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EFFENDI GAZALI



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Program Pasca Sarjana
Universitas Prof. Dr. Moestopo (Beragama)

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Kata Pengantar

Buku Ajar Komunikasi Politik

Sejak sangat muda saya sudah sangat tertarik pada Komunikasi Politik. Dalam bayangan saya sebagai seorang bocah sampai ke tingkat sekolah dasar, pasti ada seseorang atau sekelompok orang yang mengeluarkan aneka pernyataan setiap hari, sehingga begitu banyak anggota masyarakat berbuat seperti ini dan seperti itu. Ketika sampai di tingkat sekolah menengah pertama, baru saya tahu bahwa ada otoritas, atau ada orang-orang yang dipilih untuk menyatakan sesuatu. Di tingkat sekolah menengah atas, saya mulai mengintensifkan pergaulan dengan kalangan budaya. Saya mencipta puisi, komedi, dan berbagai pertunjukan seni. Sebagian besarnya sudah bernada kritis. Saya terpilih sebagai Ketua Majelis Perwakilan Kelas, semacam MPR yang mengawasi OSIS (Organisasi Siswa Intra Sekolah). Lalu juga menjadi juara lomba puisi dan lomba lawak tingkat umum se-Sumatera Barat. Seluruh karya itu menganalisis kenapa terjadi ini dan itu, lalu siapa yang bertanggung jawab terhadap semua itu. Serta sebaiknya atau alternatifnya harus bagaimana.

Saat lolos ke Departemen Ilmu Komunikasi FISIP UI, saya mulai menjadi koresponden Mingguan *Bola* yang masih menempel pada koran ternama *Kompas*. Pada ujung tahun pertama di bangku kuliah saya dibuatkan paspor untuk meliput Pekan Olahraga Mahasiswa Asean di Pattaya. Penulisan dan penugasan ini berlanjut sampai ke Piala Dunia (*World Cup*) Italia 1990 yang terkenal dengan sebutan “Italia Novanta”. Bersamaan dengan itu saya terus menulis mengenai masalah-masalah sosial

politik. Tahun 1987, saya mulai mengajar bersama denganDoktor Eduard Depari di Fakultas Ilmu Sosial-Ilmu Politik UPDM(B). Saya mengasuh beberapa mata kuliah komunikasi dengan status Asisten Dosen. Satu tahun selanjutnya saya mulai menulis Opini di Kompas. Pertama kali bersama Doktor Eduard Depari, dan setelah itu seorang diri. Mungkin belum ada orang yang membahas istilah “Komunikasi Politik” dalam artikel opini pada masa-masa awal tersebut.

Saat Revolusi 1998, kami sudah terlanjur di bangku pascasarjana. Tapi melihat semangat adik-adik di bawah kami, yang sering dilecehkan dengan sebutan “kaum amatir” sebagai lawan dari “politisi profesional” di DPR, MPR, atau bagian dari pemerintah yang berkuasa, maka kami membuat Forum Mahasiswa Pascasarjana Universitas Indonesia (Forum Wacana UI). Tidak tanggung-tanggung, saat menjadi Koordinator, saya langsung mengusulkan kami membuat sebuah Seminar Nasional di Salemba yang menghasilkan tuntutan “Laksanakan Sidang Istimewa MPR”!

Ternyata wadah ini membesar dan dibentuk di mana-mana sehingga hanya dalam hitungan bulan sudah berdiri Forum Wacana Indonesia. Terdapat beberapa nama aktivis dan akademisi menonjol di situ seperti Fadjoel Rachman, La Ode Ida, Satrio Arismunandar dan lain-lain. Tentu saja kelanjutan sejarahnya adalah gelombang gerak kekuatan mahasiswa Indonesia, dari aneka lapisan, yang menuntut dan membuat perubahan sejarah dengan lahirnya Orde Reformasi.

Melihat sebagian tugas lapangan, setidaknya beberapa *historical junctures*-nya sudah selesai, saya berusaha mengambil kesempatan melanjutkan kajian akademis di luar. Saya mendapat Beasiswa Fulbright ke Cornell University. Sambil memantapkan jenjang doktoral, saya memperoleh Beasiswa dari Cornell dan beberapa Foundation untuk menyelesaikan Master kedua di bidang International Development, suatu kajian penting menganalisis semua yang diberi label “Bantuan Internasional” atau “Kerjasama Internasional”. Profesor Michael Shapiro amat membantu saya memahami sisi psikologis dari tampilan media. Sementara Profesor Ronald Osman membantu mengasah ketajaman saya mengendus berbagai aspek tersembunyi dari Komunikasi Politik.

Setelah memperoleh Master (MPS ID) di Cornell, saya mendapat tawaran beasiswa dari pemerintah Belanda, untuk meneruskan disertasi doktoral di Nijmegen University. Untunglah Profesor Norman T. Uphoff (yang sangat terkenal dengan Teori “Working with People” sebagai lawan dari “Working for People”) dan Profesor Royal D. Colle (ahli Community-based Communication Center berbasis teknologi informasi), tetap bersedia dimasukkan ke dalam Anggota Komite Disertasi. Sehingga kelanjutan studi saya menjadi semacam “*join program*” dengan “*join PhD Committee Member*” antara Cornell University dan Nijmegen University.

Kenapa saya tergoda untuk melanjutkan ke Departemen Ilmu Komunikasi, Fakultas Ilmu Sosial, Nijmegen University? Tak lain karena di sana ada nama-nama teramat besar bagi saya yang bersedia bekerja bersama untuk menuntaskan disertasi saya. Ada nama Leen d’Haenens, yang tulisannya hingga kini terus

menggerakkan dunia ilmu komunikasi. Lalu Ed Hollander yang punya pengalaman mengajar serta meneliti di Indonesia. Dan di atas semua itu ada Maha Guru, Profesor Denis McQuail. Belasan bukunya menjadi buku teks wajib mahasiswa ilmu komunikasi di seluruh dunia, atau menjadi panduan bagi Dewan Pers serta Komisi Penyiaran di dunia untuk menilai Performa Media. Profesor Denis McQuail bersedia menjadi Penguji Utama disertasi saya. Saat itu beliau memang sedang banyak melakukan penelitian di Belanda.

Bersama dengan Profesor Uphoff, Cole, d'Haenens, Husken, dan Hollander sebagai pembimbing, terdapat pula nama Profesor K. Renkstorf (saat itu sebagai Ketua Asosiasi Ilmu Komunikasi Jerman) yang menjadi Promotor disertasi saya. Di kalangan penguji berkenan hadir nama besar Profesor Jo Bardoel (ahli jurnalistik dan media kontemporer), serta Profesor C. Hamelink (ahli media pergerakan *civil society*), keduanya dari Universiteit van Amsterdam.

Selesai Ph.D., saya pernah diminta menjadi konsultan untuk beberapa saat bagi Radio Free Asia melalui beberapa kali kunjungan ke Washington DC. Kemudian saya membuat Program TV Parodi Politik Pertama dalam sejarah televisi Indonesia, sebuah cita-cita saya sejak lama sekali. Waktu itu yang paling berjasa melahirkannya adalah teman-teman kreatif di stasiun TV Indosiar, di bawah Doddy Jufiprianto. Usaha mereka amat luar biasa, Republik BBM (Republik Benar-Benar Mabok) menjadi satu-satunya program TV Indonesia yang pernah memboyong *Asian Television Award*, tahun 2006, untuk kategori *talkshow*. Tentu saja keberanian dan keikhlasan pemilik stasiun TV kala itu

(antara lain, Handoko) merupakan prasyarat tersendiri pada masa tersebut.

Republik BBM berganti aneka nama dan terus menjelajah hampir semua stasiun TV. Bahkan “Republik Mimpi” versi Metro TV (terima kasih kepada Andi Noya, Makroen, Rachmayanto), menjadi acara TV pertama Indonesia yang didiskusikan di forum *Internasional Public Television (INPUT)*, May 2009. Dalam sistem INPUT, para kurator merekalah yang mencari program TV apa yang layak didiskusikan dalam konferensi internasional mereka. Lalu mereka mengadakan seleksi di Berlin dengan aneka pertimbangan. Produser dan bintang dari program yang terpilih diundang dan diminta mengadakan presentasi disaksikan para pakar dan praktisi televisi seluruh dunia. September 2009, Republik Mimpi menjadi “5 Besar Program TV Dunia” versi INPUT yang selanjutnya didiskusikan di Sydney.

