interests. Although a clash of civilization might be used to justify aggressions, future conflicts will be due less to a clash of civilizations and more to other interests.

Based on the statements, Esposito then goes on to answer about the uncondusive relations between Islam and the West. He shows the phenomenon known as political Islam. It is rooted in a contemporary religious resurgence in private and public life. On one hand,

many Muslims have become more observant with regard to the practice of their faith (prayer, fasting, dress, and family). On the other, Islam has reemerged as an alternative to the perceived failure of secular ideologies such as nationalism, capitalism, and socialism.

The causes of Islamic resurgence have been religiocultural, political, and socioeconomic. Issues of faith, politics, and social justice—authoritarianism, repression, unemployment, housing, social service, distribution of wealth, and corruption—intertwine as catalysts.

The resulting call for an Islamic alternative has been reflected in slogans such as "Islam is the solution" and "Neither West nor East."

Political Islam has challenged governments, policymakers, and analysts both politically and intellectually over issues of leadership and ideology, modernization and development, pluralism, democratization, and foreign policy.

One of the challenge is toward Western secular fundamentalism. It regards mixing religion and politics, like the political Islam does, as abnormal, irrational, dangerous, and extremist. Those who subscribe to this view are known as fundamentalists or religious fanatics. Thus when secular Westerners encounter Muslim who speak of Islam as a comprehensive way of life, they dub them retrogressive and resistant to change. According to this fact, many nations, especially the West, go too far by identifying political Islam as a threat to their domestic and international security concerns.

At this point Esposito gives his proportional statement by saying that Assuming that mixing religion and politics inevitably leads to extremism has contributed to the attitude that all Islamic movements are extremist and incompatible with democracy. Failure to differentiate between Islamic movements is misleading. Few equate actions by Jewish or Christian extremists with Judaism and Christianity as a whole. Similarly, the United States does not object officially to mixing religion and politics in Israel, Eastern Europe, or Latin America. Comparable liberality is absent when dealing with Islam.

One thing that makes the relations between Islam and the West worse is the way of the West in viewing Islam: the generalization of almost every aspect of Islam. Moreover, F. Halliday (1995) in "Islam and the West": 'Threat of Islam' or 'Threat to Islam' says that there are some myths surrounding Islam. That Islam sanctions terrorism is probably the most common charge against Islam. Halliday argues that, to answer this, there is no necessary or historic relationship between terrorist politics and Islamic identities. The second issue is that of democracy, that is Islam and Western democracy are incompatible. In fact, Muslim positions on participation and democratization range widely and can not be

generalized. Secularists argue for a democracy that observes the separation of religion and state. Rejectionists hold that Islam has its own forms of governance that are incompatible with democracy. Moderate and militant Muslims hold the secularist position while accommodationists believe that traditional concepts—consultation (*shura*), consensus (*ijma*), and reinterpretation (*ijtihad*)—can develop Islamically acceptable forms of popular participation and democratization. Differences in power and struggles for military, economic and institutional power are thus one source of conflict between the West and other civilizations. Differences in culture, that is basic values and beliefs, are a second source of conflict.

What Political Islam has done so far can be categorized into the third form of Kishore Mahbubani's theory about the responses of non-Western civilization to Western power and values. At one extreme, non-Western states can attempt to pursue a course of isolation, to insulate their societies from penetration or "corruption" by the West, and, in effect, to opt out of participation in the Western-dominated global community. A second alternative, the equivalent of "band-wagoning" in international relations theory, is to attempt to join the West and accept its values and institutions. The third alternative is to attempt to "balance" the West by developing economic and military power and cooperating with other non-Western societies against the West, while preserving indigenous values and institutions; in short, to modernize but not to westernize (Huntington, 1993).

Why does political Islam attempt to do so? One of the good explanations is that this is a reaction of the West's efforts to induce other peoples to adopt Western ideas concerning democracy and human rights. V.S. Naipaul has argued that Western civilization is the "universal civilization" that "fits all men." However, Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in not only Islamic but also Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures. Harry C. Triandis even concludes that "the values that are most important in the West are least important worldwide." Huntington adds that when it has developed in non-Western societies it has usually been the product of Western colonialism or imposition.