Sebagai pembahas, saya terlibat di puluhan acara televisi, atau juga seminar-seminar, umumnya dengan tema atau titik singgung Komunikasi Politik. Untuk beberapa program saya bahkan menjadi pembaca acara, seperti “Negeri Setengah Demokrasi” (TV One), juga “Newsdotpol” (Inews) dan lain-lain. Kesempatan menulis di berbagai media, dan utamanya jurnal internasional, tetap saya upayakan. Antara lain di *Gazette, International Journal for Communication Studies; Communication; Javnost, the Public*; dan lain-lain.

Pada saat yang sama saya mencoba betul mewujudkan ilmu Komunikasi Politik sebagai sebuah upaya sistematis (*Action Research*), untuk menciptakan Sistem Politik yang Jernih, Adil

untuk Semua, serta Memiliki Kepastian. Tim Pascasarjana UI atau yang juga dikenal sebagai “*Salemba School*” saat itu (Profesor Harsono Suwardi, Profesor Dedy N. Hidayat, Profesor Sasa Djuarsa, Profesor Victor Menayang, Doktor Pinckey Triputra, Effendi Gazali, Suko Widodo, dan lain-lain), mengadakan penelitian dan diskusi di seluruh Indonesia untuk membahas dan memformulasi Undang-Undang Pers, Undang-Undang Penyiaran, Pemyiaran Publik, dan lain-lain.

Dalam konteks perbaikan riil Sistem Politik Indonesia (yang amat terkait dengan Komunikasi Politiknya), saya mengajukan *Judicial Review* ke Mahkamah Konstitusi beberapa kali. 10 Januari 2013, ditemani Wakil Kamal SH MH sebagai Kuasa Hukum, saya mengajukan *Judicial Review* untuk Sistem Pemilu Republik Indonesia. Sebagai sebuah negara dengan sistem presidensiil, harusnya pemilu presiden dilaksanakan lebih dulu, bukan sebaliknya. Jika terus terjadi seperti apa yang ada di Indonesia saat itu, maka yang kita alami adalah “Sistem Presidensiil Rasa Parlementer”. Saya meneliti 17 buku yang terkait dengan proses lahirnya UUD 1945 dan proses Amendemennya, untuk menemukan *Original Intent* UUD 1945, yakni Pemilu Serentak. Akhirnya Mahkamah Konstitusi mengabulkan, yaitu karena *Judicial Review* saya, maka seluruh Indonesia akan menjalani Pemilu Serentak sejak 17 April 2019. Keputusan Mahkamah Konstitusi keluar pada 23 Maret 2014.

Pada konteks Pemilu Kepala Daerah (Pilkada), saya kembali bersama Wakil Kamal SH MH juga mengajukan *Judicial Review*. Lama kami mencermati bagaimana menderitanya sebuah daerah atau Kepala Daerah yang berprestasi (seperti Bu Risma, walikota Surabaya), jika partai-partai politik yang tidak

suka kepadanya, bermuslihat tidak mengajukan lawan dalam pemilihan kepala daerah. Kalau itu terjadi maka Bu Risma, atau siapa saja, harus menunggu sampai pelaksanaan Pilkada selanjutnya. Artinya Pilkadaanya ditunda, dan bisa saja Kepala daerah itu harus turun lebih dahulu yang akan membuat popularitas serta kesukaan padanya melorot. Padahal kami beranggapan terlambatnya pembangunan di semua daerah Indonesia adalah kerugian kita semua secara nasional. Maka saya mengajukan Judicial Review 19 Agustus 2015 dan dikabulkan Mahkamah Konstitusi pada 29 September 2015. Artinya sejak saat itu, Pilkada kita di seluruh Indonesia mengenal apa yang dinamakan “Calon Tunggal” melawan “Kotak Kosong”.

Saya melakukan kajian sangat serius dan menjanjikan pada para Hakim Mahkamah Konstitusi bahwa tidak akan lama, jika seorang calon tidak baik namun memborong semua partai, maka Kotak Kosong akan menjadi pemenang!

Di lapangan empirik, saya dan tim Salemba School sering menjadi Konsultan Politik dalam pertarungan riil Pilkada. Kami menerapkan prinsip “kami yang memilih klien” bukan sebaliknya. Rekor kami pun sangat baik hingga hari ini.

Kenapa saya menceritakan semua ini, tak lain untuk memperlihatkan betapa saya percaya dan menganut aliran bahwa ilmu Komunikasi Politik itu memiliki begitu banyak bentuk, dimensi, dan lapangan. Sebut saja: lagu, puisi, komedi, pidato, kampanye, kongres, pemilihan umum, pendidikan politik, demonstrasi, organisasi masyarakat, *civil society*, olahraga, film, dan Anda bisa menyebut apa saja. Serta pada level meso tentu

kita harus membahas sistemnya. Dan di tingkat makro ada ideologinya serta aliran dan sebagainya.

Dalam berbagai hal, untuk keluasaan cara berpikir yang terintegrasi itu, saya adalah pengagum Denis McQuail, Shapiro, d'Haenens, Chaffee, Jamieson, Graber, dan lain-lain.

Selamat menjelajah dunia Ilmu Komunikasi Politik yang terus bergerak dinamis ini, dan di sana-sini diwarnai tempik sorak kemenangan tim kampanye, atau bisa juga keheningan mereka yang berdiam diri di pojok jalan dengan payung hitam menyerukan terinjaknya hak asasi manusia sejak begitu lama.

Alur Isi Buku

Buku ini akan berisi Kata Pengantar ini lalu diikuti dengan alur Bab sebagai berikut:

- Bab 1 akan memberikan pengantar tentang berbagai Definisi Komunikasi Politik.
- Bab 2 memperkenalkan Konteks Makro, Meso, dan Mikro sekaligus melihat Komunikasi Politik, Media, dan Demokrasi di dalam tiga tataran tersebut.
- Bab 3 menulik ke hal Mikro mengenai Periklanan Politik dan Kampanye beserta Lingkungannya.
- Bab 4 memperkenalkan dunia empirik lanjutan berupa Pemasaran Politik dan Kehumasan Politik.
- Bab 5 membahas bagaimana Komunikasi Politik bertumbuh di Indonesia bersama Media dan Demokrasi

dalam 3 Era: Orde Baru, Revolusi Mei 1998, dan Era Reformasi.

- Bab 6 menggagas Model (Ilmu) Komunikasi Politik berdasarkan Pengalaman Indonesia.
- Bab 7 menyambut Era Media Baru di Indonesia, yang kemudian disebut-sebut sebagai Demokrasi Media Sosial.

Bab 1

Definisi Komunikasi Politik

Apa definisi komunikasi politik?

Beberapa Guru Besar yang pernah saya dapat ilmunya atau pernah bekerjasama dengan saya, menyatakan tidak ada definisi komunikasi politik yang sangat komprehensif atau akan memenuhi harapan semua orang.

Yang paling klasik dan tersohor selama ini adalah Lasswell (1948), walau Chaffee (2001) kemudian melihat sebuah arah baru dengan munculnya media sosial. Tentu bagan seperti ini memerlukan diskusi serius bagi kita semua.

Between Political Communication & Politics of Communication

**Formula H.D. Laswell
(1948)**

*in L. Bryson "Communication
of Ideas"*

**Who Says What to Whom
in Which Channel with
What Effect**

Formula S. Chaffee (2001)
Political Communication,
18:237–244

**Who GETS to
say What to Whom
in Which Channel with
What Effect**

Bagan Elemen Dasar Definisi Komunikasi Politik

Sekarang kita bandingkan secara aktif dengan definisi klasik dari Politik

See what they said

Lasswell, Lazarsfeld, Berelson

- Laswell, 1936
- Politics: Who Gets What, When, How
- Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee, 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Gaudet, 1944: "molecularized" citizens embedded in close interpersonal networks where consensual opinions were shared.
- Klapper, 1960
- Berelson & Steiner, 1964
- "Theory of the MIDDLE RANGE"

Bagan definisi Politik, yang menyatakan bahwa apa yang diperoleh oleh siapa dan kapan serta dengan cara bagaimana, memerlukan semacam kontrak yang dibangun atas dasar jaringan-jaringan interpersonal di mana opini-opini yang disetujui bersama terbagi sedemikian rupa.

Jadi kalau begitu apakah realitas politik itu sesungguhnya?

so, what is
POLITICAL REALITY?

- A "FINISHED" ARTICULATION OF WHAT "REALLY" MATTERS IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS AT ANY GIVEN TIME
- Insert the events of political life, into NARRATIVE FRAMEWORKS which allow them to be told as news stories
- Not spring fully formed from the journalist pen, but DEVELOP OVER TIME in the interaction and competition between different news media, and between the various actors in, or sources of, a story.
- Over time, competing framework are narrowed down and eliminated until one DOMINANT FRAMEWORK remains.
- Although always subject to challenge and revision, the dominant framework, once established, provides the structure within which subsequent events are allocated news value, reported and MADE SENSE OF.
- BEING PUNDIT? The journalists must also be accepted by the political class, so that he or she can move among them, gather information –often in confidence- and make RELIABLE JUDGMENTS.

Bagan Realitas Politik

Dengan demikian, salah satu definisi Komunikasi Politik yang penting tampak dari apa yang disampaikan Graber & Smith. Graber adalah salah satu guru besar ilmu Komunikasi Politik yang mendapat ucapan khusus terima kasih atas segala pengorbanan waktu dan dedikasinya untuk ilmu ini bersama juga dengan Steven Chaffee sebelumnya.


*Thus, the definition should be quite
STRONG on the IMPACT*

- **The field of political communication encompasses the construction, sending, receiving, and processing of messages that **potentially have a significant direct or indirect impact on politics** (STATE OF THE ART IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION THEORY & RESEARCH, Graber & Smith, 2005)**
- The message senders or message receivers may be *politicians, journalists, members of interest groups, or private, unorganized citizens.*
- The key element is that the message has a significant political effect on the thinking, beliefs, and behaviors of individuals, groups, institutions, and whole societies and the environments in which they exist

Bagan Definisi Graber & Smith

Sebetulnya sekarang seluruh dari kita bisa membuat definisi ilmu Komunikasi Politiknya sendiri. Untuk membantu, kita bisa menggunakan bagan McNair tentang elemen-elemen yang mungkin masuk di dalamnya (buku McNair yang memperkenalkan ilmu ini telah dicetak hingga edisi ke sepuluh sebagai sebuah pengantar yang baik: 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011).

Element(s) of Political Communication (according to McNair, what about yours?)



Bagan McNair: Elemen-elemen Komunikasi Politik

Untuk menggambarkan kelengkapan definisi ini dengan ulasan-ulasan di dalam buku pengantar oleh McNair, maka dapat dikatakan McNair menyatakan bahwa hampir semua komunikasi politik dewasa ini terjadi di Era Bermedia. Atau komunikasi politik yang melalui media. Dengan itu McNair memulai analisisnya dengan mengajak kita semua

berpikir tentang Sistem Demokrasinya seperti apa; dan sistem tersebut terletak dalam Sistem Politik yang seperti apa pula.

Dan dalam konteks makro seperti itu, jika seseorang atau kelompok melakukan komunikasi, apakah akan ada dampak atau pengaruhnya (yang bisa saja sampai ke tataran makro, meso, atau bahkan mikro). Ketika komunikasi politik itu dilakukan melalui media, bisakah pula ternyata media merupakan salah satu tempat berpolitik atau bahkan aktor politik?

Bab 2

Komunikasi Politik dan Media

Ketika membahas Komunikasi Politik dan Media, jangan lupa meletakkannya selalu dalam konteks ketiga level Makro, Meso, dan Mikro. McNair misalnya memulai dengan mencari hubungan antara Politik, Media dan Demokrasi.

Relations among **POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, MEDIA**

- **Constitutionality**, Participation, Rational Choice
- (procedures, rules, elections, win, lose, informed electorate demanded by democracy, voting rights, the availability of choice, knowledgeable, educated citizenry)
- **MEDIA**: must inform, must educate, must provide a platform for public political discourse (facilitating the formation of public opinion), give publicity to governmental and political institutions (watchdog), must serve as a channel for the advocacy of political viewpoints.

Bagan McNair: Politik, Demokrasi, Media

Di dalam media sendiri, termasuk misalnya studi-studi Kepemilikan Media serta Interaksi di Ruang Redaksi, McNair membahas keterbatasan Obyektivitas di dalam media. Tentunya hal ini dapat selalu lebih dikembangkan dengan aneka keingintahuan atau niat riset yang unik.

LIMITATIONS OF OBJECTIVITY

- Media's political reportage is biased and flawed
- Subjective
- Partisan
- There are no objective standards here.
There are conventions (Lippmann, 1922, 1954)

Bagan McNair Keterbatasan Obyektivitas; tentu masih banyak yang bisa digali selain dua gejala dengan dua penyebab di atas.

Kenapa Media bisa pula menjadi sesuatu yang amat politis? Tak lain karena media dapat pula menjadi para Aktor Politik di luar fakta tentang kredo bahwa Media adalah Pilar Keempat Demokrasi sesudah Eksekutif, Legislatif, dan Yudikatif.

POLITICAL MEDIA

(even media are Actors too)

- Various processes of news-making and interpretation
- What the politician wishes to say is not necessarily what the media report him or her as HAVING SAID
- The relationship between the media and the political process is a dialectical one, involving action and reaction
- The media REPORT ON and ANALYSE POLITICAL ACTIVITY, but **THEY ARE ALSO PART OF IT**, available as A RESOURCE for POLITICAL ACTORS and THEIR ADVISERS
- Burke in Scannel & Cardiff (1991): "FOURTH ESTATE"?
- For the first media – the press – 'freedom' was founded on the principle of independent **economic organization**
- **Manufacturing concern?**

Bagan McNair tentang Kenapa & Bagaimana Media Menjadi Aktor Politik.

Secara khusus jika dibahas dalam dunia penyiaran, maka akan terdapat fenomena seperti ini (McNair utamanya banyak membahas Inggris dan Eropa Barat)

Broadcasting Environment

(case study on media being –so called- independent in Great Britain)

- The press has from the beginning functioned essentially as a set of capitalist business
- In Britain, broadcasting was conceived and born as a “utility to be developed as a national service in the public interest”.
- Too powerful, in fact, to be placed in the hands of un-trammelled commercial interests.
- Too powerful, also, to be left vulnerable to political abuse
- None of the parties in Britain’s multi-party democracy wished to permit the possibility of any of its rivals gaining control of broadcasting for the pursuit of its own interests.
- So, BBC is a publicly funded (from taxation, in the form of a license fee) but politically independent institution, protected from interference in its activities by the government of the day.
- Then the Independent Television Network came in 1974
- Legislation was passed to prohibit its output from being subjected to undue political or economic pressure

Bagan McNair tentang Lingkungan Broadcasting

McNair kemudian mencoba menawarkan berbagai cara untuk membuatnya menjadi lumayan berimbang.

(how to make it/ them)

BALANCED

- By 2003 British viewers had access to dozens of television channels, most of them financed by subscription revenues and advertising
- Digital TV was introduced in 1998
- The BBC took over digital terrestrial TV from ITV in 2002
- Then Britain was well on the way to becoming what America had already been for many years: a multi-channel broadcasting environment
- Unlike the press, British Broadcasting has always been subject to close regulation, both by legal means and through regulatory bodies such as the Independent Television Commission and the Broadcasting Standards Commission; ensuring that it is consistent with public service criteria such as good taste, diversity and, of particular relevance to "the Balance":
POLITICAL IMPARTIALITY.
- The 1990 Broadcasting Act requires broadcasters to observe "due impartiality" in their coverage of political issues, ensuring "adequate or appropriate" balance during and between election campaigns, for PARTY and NON-PARTY political actors.

Bagan McNair: Menyeimbangkan Dunia Penyiaran


McNair kemudian mencoba mengingatkan keseluruhan rangkaian terkait satu sama lain dari tingkatan Makro, Meso, dan Mikro ini pada Pendekatan Kritis, yang mencoba melihat Hegemoni di balik tampilan Media.

(bare in mind: the relations between)
THE MEDIA AND HEGEMONY

- When elites were successful in mobilizing consent, Gramsci referred to their **hegemonic position**, by which he meant that there was no need to protect the social structure by coercion and force of arms, but that citizens consented to the system and their place within it.
- The maintenance of hegemony was, a cultural process, in which the media played a great role.
- (when society is stratified along CLASS, GENDER, ETHNIC, and AGE lines <to name but four status criteria>, levels of education and rates of democratic participation are substantially lower than the theory of Liberal Democracy would seem to demand)
- (see Bobbio, Williams, Ericson et al.)