The emergence of the political Islam does influence the West's domination. Huntington says that the West is now at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other civilizations. Military conflict among Western states is unthinkable, and Western military power is unrivaled. Apart from Japan, the West faces no economic challenge. It

dominates international political and security institutions. The West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values. Thus, political Islam is viewed as a new challenge.

Now, let us turn into the debate over democracy and Islam. Essentially, democracy is a system of governance where sovereignty lies in the hands of the people. But many will say this contradicts with the doctrine of Islam, since in the Islamic view, sovereignty lies in the hand of God. Advocates of this line of thinking put forward three arguments (Kumoro, 2013).

First, there is the fundamentally different view of the nation, or ummah. The view of the nation in modern democracy is tied to a physical space marked by territorial and geographical borders. On the other hand, Islam has its own understanding of a nation that is not bounded by borders, but by *aqidah* (the basic tenets of Islam). Therefore, for many Muslims, nation is defined by faith, not by geography. Second, some Muslim scholars see democracy as a worldly value, when spiritual goals are of primary importance. Democracy thus becomes a secondary goal. Third, a contradiction arises because the people's sovereignty that lies at the heart of democracy is absolute, meaning the people are the ultimate holders of power. Laws and regulations are decided by the people through their representatives and not by God. But for some scholars, the people's sovereignty is not absolute at all, since it is bound by the laws of Islam. In Islam, only God's sovereignty is absolute.

These three interpretations are used by some Muslims to argue that there is no space for democracy in their lives. However, there are many Muslims who take the opposite view, arguing that democracy is inherent in people and in line with Islamic teachings. They base their argumentation on Islamic doctrines—justice, freedom, deliberation and equality—that espouse the basic principles of democracy.

At this level, Islam does not speak about a procedural system but more about the basic soul and spirit of democracy. If the interpretation of democracy is the existence of certain social and political ideals, like the freedom of thought, faith, opinion and equality before the law, there would seem no contradiction, as these are guaranteed by Islam.

It is important to note that the absence of democracy in some Muslim World, such as countries of the Middle East, is not a feature of the wider Muslim world. Indonesia, for example, has seen much success in the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic system of governance. While Indonesia still has a long way to go before

democracy fully takes root, at the very least it has been quite successful in tearing down the walls of tyrannical power. Indonesia is the largest Muslim-majority country in the world. Home to approximately 230 million people of which more than 85% follow Islam, there are almost as many Muslims living in Indonesia as in the entire Arab-speaking world combined. Sunni Islam is the predominant branch of Islam, with only around one million Indonesians being Shia. There is a wide array of other forms of Islam, including significant numbers of Sufi communities. The major fault line, however, lies between santri who adhere to orthodox forms of Islam while the abangan practice more syncretic versions of Islam.

It is said that Islam and democracy are in a relationship fraught with problems as the former, allegedly, does not allow secular law to be put above divine law or accept the legitimacy of worldly authorities (see Table 1). This relationship is less problematic in Indonesia, a democratic Muslim-majority country, the argument goes, due to the syncretic forms of Islam practiced in the archipelago state that are less dogmatic, and hence more conducive to democratic principles. While this is a valuable point, various factors extraneous to ‘moderate Indonesian Islam,’ such as a fragmented Islamic authority in civil society, a weakly institutionalized party system as well as dynamics triggered by recent institutional reforms all play a role in the continuing insignificance of political Islam in the country (Buehler, 2009).

Table 1:

TYPOLOGY IN MODERNIZATION CLAIMS	
SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY	SUPPORT FOR ISLAMISM
• High Education	• Low Education
• More Equitable Gender Attitudes	• Less Equitable Gender Attitudes
• Higher Income	• Lower Income
• Less Religious	• More Religious

Source: (Jamal, 2006: 52)

To summarize, the reason why Islam and democracy seem to go well together in Indonesia has as much to do with broader dynamics within civil society, political parties and state institutions as it has to do with the syncretist, hence moderate forms of Islam practiced in the archipelago.