Bagan McNair: Media dan Hegemoni

Akhirnya Pendekatan McNair dapat digambarkan secara lebih komprehensif melalui bagan berikut ini, yang berupaya memperlihatkan Ruang Publik itu sebetulnya terdiri dari interaksi berbagai Pelaku dengan Produknya masing-masing.




Bagan Ruang Publik McNair


Saya pribadi mengembangkan beberapa model atau bagan berikut ini untuk memperlihatkan hal yang kurang lebih sama, dengan beberapa Elemen Utama (sebagian model dan bagan akan tampil dalam konteks historical juncture-nya pada Bab-bab berikutnya).



INTERPLAY(S) KOMUNIKASI POLITIK




(Gazali, 2010; Presentasi/Diskusi pada 2nd World Journalism Education Congress, Group "Ultimate Journalism Education", South Africa)



INTERPLAY OF RECENT "SOCIAL MEDIA DEMOCRACY"
IN INDONESIA (Gazali, 2014)

Menarik pula untuk melihat apa yang sangat terkenal di Eropa sebagai Studi atau Penelitian Serial MDM (Media Democracy Monitor) dalam bagan sebagai berikut.



Bagan Trappel dkk. , MDM Project, dilaksanakan di Eropa sejak 2008.

Bab 3
LEVEL MIKRO:

***Political Advertising &
Model of Campaign Environment***

Posisi Akademis : Action Research*

Komunikasi Politik



Tujuan:

1. Demi Kepentingan Publik
2. Mengurangi Ketidakpastian
3. Menunjukkan Arah
4. Melibatkan Publik
5. Merancang Makna Bersama
6. Memberikan Contoh / Teladan

Kata kunci:

purposeful, **have a significant direct or indirect impact on politics**, winning the hearts;
on constitutionality, well-informed citizen, political education / socialization,
voter education, co-creation,

3C: Consumerism - Celebrity - Cynicism, working with the people, good governance






ADVERTISING POWER (if there are some)

- TO INFORM
- TO PERSUADE
- Within (beware of) legal constraints of truth and taste, which vary from one country to another, the producers of political advertisements have the freedom to say what they like
- They can replace the journalist' agenda with their own
- They can play to their clients' strengths and highlight the opponents' weaknesses
- IN SHORT, it is the only mass media form over the construction of which the politician has complete control

UTILITY

- BY making commodities mean something to their prospective purchasers;
- By distinguishing one product from another, functionally similar one; and
- By doing this in a manner connecting with the desires of the consumer





IMPORTED

- The techniques developed in the US have been exported to many countries
- The air was filled not with substantive disputes but with SIMPLIFICATION, SLOGANEERING, and SLANDER
- SHRINKING SPOT (TIME SLOT, EXPENSE)
- THE RISE OF IMAGE (
 - Clinton: YOUTH, VIGOUR, RADICALISM
 - Reagan: NICE GUY, HANDSOME, CONGENIAL , FIRM and UNBENDING AGAINST THE ENEMIES OF FREEDOM
 - Carter: SELF-MADE SMALL BUSINESSMAN, INDEPENDENT OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT /CORRUPTION)
- MYTH & SYMBOL
- SIGNIFYING POWER

Apa yang HARUS DILAKUKAN

(a.l. Vraga, et.al. 2010; Dumitrescu, 2010; Ryan, 2010, Winter, 2008- all in Political Communication Vol. 27, 2010)

- KLAIM ELEKTABILITAS & DAERAH PSIKOLOGISNYA TERLEBIH DAHULU (Ganteng? Merakyat?)
- <ingat ini HORSE-RACES)
- RUMUS TEORI-TEORI PUBLIC RELATIONS & OPINION termutakhir adalah TEORI **CO-CREATION**
- CIPTAKAN SATU ATAU DUA SIMBOL yang MEMORABLE!



3 macam IKLAN/KAMPANYE POLITIK (Bartels, 1998; Jamieson, 2003)

1. **IKLAN ADVOKASI KANDIDAT**: memuji-muji (kualifikasi) seorang calon; pendekatannya bisa: retrospective policy-satisfaction (pujian atas prestasi masa lalu kandidat), atau benevolent-leader appeals (kandidat memang bermaksud baik, bisa dipercaya, dan mengidentifikasi diri selalu bersama/menjadi bagian pemilih)
 - Bedakan dengan **IKLAN ADVOKASI ISU**: dipasang oleh pihak independen untuk menyampaikan isu-isu penting (lingkungan hidup, pengangguran dll) yang diarahkan pada satu atau beberapa iklan atau ungkapan-ungkapan kampanye dari satu atau beberapa kandidat.
2. **IKLAN MENYERANG (ATTACKING)**: berfokus pada kegagalan dan masa lalu yang jelek dari Kompetitor; pendekatannya bisa Ritualistic (mengikuti alur permainan lawannya, ketika diserang, akan balik menyerang)
 - **IKLAN MEMPERBANDINGKAN (CONTRASTING)**: menyerang tapi dengan membandingkan data tentang kualitas, rekam jejak, dan proposal antar-Kandidat

7 alasan mengapa Attacking /Contrasting Campaign bermanfaat

- Finkel & Geer (1998), *A Spot Check: Casting Doubt on the Demobilizing Effect of Attack Advertising* dalam American Journal of Political Science 42: 573-95:
1. Terdapat Learning Effect: Proses Pembelajaran bagi masyarakat (Voters Education)
 2. Mengomunikasikan lebih banyak informasi tentang kebijakan yang akan dilakukan kandidat
 3. Lebih mengejutkan karena tidak normatif
 4. Menawarkan perbedaan antara satu kandidat dengan lainnya
 5. Menimbulkan respon afektif yang lebih besar
 6. Mendorong entusiasme untuk datang ke TPS
 7. Meningkatkan kapasitas untuk di-recall (dikeluarkan) kembali dari memori

Debat/ Attacking/ Comparing

- Sangat perlu bagi Challenger
- Sangat cocok untuk yang lebih Energik
- Harus Kelihatan Siap & Sigap
- Data Akurat
- Ungkapan Pendek, Tajam, Elegan
- TWISTING
- Menjawab secara Mengejutkan Apa yang Sudah Diributkan di Luar Arena
- Seakan Berbicara pada Penonton di Tempat Debat dan Di Manapun Dapat Disaksikan
- Luar Biasa Jika Ada Sambutan Spontan
- Jaga Make Up dan Mimik Antusias
- Berbicara dengan Sikap Seorang Pemenang (The Winner)
- Debat juga Entertainment

Mari kita luruskan beberapa definisi kita:

- Kampanye/Strategi/ Iklan (dalam pemilu) terbagi dua: POSITIF dan

KAMPANYE/ IKLAN NEGATIF:

Jamieson, *"Everything You Think You Know About Politics and Why You Are Wrong"* (2003); Bartels & Princeton University (1998):

Kalau ia bersifat:

- **NASTY**: berselera rendah, tak ada hubungannya dengan kemampuan memerintah
- **INACCURATE**: data tidak akurat
- **UNFAIR**: membayangkan sesuatu di masa depan yang tidak punya dasar atau belum terbukti

Contoh kasus: Attacking for Attacking only

- Jangan Pilih Bupati X,
Putrinya terlibat Video Porno, Putranya Terlibat Narkoba
- Jangan Pilih Bupati X
Guru-guru telah ditipunya, diberikan angsuran motor senilai total 18 juta, padahal fakturnya cuma Rp 3.600.000
- Jangan Pilih Bupati X
Banyak sekali kontraktor yang belum dibayarnya!

Contoh Kasus:
CONTRASTING: PERBANDINGAN
yang ELEGAN

Para Guru akan Memilih Pak X....
Keluarganya Bersih tidak ada yang
terlibat Narkoba dan Pornografi!
Hanya kalau pemimpin bisa memimpin
keluarganya sendiri, ia akan mampu
memimpin kabupaten kita!

Para Guru akan Memilih Pak X...
Dia akan meningkatkan insentif guru dan
memberikan motor dinas dengan
harga sesuai faktur (tidak
dimanipulasi)



CONTRASTING: PERBANDINGAN
yang ELEGAN

SELAMAT TINGGAL MASA
DUKA
Jangan Ada Dusta Di antara
Kita,
Jangan lagi ada Pemimpin yang
tersenyum di atas
penderitaan para kontraktor,
Mari pilih Bapak X....