Indonesian Democracy ≈ Theodemocracy ?

As the largest democratic Muslim-majority country in the world, can we say that Indonesia embraces Theodemocracy system? To answer it, we must trace back to Mawdudi's concept of Theodemocracy. Mawdudi hates democracy as politic. It is due to democracy gives the unlimited sovereign to citizen, so there is no beadle. But, he hates theocracy also. As known the sovereign of theocracy country is only in scholar's hand. In other hand, democracy makes the sovereign of the leader is in citizen's hand. The citizen's duty is to watch the leader's doing. So, the leader is not authoritative. Then, in theocracy, the citizen has limited action to do. Because the super power to have sovereign is Allah. The form of Al-Maududi's country is theodemocracy or ideological country. Because, the ideology is Islam.

Here, some main principles of Mawdudi's theodemocratic system: (Nasr, 2009)

- The State must "be controlled and run exclusively by Muslims."
- Head of state, "the locus of all power and authority," must be a Muslim, adult male who has NOT actively sought the post.
- The Ruler should be the "best" (in terms of piety as well as competency) for the task.
- non-Muslims may hold non-sensitive posts, but must be "rigorously excluded from influencing policy decisions."
- Government must be managed through mutual consultation, the ruler is to be selected, appointed, or elected through a consultative process.
- How the leader is chosen may vary. "Islam does not limit the scope of its possibilities by attempting to lay down exactly how the choice of leader will be made."
- Legislature is a consultative body whose "opinions and judgments are not binding either upon the ruler or the people of the Islamic state." ("Complete power remains with the ruler.")
- because in a pious Islamic society matters would be resolved by consensus, there is "no provision of effective machinery for resolving conflict" in Mawdudi's state.

Moreover, to restore the unity and righteousness that existed at the time of the Rightly Guided Khalifs, four principles are needed:

1. Those who bear responsibility should face the representatives so the public and be accountable for what they do
2. The party system should be reformed to abolish loyalty to parties

3. The government should not operate with complex rules
4. The people elected to office should have the proper qualifications.

Mawdudi also talked about society (Nasr, 1994). The society according to Al-Maududi's thought is divided into two parts: 1. Moslem society 2. Non-Moslem society. Moslem society has full rights. They have the right to do their religious ritual, to be safe, and to be the leader of the government. It is different from non-moslem who has particular rights. They are free to do anything, including to do their religious ritual. But they can't get the position of the leader. They just get the position as the head of regency only. No more.

According to his teaching, society must be linked harmoniously to the Authority. The authority is divided into three categories:

1. Legislative : who makes the laws, Al-Maududi calls *ahlul halli wal 'aqdi*. The function of this authority :

- maintaining *Syari'ah* in form of laws and regulations.
- interpreting verses of the Koran and sunnah that have multiple meanings. To decide which one of the interpretations is better to be the law of the country.
- finding the laws from four main sources in a row: Koran, sunnah, Khulafaurrasyidin's convention, and fuqaha's instruction.
- if nothing is allowed to do *ijtihad* according to *syari'ah*.

2. Executive : who operate the laws, *khalifah*. The requirements of the leader : The person has to be from Moslem, Baligh, Having intellectual capability and not physical defect, and Fair.

3. Judikative : who watch the activity of the laws, *Qadli*.

Someone who wants to be the functionary of the government, having to be required of these : 1. Moslem, 2. Baligh 3. Wise 4. Having to be from Islamic country.

Mawdudi's theodemocracy is an ideological state in which legislators do not legislate, citizens only vote to reaffirm the permanent applicability of God's laws, women rarely venture outside their homes lest social discipline be disrupted, and non-Muslims are tolerated as foreign elements required to express their loyalty by means of paying a financial levy` (i.e. the *jizya*). The representatives of the people may be co-opted into the national assembly rather than elected, on the grounds that truly virtuous people will not always put themselves forward. (Choueiri, 1990: 111)

Mawdudi did not preach violence; on the contrary he argued that the goal of an Islamic state would be achieved by a steadfast process of proselytizing. To Mawdudi, fundamentalism was all about a practice of educating; he would write and give speeches, argue and persuade, and his followers would do the same. The process would be slow and tedious, but by this means, more and more believers would be converted, until everyone was in the fold. The Islamic state would then follow naturally. He told his followers in 1941, “we desire no demonstrations or agitations, no flag waving, slogans, or the like ... [for us] such display of uncontrolled emotions will prove deadly. ... You do not need to capture your audience through impassioned speeches. ... but you must kindle the light of Islam in your hearts, and change those around you.” There was more than a pinch of elitism here. Mawdudi wished first to convert the educated—professionals, bureaucrats, and intellectuals; the same class upon which Ataturk and Reza Shah had pinned their hopes. If the best and brightest converted to Mawdudi’s cause, then an Islamic state could not help but follow, he argued, as the educated elite would be running the state (Nasr, 2009).

His teaching was also not expressly antidemocratic. The Islamic state was not conceived of as a true democracy, but through tautological reasoning, Mawdudi and his followers did claim that their Islamic state would be democratic. If democracy is a cherished quality in a state, then the Islamic state must by definition have it too, so Mawdudi described his imaginary republic as a “theodemocracy” or a “democratic caliphate.” The state’s duty was not however to enact the will of its citizens but to make sure that its citizens followed religious dictates in their daily lives. Mawdudi assumed that this in itself would win the state popular support. After all, he argued, in a gemlike example of the closed-circuit rhetoric at which fundamentalists excel, if a state truly reflects God’s will and its citizens are good Muslims, then how could they possibly want otherwise or disagree with their rulers? If you offered sovereignty to the people, they would give it right back, assuming they had been properly educated in what is expected of them. Fundamentalism is therefore not, in its own mind, antidemocratic; it merely thinks democracy is irrelevant. Mawdudi doesn’t sound all that different from a million other revolutionaries—religious or secular—who have no use for democracy until everyone is properly (re)educated and therefore can be expected to vote the approved way (Nasr, 2009).

- It can be concluded from explanation above that Mawdudi’s theodemocracy is Islam-based political concept used as alternative for western democracy. Hence, does Indonesia embrace it? Although the first pillar of Pancasila says about Belief in the One and Only God, it is not a strong evidence that Indonesia is an Islamic country.

The founding fathers of this country intended the first pillar as the basis for religious country, to contradict with atheis country.

Pancasila Democracy ?!

Pancasila Democracy (democracy based on five basic pillars) was formally labeled under President Suharto in 1966 to 1998. It is inspired by the noble values of the Indonesian nation. Pancasila itself, which means the five principles, is the name given to the foundation of the Indonesian Republic. The five principles of Pancasila are Belief in the One and Only God; A Just and civilized humanity; the Unity of Indonesia; Democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations of representatives; and Social Justice for all the Indonesian people.

Pancasila Democracy is a system of government based on popular sovereignty. It is the people who determine the shape and content of the desired rule. Based on these meanings, it is clear that people are not objects, but subjects who could play an active role. For example, most Indonesians believe that the individual exists in the context of his family. And the family is the building block of society. There are cultural differences between Western and Indonesian societies and these differences influence their understanding of democracy. Meanwhile, Indonesians believe human beings should pursue balance between individual and communal interests. In the past, all aspects of the individual's life in Indonesia were regulated through structures and by coercive pressures, both formal and informal. In such a setting, organized opposition was not only out of place, but antisocial.

Pancasila itself, as a genuine ideologi, can be define as following: (Pilliang, 2010)

First Pillar : Deity

SecondPillar : Humanity

Third Pillar : Nationality

FourthPillar : Democracy

Fifth Pillar : Socialism.