Contoh SUBSTANSI yang FOKUS



- HEALTH CARE PLAN
- Pemerintah mewajibkan Perusahaan melindungi segenap karyawannya dengan asuransi kesehatan yang memadai; di luar karyawan Pemerintah akan menjamin terdapatnya sistem perpajakan yang memungkinkan terdapatnya dana untuk asuransi kesehatan bagi warga biasa



- Ngapain pemerintah mewajibkan dan punya mandat semacam itu?
- Kita beri saja masing-masing orang uang di bank senilai US \$ 5,000, nanti terserah mau dibelikan asuransi di mana, bahkan kalau ada lebihnya, kan uangnya bisa diambil
- Kalau apa-apa dipajakin, usaha kecil dan menengah mati dong, Anda ini memang SOSIALIS yang mendistribusikan kesejahteraan

Contoh SUBSTANSI YANG FOKUS

- Tidak benar dong!
- Kalau orang kecelakaan, kakinya retak sebelah, biayanya kan bisa sampai US \$ 15,000 darimana nomboknya?
- Kalau disuruh beli sendiri, pasti ada yang curang, menjual dari negara-negara bagian lain dengan harga murah tapi tidak jelas servis-nya
- Begini saja:
dengan HEALTH CARE PLAN saya:
Rakyat Amerika akan menikmati pelayanan kesehatan yang persis sama dengan yang dinikmati Anggota Kongres di Washington DC; Yang dinikmati oleh saya maupun Senator McCain



Bab 4
Political Public Relations (PR)
&
Political Marketing

POLITICAL PR & POLITICAL MARKETING

- Political Marketing 1960s; Philip Kotler (1975)
- In practical terms, Political Marketing is viewed as the strategic importation of theories, concepts, and tools by political organizations in response to a range of social trends. Marketing, it can be argued, provides the tools that may fill the engagement and loyalty gap left by the weakening of ideological attachment to parties.
- Political marketing is underpinned by a theoretical conceptualization of the voter as a consumer: an individualistic and rational entity that makes voter choices based on economic equations (Curtice, 2001).

3 Orientations POLITICAL MARKETING


- Party Behavior Modeling (1970s; Abraham Shama, 1976)
- Political Parties as production, sales, or market oriented and linked to each of these models different modes of communication
- PRODUCTION ORIENTED CANDIDATES & PARTIES would seek exposure through persuasive communication: resulted in a propaganda communicational style
- SALES ORIENTED CANDIDATES & PARTIES would employ more media management and would use the tools of advertising and PR to convince voters, and communication would be targeted and underpinned by rigorous market research
- MARKET ORIENTED CANDIDATES & PARTIES would adopt a more expansive communication mode. Market research would inform product design as well as the design of all communication. Internal communication among members, loyal supporters, affiliates, and donors would refine policy and allow for strategic positioning vis-a-vis key market segments.

3 INTERRELATED STREAMS OF THOUGHT WITHIN PR

- GRUNIGIAN paradigm stresses the importance of communication enhancing mutual benefit for both an organization and its publics. The use of two-way symmetrical communication plays the key role in encouraging understanding, and subsequently mutual benefit.
- THE RELATIONAL APPROACH goes a stage further and focuses on the building of strong relationships with a limited number of key stakeholders
- THE THIRD STREAM, closely related to the relational approach, is that the aim of such PR is reputation management. Here the focus is on identifying, amending, and changing the reputation of an organization (Griffin, 2008)

- While critiques stand, Political Marketing is more conventionally used to explain and model the behavior of parties and candidates in the process of striving to win elections.
- Stromback, Mitrook, Kioussis (2010) suggested that Political Marketing suffers from a lack of detail understanding of PR. Moreover, by referring to “spin” (Jones, 2001; Scammell, 2001a), Political PR is given a slight sense of the sinister, and Scammell (2003) suggests it has been viewed as “ugly”.
- This essentially negative view of public relations implies that it is a process by which the message that voters receive becomes “packages” for consumption. Political Marketing reinforces this negative perspective, due to its conflation with consumption and communication.

The Lees-Marshment model



RELATIONSHIP

- Whereas the target audience of marketing is essentially groups of customers within market (Fill, 2009), PR, it has been argued, has a wider audience, namely PUBLICS (L'Etang, 2008).
- KOTLER & MINDAK (1978): Best known attempt to conceptualize the relationship between Marketing & PR: 5 DIFFERENT MODELS: HOW PR & MARKETING OPERATE TOGETHER WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION
 - SEPARATE BUT EQUAL FUNCTIONS
 - EQUAL BUT OVERLAPPING FUNCTIONS
 - MARKETING AS THE DOMINANT FUNCTION
 - PR AS THE DOMINANT FUNCTION
 - PR & MARKETING AS THE SAME FUNCTION
- (They suggest that NO single model will be appropriate for all organizations, but that the two functions will have to evolve due to external pressures, and that eventually they will converge)

So,

- Political Marketing has conflated the need for gaining visibility through PR activities, and as a consequence Political Marketing approaches focus on media management and gaining hype by being “LOUD”. This reflects a transactional approach to marketing, which requires “LOUDNESS” in marketing communications to gain attention. The volume may be targeted at key voters, but is more akin to SHORT-TERM persuasion to commit a single action than creating LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIPS: Bannon’s metaphor (2005) of the ONE-NIGHTSTAND as opposed to a COURTSHIP seems to describe the predominating political strategy.
- SUGGESTING 2 alternative approaches to marketing exist:
- RELATIONSHIP MARKETING implies a longer-term contact using both indirect and more importantly direct communication channels, and with a strategy designed to encourage longer-term support as opposed to winning votes at one moment in time.
- EXPERIENTIAL MARKETING focuses on how the citizen voter does not just buy into a political product, but interacts with a party, government, as well as an election or political campaign. Therefore, viewing POLITICAL PR merely as a means of gaining media coverage is a partial and erroneous approach

So,

- SUGGESTING that Political PR, rather than being “ugly”, is potentially actually “HANDSOME”.
- The key factor for determining if it is ugly or handsome is whether PR is used in a narrow and tactical media management sense, or as a much wider strategic tool following the definition suggested by Stromback and Kiousis.
- Political Marketing’s reliance on MARKETING PUBLIC RELATIONS (MPR) is what makes it ugly, the application of CORPORATE PUBLIC RELATIONS (CPR) adds significantly to a political marketing communication perspective.

RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT	POLITICAL PR
FOCUS ON BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS WITH KEY STAKEHOLDER GROUPS	IDEM
MIMIC all (the 4) STEP MANAGEMENT PROCESS)	IDEM
Identifies jointly held interest and goals as the basis for relationship	Market-oriented Political PR identifies what stakeholders want and offer it
Seeks to build lasting relationships that are mutually satisfying	Market-oriented Political PR employs short-term strategies to reach the limited goal of winning an election
More likely to result in a SHARING of power, access, and community support	Is about CONTROLLING power
Is inexorably linked to building enduring relationships	Product-oriented parties have a mantra (cut taxes, smaller government, reduce benefits) driven not by the electorate, but by a rigid ideology. In practice, market-oriented parties may in fact be far less flexible than are most market-oriented organizations
	Firmly fixed on the gaining of power

RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT	POLITICAL PR
FOCUS ON BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS WITH KEY STAKEHOLDER GROUPS	IDEM
MIMIC all (the 4) STEP MANAGEMENT PROCESS)	IDEM
INTENT, EXCHANGES, PROCESSES can be strikingly different, primarily because the locus of each is different. THE LOCUS (by definition & emerging practice) is RELATIONSHIP	THE LOCUS: partly by definition but even more practice: POWER & STABILITY
(Effective RM) RESULT IN A QUALITY RELATIONSHIP	RESULT IN GAINING OR MAINTAINING POWER WITHIN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
SEEK MUTUALITY	SEEK VICTORY
Philosophically, SEEK BALANCE	SEEK DOMINANCE
SEEN in the QUALITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP	SEEN in BEHAVIOR, including VOTER REGISTRATION, DONATIONS, and VOTING

Bab 5

Political Communication in Indonesia: Revisiting the Media Performance in Three Eras

1. Introduction

Data on political communication research in Indonesia in the past two decades have rarely been recorded. This might be associated with some basic problems in the academic environment as well as in the development and practices of the political and communication systems in the country. In the academic environment, both communication and political scholars in Indonesia have continually struggled to establish their own boundaries and methods, in order to gain more acknowledgement as scientific fields (for a full description, see Dahlan, 1990). They have also struggled to establish departments, generally in the faculties of social and political sciences. For example, out of the forty-eight main state universities in Indonesia, only thirteen universities have an undergraduate communication program, compared to thirty-nine for management (PPSPMB, 2003). Besides, a special forum (division) for scholars from communication and/or politics, that would help accelerate development of political communication field (see Ryfe, 2001, p. 408), is not in place yet. Neither the Association of Indonesian Communication Scholars (ISKI) nor the Association of Indonesian Political Scholars (AIPi) has a political communication division.