Thus, Pancasila Democracy means democracy based on people's sovereignty, which is inspired by and integrated with the other principles of Pancasila. This means that the use of democratic rights should always be in line with the sense of responsibility towards God Almighty according to the respective faith; uphold human values in line with human dignity; guarantee and strengthen national unity; and be aimed at realizing social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.

In a democratic life based on Pancasila, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), being the highest state institution, has a very important role to play. As an institution, which fully exercises the sovereign rights of the Indonesian people, MPR should always reflect the aspirations and the wishes of the people with all its decisions or decrees. And as the holder of the highest power in the state, the Assembly appoints the President and Vice-President and determines the Guidelines of State Policy for implementation by the President. The House of Representatives (DPR), the members of which is from the people and is elected by the people, has the function of exercising control over the conduct of the administration by the President. The mechanism of this control by the House of Representatives constitutes a means to prevent constitutional deviation or deviations from the people's wish by the government.

The principle of the Pancasila democracy contained in the four precepts of Pancasila, namely democracy, led by the inner wisdom of deliberations of representatives. In this case, government policies and decisions should be based on consultation and consensus. In a democracy, said freedom is not foreign. Misinterpreted so much freedom causes anarchy, chaos, and conflict. Freedom in Pancasila democracy is the freedom that can be accounted for, freedom without disturbing the freedom of others. (Pilliang, 2010)

In addition, as a system of government, Pancasila democracy is a way of life or the way of life in the areas of government. Way of life is the way it deems appropriate in the implementation of the wheels of government to be orderly and safe and peaceful. Democracy as a way of life that both include the following:

1. Any opinion or differences of opinion on issues concerning the state or state of life issues and community settled by the state institutions that have been determined. In this case, how the problems of people's aspirations are accommodated by the government to look for a solution;
2. Dialogue or discussion. Characteristic of the state of democracy is open dialogue or discussion process for continuous exchange of ideas in the interest of the people. Discussion or dialogue can take the form of polemics.

Pancasila democracy is an ideal model for Indonesia since it is a mixture of Pancasila as an ideology or political belief and democracy as a system of government (Sriyono, 2013). According to the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, Indonesia is based on "democratic life led by the wisdom of thought in deliberation amongst representatives of the people." It means that in any decision-making process, the representatives should prioritize *musyawarah* (deliberation) to attain *mufakat* (agreement).

Through musyawarah, the people reach mufakat without opposing views clashing with one another, or resolutions and counter-resolutions that might be forced upon them by a majority vote. It comes rather through a persistent effort to find common ground in solving a problem. Voting is legitimate when common ground cannot be achieved.

Besides deliberation leading to consensus, the preamble prescribed four other guiding principles by which democracy was to be applied: belief in one supreme God; just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; and social justice for all Indonesians. Therefore, the decision-making process for public policy in Indonesia should be in line with the holistic approach of Pancasila.

It is almost certain that Indonesian democracy differs from liberal democracy. In terms of cultural origins, liberal democracy is rooted in Western culture while Indonesian democracy has its own roots that emphasized the harmony between individual and communal interests. Gotong royong (mutual cooperation) is one of the underpinnings of Indonesian society that has to be preserved.

The other difference relates to the role of religion vis-a-vis the state. All liberal democratic states are secular in nature. Indonesia is neither a theocratic nor a secular state. It believes that God Almighty is a spiritual guide who drives everyday life. As for social democracy, this system is relatively close to Pancasila democracy in terms of values. These two political ideologies are in the same camp in perceiving social justice and the role of the state in regulating economic and social life. When it comes to the issue of religion and the state, they have opposite views (Sriyono, 2013).

Most people are cynical of Pancasila democracy because in the past it was applied by an authoritarian regime. There was no genuine liberty and equality and the elites often showed little respect for human rights. It is unfortunate that for more than three decades this model was used by the elites as a vehicle for accumulating power. The paradox is that Pancasila democracy was manipulated by an authoritarian government.