Parallel to those situations, the Soeharto Regime (1966 to 1998, better known as the “New Order Regime”) put into place a systematic and comprehensive strategy to ensure that the political and communication systems functioned as a control instrument of power (see Haris, 2004; Gazali, 2002; Hidayat, et al., 2000). Under these circumstances, all research plans had to be submitted for approval to

several Government offices. The Government ensured that no research interests posed a threat to the political stability.

From mid-1997 to May 1998, a chapter of Indonesian history was written that some analysts called, “a fascinating chapter in Indonesia’s media history” (Cohen, 1998). The mounting demonstrations by students and activists, simultaneous with the ailing economy (Indonesia was hardest hit by the Asian economic crisis) and the changing attitudes of certain media to the fight against Government control, finally forced Soeharto to step down on May 21, 1998. Afterwards, Indonesia entered the so-called “Era Reformasi” (the Reform Era) characterized by a freer political and communication environment. Certainly, it was expected that the new climate in this new era would stimulate enthusiasm among scholars to conduct political communication research.

This chapter examines what has been done in political communication research in Indonesia during and concerning three periods, i.e. the Soeharto Era (New Order Regime, especially from 1984 to April 1998), the May 1998 Revolution when the peak of the so-called “Indonesian Revolution” took place, and the Reform Era (after May 21, 1998, until the present day). The authors use the historical narrative and develop the triangle of Media Performance Model (as exemplified in the works by McQuail 1992; Hidayat & Sendjaja, 2002; and Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2004) as an analysis tool for documenting and examining the functioning of the media in each period. This triangle is built up by four power entities, i.e. the Government, Market, and Civil Society, and in the middle position the Media themselves (see Figure 1). We have to note that a strong awareness of, and sensitivity to, external pressures and demands has been reported in many accounts of the media at work (McQuail, 1992, p. 82).

Figure 1: Media Performance Model



At the same time, within each (f)actor, according to Golding and Murdock, 1991, p.19; see also Cottle, 2004, p.5), there is a constant interplay between structure and agency, which constrain as well as facilitate, impose limits on as well as offer opportunities to each other. The term “structure” may be seen as including resources and regulations (Giddens, 1984, p.17). The term “agency,” in general, refers to social actions carried out by social actors, either as individuals or as a group. It can also refer to social actions of human agents in a broader sense, not only individuals, but also including organized groups, organizations, and the state (Burns, 1986, p. 9). The results of interplay within each (f)actor will inevitably have an impact upon the interplay or power relations among those four elements and vice versa. We will mark the resulting tendencies in each era (as put together in Figure 2) and relate them to strands of concrete research interests that have arisen within each period. Using this model could

also help to evaluate the contributions and limitations of past studies with respect to certain elements of the model, as well as helping to provide directions for future research.

The data on political communication research were collected from the research collections of the faculties of social and political sciences, and the faculty of communication, at four main state-universities, i.e. the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, Padjadjaran University in Bandung (West Java), GajahMada University in Yogyakarta (Central Java), and Airlangga University in Surabaya (East Java). A panel of experts, consisting of seven senior researchers from those universities, was formed for the purpose of categorizing research that fits into the political communication area.²

2. Indonesia under the Soeharto Regime

The Soeharto Regime came to power in 1966 after ousting Soekarno, a left-leaning nationalist President. Soekarno's policies left the country with a negative growth rate, 600 percent inflation, no foreign reserves to speak of, and a national debt of over US\$ 2 billion (see e.g., Vatikiotis, 1994). The Soekarno Regime was also characterized by unstable administration with constant changes in cabinets. In dealing with these problems, Soeharto's economic advisors and technocrats sought to build and restructure political mechanisms that aimed primarily at achieving political stability, and were believed to improve economic life (Moertopo, 1974; Mas'oed, 1989). This plan was then promoted to the international world, especially the anti-communist Western states, as a way of gaining support and attracting foreign investment.

There is no doubt that until the economic crisis of 1997-98, the Soeharto Regime had succeeded in transforming the country from what has been characterized by Higgins as "the number one economic

failure among the major underdeveloped countries" (Higgins, 1968, p.678), to an economy that was held up as a model of Third World development. Over the span of the New Order's first five five-year plans (from 1969 to 1994), the GDP expanded on average 6.8 percent annually; even in the aftermath of declining hydrocarbon prices in the early 1980s, annual average GDP growth accelerated from 6.1 percent (from 1980 to 1990) to 7.6 percent (from 1990 to 1995), while the annual average population growth fell to 1.8 percent (Booth, quoted in Emmerson, 1999, p.113). Such achievements led the World Bank in 1993 to place Indonesia in the same category with South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Thailand, as high-performing economies responsible for the "East Asian miracle of rapid growth and declining inequality" (World Bank, 1993; pp. 1-3; see also Schlosstein, 1991).

In practice, such a success heavily depended on a systematic and comprehensive strategy to ensure that the political and communication systems functioned as a control of power. In the beginning of 1973, outside the ruling party, Golongan Karya (Functional Group or Golkar), all parties were forced to merge into two parties, namely the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party or PDI) and the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party or PPP). Those parties and any mass organizations were required to adopt the Pancasila (Five Pillars) as their sole ideology. The Government then developed an election format that served only to demonstrate the power of Golkar and its domination (Haris in Antlov & Cederroth, 2004). The parliaments elected under the New Order did not function as legislative bodies, conduits for popular aspirations or as a "checks and balances" mechanism for the executive branch. On the contrary, as Haris (2004, p. 34) writes: "(...) By means of various policies and mechanisms, such as screening, political development, special examination and recalling, the Government was fully capable of controlling the House."

3. The Shape of the Media Industry During the Soeharto Era

The media industry during the Soeharto era had two faces. Its first face was shaped markedly by the dynamics of Soeharto's market economy. Rapid economic growth during the Soeharto period brought into being a new middle class with relatively higher education and income levels. This meant greater opportunity for the media to find large audiences with purchasing power. The expansion of the economy also led to the growth of the advertising industry and of advertising expenditures. Transnational advertising agencies arrived *en masse* during the 1970s.³ This in turn created a greater opportunity for the Indonesian media industry to become profitable by selling access to audiences to producers in various industrial sectors.

The commercialization of the media industry was also marked by the transformation of the Indonesian press from "political press" to "industrial press." Previously, during Soekarno's "Guided Democracy" period, the press was defined as a "tool of the Revolution," responsible for energizing and mobilizing public opinion (see Hill, 1994, p. 14). In addition, most of the press aligned their editorial policies with particular politicized segments of the population. Under the Soeharto Regime, except for a few newspapers, most media aimed at achieving a broad readership across social, cultural and political distinctions, in order to have as large a circulation as possible and hence attract more advertisers. The opportunity for such a transformation was made possible by the annulment of a regulation stipulating that all newspapers had to be affiliated with a political party or mass organization of their choice.

Nonetheless, the media had always been defined by the Soeharto Regime as a "partner in development," and while pursuing commercial success, the Indonesian press was declared "free but responsible," in contrast to the presumed irresponsibility of the liberal

Western press. This was the second face of the media industry during the Soeharto era that affected almost all aspects of the functioning of the press. The Government controlled -- preventively and correctively -- the ownership of media institutions, through the issuance of printing licenses (SIT), which later became licenses for publishing print media (SIUPP). These licenses were issued primarily on the basis of political criteria. Journalists were required to join the one and only journalists' organization allowed at the time. Chief editors had to attend courses on state ideology that were in fact part of an indoctrination process. The Soeharto Regime, through the Ministry of Information, monitored closely the production of news texts, among others by means of the so-called "telephone culture": one call from the Government official was enough to nip any potential revelation in the bud. The Government also forbade press coverage of opposition leaders. It even went further by controlling paper supplies (see Hidayat et al., 2000, p.6; Gazali, 2002, p. 122).

In the broadcasting sector, the appointment of individuals for certain positions in the Government-owned media, RRI (Radio of the Republic of Indonesia; established in 1945) and TVRI (Television of the Republic of Indonesia; established in 1962) was fully in the hands of the Government. Only after twenty-five years of TVRI monopoly, the first commercial TV station, RCTI (Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia), was allowed to operate in Indonesia. It was then followed by SCTV (Surya Citra Televisi, 1990), TPI (Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia, 1990), ANteve (Cakrawala Andalas Televisi, 1993), and IVM (Indosiar Visual Mandiri, 1995). All commercial TV stations were under the control of giant business enterprises owned by Soeharto's family members and their cronies (for a full description, see d'Haenens et al., 2000, p. 197-232). The commercial radio landscape was slightly different from that of the television industry. After 1970 local commercial radio stations operated in many large cities; the licenses for those radio stations were granted to those whose loyalties to the Ministry of Information branch,

or to local Government, was unquestionable. Both commercial TV and radio stations were not allowed to produce their own news programming and had to resort to packaging news items into something like features or soft news. In addition, they had to relay the news from the state-owned stations. Commercial radio stations had to relay RRI news up to eighteen times a day, or almost every hour, while commercial TV stations had to relay two TVRI news programs daily (see Gazali & Menayang, 2002).

There were two contradictory features worth noting about the shape of the media industry during the Soeharto era. First, in line with the open market strategy, the “open sky policy” was announced by the regime in the 1990s, that allowed domestic companies to distribute foreign television direct broadcasts. Government Regulation No.20, of June 1994, also included the mass media sector among previously off-limits sectors to be opened to foreign investment and majority ownership. However, Harmoko, then Minister of Information, sharply criticized the regulation, asserting that it contradicted the 1966 Press Act, which explicitly prohibited any kind of foreign investment in the press industry. Harmoko -- himself the owner of the second largest daily newspaper in the country, *Pos Kota*, and a significant shareholder in various print media -- declared that irrespective of the regulation he had the full support from the President in keeping foreign investment out of the press industry.

Second, the pattern of vertical integration between private media and the ruling regime was a rare phenomenon in the world’s market economies. In neighboring Southeast Asian countries, e.g., Singapore and Malaysia, the media were under state-controlled holding companies; but in the Indonesian case, it was the individual members of the ruling elite and their cronies who personally owned the media as part of their business empires.⁴

4. Press Freedom

The power over licensing was clearly an effective instrument of power to control dissenting views and to promote Soeharto's pragmatic and ideological interests in the media sector. There was a long record of press crackdowns during the Soeharto era. There were at least two cases of wholesale mass media banning. The first occurred in January 1974, when thirteen newspapers and news magazines were shut down following student demonstrations and riots in major cities. Encouraged by the scale of demonstrations and riots, the press gave heavy coverage and editorial support to the protests.

The second series of multiple bans took place in 1978, when further anti-Government student protests, which were sweeping through the main campuses since 1977, were again reported extensively. The First Family was specifically targeted by the students; there were even calls for Soeharto to step down. The Soeharto Regime finally responded in January 1978 by banning seven Jakarta dailies and seven student newspapers. These bans preceded the disbanding of all student councils, the arrest of some 200 students, and the military occupation of several key campuses in Jakarta, Bandung, and Yogyakarta. Unlike 1974 when the bans were permanent, in 1978 all of the banned commercial publications were back on the streets within weeks, except some of the student newspapers.

In addition to the multiple bans, there were also sporadic bans of individual publications. In April 1981, for instance, *Jurnal Ekuin* (a specialized magazine on economy, finance, and industry) was shut down after it reported an impending reduction in the Government's floor price for oil exports. On October 9, 1986, *Sinar Harapan*, an evening newspaper, had its publication permit withdrawn over commentaries on the Soeharto Regime's economic policies. In June

1994, in the midst of increasing public demand for more democracy and freer press, three major weekly magazines (*Tempo*, *DeTik*, and *Editor*) were closed down. The reason seems to have been that the magazines had been pursuing, to the embarrassment of the Government, a conflict that had arisen between two of its ministers. One, the minister for science and technology, B.J. Habibie, had close links with Germany and had been the prime mover in the purchase by Indonesia of thirty-nine warships, formerly belonging to the East German Navy. The other, the finance minister, Marie Mohammad, had been critical of the purchase.

In some situations, however, the limits on what could be published were ill defined, and were also a function of Soeharto's "ideological maturation." For instance, in 1983, *Ekspo*, a news magazine, lost its publication permit for publishing a report on "Indonesia's 100 millionaires," a list that included an embarrassing number of Soeharto's family members and cronies. But by the 1990s, when the Soeharto Regime's attitude and behavior towards capitalism had become "more mature," and when the authorities perceived that it was no longer politically embarrassing to become exceptionally rich, such listings had become common in the media.

Yet, this was not the case when it came to the issue of SARA, which stands for "Ethnicity, Religion, Race, and Groups with differing affiliations and backgrounds" ("Suku, Agama, Ras, dan Antar Golongan"). Until the end of the New Order Era, the Government never allowed any media to explore or discuss openly any case related to SARA. What exactly constituted the limitations was ill defined. The main reason was that all elements of society were to uphold the nation's principle of "Diversity in Unity" ("Bhinneka Tunggal Ika"). For the media, it meant that all differences should be swept under the carpet; what should be promoted and brought into the media was "unity" only. On the other hand, when the Government faced

problems rooted in different political views, usually concerning certain radical Muslim groups and violent riots, the Government quickly labeled those problems as SARA conflicts, generally by announcing that the conflict was between the indigenous people and those of Chinese descent, or between Muslims and Christians.⁵

At the same time, a group of individuals in the inner circle of the Soeharto Regime, guided by their own perception of existing socio-ideological conditions, subjectively defined the limits of press freedom. Accordingly, in addition to the dependence on Government-owned media and other Government sources, Indonesian journalists had to rely on their skill to report politically sensitive news that maximized sales and minimized the risk of closure. According to one senior journalist, this meant, on the one hand, that editors had to develop “sensitivity to the Government’s approval and disapproval conveyed through an intricate and culturally conditioned network of subtle gestures and signals” (Makarim, 1978, p.279), while remaining sensitive to the market’s demand for critical reporting.

Such a constraining media structure produced a type of journalism that was very cautious, exercising self-censorship, avoiding direct criticism, resorting to what has been described by the chief editor of the banned *Indonesia Raya* as, “very subtle allusions to avoid hurting anyone’s feelings, having to be like a snake, circling round and round without ever striking the target” (Lubis, as quoted in Hill, 1994, p.47). Headlines never focused on negatives; criticisms were rarely written in the active voice, and the circumlocutory passive form of speech disguised disapproval (Hill, 1994, p.47). A unique form for criticizing the Government, namely “criticism by praise,” was also common in the Indonesian press during the Soeharto period (Flournoy, 1992, p.2).

On the part of media audiences, interpreting such news reports required a skill for reading between the lines (or for “reading between the lies,” as former editor of the banned *Sinar Harapan*, Aristides Katoppo, claimed). Such skill seemed to have been widely learned by the media-consuming public in the country. In many situations, such a skill was “improved” by political instinct, beliefs, suspicion of Government sources, and background information.

5. Research Interests During the Soeharto Era

This section deals with research interests that surfaced after assessment of the data on political communication research carried out at four main universities in Indonesia, from January 1984 to April 1998, a month before Soeharto was forced to resign. One might expect that any dictatorship might offer a challenging ground for political communication research. As a matter of fact, in Indonesia’s case, it could not be cultivated to the fullest extent due to the severe constraints imposed by Soeharto Regime. Even if there were some grounds for research, their aims and scope would be primarily “administrative research” (see Smythe & Dinh, 1983, Dhakidae, 2003), or to the limit described in Chaffee’s words (2001), “(...) [research that] approached political communication practices with a critical eye, [but the] main goal was to understand and explain existing institutions, not to reform them” (p.239). Dahlan (1990) also subscribes to the aversion of communication scholars to conduct political communication research, except in the case of descriptive or normative research, such as “the Information Order of the New World” or “the Pancasila” (Five Pillars Ideology). When scholars carried out research on the freedom of the press, they preferred to examine the foreign press rather than the Indonesian press as the object of the research.