However, still are there positive side about Pancasila Democracy. Syeikh Ali Zainuddin, a religious cleric from Lebanon, addressed his respect to Pancasila. "Pancasila is a living philosophy that serve as a guidance to live quite harmoniously for Indonesian people from various backgrounds, such as tribes, religions, cultures and languages" (Tribunnews, 2013). As we know, Lebanon is one of fragile countries in the world because of prolonged sectarian conflicts.

As a comparison, let us see what Japanese people did in pursuing their national philosophical ideology. The Japanese after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 asked themselves:

“Can we economically modernize without culturally Westernizing?” The Japanese said “YES – we shall seek Western techniques and maintain the Japanese spirit.” They retained Japanese tastes; and expanded their Western skills. Following the Second World War, they economically interlocked specifically with the American economy, even displacing American dominance in areas like the automobile industry – without giving up their Japanese spirit (Waswo, 1996).

CONCLUSION

There has been a consensus in Indonesia that after the end of New Order Era and the beginning of Reform Era this country has to strive to cristalize the form of democracy. However, still are there a great obstacle toward it. If the goals of democracy are the same while the means for achieving them differ, are there Indonesian means of achieving those same four goals of accountability of rulers, participation of the citizens, openness of the society and greater social justice?

As the biggest muslim country in the world, Indonesia would thus seem to prove that Islamic doctrine itself is not in contradiction with democracy. Instead, Muslims’ interpretation of Islamic doctrine and cultural heritage forms their views on the value of democracy and its relationship to Islam. Moreover, the existence of various models of democracy in Indonesia has given rise to an intellectual question on what kind of democracy is the best fit, whether to be combined with another ideology or to be “pure” a la western countries.

From the discourses above, it is important for this country to give more space to rejuvenate the position of Pancasila to fight extremism and terrorism. It is time to uphold a genuine Pancasila democracy for the betterment of the Indonesian people, not only due to historical stand point but also due to its values that have great philosophy to further discuss.

REFERENCES

Books:

- Birch, Anthony H. (2001). Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy , 2nd ed. London; New York, Routledge.
- Choueiri, Yousef. (1990). Islamic Fundamentalism, Boston, MA.

- Feldman, David. (1993). *Civil Liberties and Human Rights In England And Wales*. Oxford, England, Clarendon Press. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Halliday, F. (1995). *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (Chapter 4—Islam and the West: "Threat of Islam" or "Threat to Islam"?)*. London, I.B. Tauris.
- Hensley, Thomas R. ed. (2001). *The Boundaries of Freedom Of Expression & Order in American Democracy*. Kent, Ohio, Kent State University Press.
- Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. (1994). *Vanguard to the Islamic Revolution : the Jama`at-i Islami of Pakistan* . Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Nasr, Vali. (2009). *Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for Our World*, Free Press.
- Ruthven, Malise. 2002. *A Fury For God : the Islamist Attack on America*. London; New York, Granta.
- Waswo, Anne. (1996). *Modern Japanese Society*. Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press

Book Chapter:

- Piliang, Indra Jaya. (2010). *Demokrasi Pancasila dalam Budaya Politik dan Etika Politik*. In *Bahan Diklat Lemhanas*. The Indonesian Institute.

Journal Articles:

- Esposito, John L. (2000). *Political Islam and the West*. JFQ, Spring.
- Buehler, Michael. (2009). *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia*. *Insight Turkey*. Vol. 11 No. 4.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1993). *The Clash of Civilizations*. *Foreign Affair*. Summer. Vol. 72 No. 3.
- Jamal, Amaney A. (2006). *Reassessing Support for Islam and Democracy*. *World Affairs*. Fall. Vol. 169 No. 2.

Online Media:

- Kumoro, Bawono. 2013, May 13. *Indonesia, Islam and Democracy: Analysis*. www.gnfi.com.
- Sriyono, A. Agus. 2012, July 31. *Pancasila Democracy the Right Fit For Every One of Indonesia's 240m*. www.jakartaglobe.com.
- Tribunnews. 2011, May 10. *Pancasila Disukai Ulama Lebanon*. <http://www.tribunnews.com/2011/05/10/pancasila-disukai-ulama-lebanon>. Accessed on May 25, 2013.