The “Suburi Incident,” that took place during the time preceding the 1972 General Election, contributed to this aversion. The incident refers to the Government reaction to a poll that was about to be conducted by the Subury (Research) Company led by John DiGregorio in several provinces of Indonesia. Respondents were asked to rank political figures, including Soeharto. This type of polling, especially due to its ranking technique, was considered highly sensitive politically, since it could destabilize the national and local security order. Thus, the Government prevented the researchers from conducting the polling in the field. The company was allegedly accused of carrying out espionage and its operating license was revoked (see Sopiann, 2002).

Table 2
Political Communication Research in Indonesia

N o	Category	Research Interest	1984-April 1998*	May 1998 Revolution*	After May 21, 1998*
1	Democratic Media System	Media law & press freedom	7		10
		Structure of media industry and power relations related to it	2	1	5
		Citizens as active information gatherers & processors			2
		Diversity of media types, ownership & content			1
		Access to, & freedom of, alternative media	1	1	1
2	Media Roles, Media Uses & Effects	Media effects on political opinions, attitudes, beliefs & perceptions	6		7
		Effects of the media agenda on the audience agenda	3		5
		Media roles	2		3
		Media & content choices			2
3	Media	(Comparative) Media portrayal of	5		7

	Reality Construction	certain issues			
		Newsroom analysis	2	4	4
4	Political Processes & Interaction among Interest Groups	Elections & campaigns	3		7
		Governmental institutions & processes	3	1	3
		Political conflicts with violence (including terrorism issues)	2		5
		Local politics & local autonomy	2		4
		Presidential political messages	2		4
		Political leadership	2		3
		Gender in politics	2		3
		Political socialization	2		2
		Political communication in development	2		
		Political communication management			2
		Former forbidden (taboo) concepts in politics			1
		Money politics			1
5	“Otherness”	Religious issues/influences in political communication	4		8
		Ethnicity issues in political communication	2		4
		Political communication in arts/cartoons/ movies	1		2
		Political rumors		1	
Total			55	8	96

Note: *The research period refers to the time when the event or case examined took place. This means that research conducted in 2002 might investigate an issue under the Soeharto Era (and is therefore classified as part of the first period column). One should also keep in mind that certain research plans were not feasible during the Soeharto Era and hence needed to be postponed to more prolific times.

Table 2 (Research on Political Communication in Indonesia) reflects the above-elaborated contexts. The data collection (limited only) at the four main universities shows the significant increase in quantity and variety of research interest after the Soeharto Era. This is in line with Menayang's data (2003), that during the final years of the Soeharto Regime and afterwards, there has been an increasing interest in application of critical approach to the research in communication questioning power and its distribution in society, as well as exploring audience resistance to the operations of media as ideological apparatus. The data collected for this chapter show that approximately twenty percent of research during the Reform Era could be categorized as critical studies in contrast to the Soeharto Era which was almost entirely dominated by "administrative research."

The studies on freedom of the democratic media system (category 1) during the Soeharto Era show two tendencies. First was the tendency to blame the journalists, or the media in general, for most of the political communication ills during the Soeharto Era. For instance, a study by Nasir (1996), that takes the closure of *Tempo*, *deTik*, and *Editor* in 1994 as its case, among others concludes that the Indonesian press tended more to "emphatetically" understand the state or power behaviors than to critically question them. The Indonesian journalists were spoiled, desperate, and too worried that the law would never side with the press. Nasir states that one cause of this problem might have been the lack of solidarity within the media itself and the lack of clear support from the public. These factors resulted in media personnel attempting to avoid isolation -- being the only ones questioning the state or those in power.

The second trend was the tendency of research projects to put the limitations faced by the media in a larger context. Researchers in the latter category were keenly aware, even before they planned their research, that the Government and business interests exerted a huge influence over the Indonesian press. For example, a research project conducted by Taufik (2002), examined whether there was an

overlapping of interests between the Soeharto Government and a media conglomerate, Bakrie Group which owned several printed media (*Sinar Pagi*, *Berita Buana*, and *Nusra* dailies, as well as *Go*, a sport weekly). Findings of this research reveal the existence of a systematic and comprehensive strategy launched by the Government during the Soeharto era. A license for publishing print media (SIUPP) was granted to the Bakrie Group by the Government for two reasons. Firstly, the Government knew that the tycoons in this group would never pose any threat to the Government. Secondly, the Government officials dealing with the issuance of this license saw the SIUPP as a commodity, or to be more specific as a “bribe” paid by businessmen to high-ranking Government officials. On the other hand the owners of the Bakrie Group did not really care about that illegal bribery, since the “bribery tradition” being a long-standing practice in the business community in Indonesia, and because they thought the media business would still make money after counting the bribes as a business expense. Regarding the performance of the media, the businessmen fully agreed to act as the Government wished. And then they treated the media industry in the same way as other business commodities.

Support for Government’s paradigm also spread to journalistic practices. A study conducted by Soesilo and Wasburn (1994), noted that a leading national newspapers (i.e. *Kompas Daily*) was ideologically committed to the norms of a “developmental press,” that supports the social and economic needs of their nation and gives priority to news and information about their Government. Those researchers employed a framing analysis of the news coverage of the Gulf War in the *New York Times* and the Indonesian *Kompas* between 1990 and 1991 (in Table 2, this research is put under the media portrayal, category 3). This confirmed McCargo’s findings (1999) that much of the Indonesian press was engaged in the kind of essentially uncritical ‘development journalism’ favored by the authorities, serving primarily as an agent of stability. It is exactly what President Soeharto expressed in his speech on National Press Day in 1989 (quoted by Mehra et al., 1989, p. 131):

As an integral part of our developing society, nation and state, the press has an important role to assist in managing this nation in all its complexity through the dissemination of news, opinions, ideas, grievances and hopes to the masses. (...) It is in this respect that the press has a role to play in helping build and preserve our unity and cohesion as a nation.

Almost all studies into media effects on political opinions, attitudes, beliefs and perceptions (category 2) employed (as usual) quantitative methods. For example, the studies examining how media exposure influences student perceptions regarding human rights in Indonesia; and how exposés by local newspapers affect the attitudes of local Government officials on local autonomy regulations. There was a unique study in this category, attempting to examine the effect of TV-3 (Malaysia) in terms of political socialization among Indonesians living in Medan who had access not only to TVRI Jakarta and TVRI Medan, but also to the spillover from RTM-1, RTM-2 and TV-3 from Malaysia (Djaja, 1990). This research project showed that people living in Medan merely used the spillover from TV-3 Malaysia to enjoy the entertainment programs and some information unrelated to politics. The TV-3 programs neither increased the audience's feeling of being involved in aspects of the political system in Malaysia nor in the political system in Indonesia. The audience did not consider that the Malaysian programs addressed the problems they had to face in their daily life any better than those of TVRI Jakarta or TVRI Medan. They did not feel encouraged either to carry out actions to support the efforts developed by the local Government or the community as a result of potential inspiration they might receive from the TV-3 programs.

As of the 1990s, studies of religious issues or religious influences in political communication (category 5) seemed to emerge. Most of the earlier studies examined the ways in which political figures, or

political issues related to certain religions, were portrayed in different media. Certain newspapers were most frequently used in this kind of comparison, i.e. *Kompas* (presumably representing the Catholic viewpoint), *Republika* (considered to be the Muslim voice), and *Suara Pembaruan* together with *Sinar Harapan* (seen as having Protestant principles in their news). A study by Semma (1998) examined how *Kompas*, *Suara Pembaruan* and *Republika* dailies portrayed two events related to sectarian tension among Christians and Muslims in East Timor (September 1995) and Situbondo (October, 1996). It combined a content analysis with in-depth-interviews with the gatekeepers of those three newspapers. This research found that in principle all three newspapers sent the same message, i.e. that those conflicts were not supposed to take place! However, in carrying this message, *Kompas* and *Suara Pembaruan* paid much more attention to the Situbondo Case, in a way that defended the position of the Christian background residents. In contrast, *Republika* paid much more attention to the East Timor Case, in a way that defended the interests of the Muslim background residents. This finding might be related to which residents are considered the minority in each conflict area.

The only dissertation in our data collection that dealt with media-related political process (category 4), during the Soeharto era, is entitled, "Roles of the Press in Indonesia's General Election: a Political Communication Study on the Coverage of Ten Newspapers During the 1987 Election Campaign" (Suwardi, 1993). Suwardi has there been recognized as the first political communication expert in Indonesia, and his dissertation stands as the first academic writing with elaborative political communication definitions and analyses of the effects of media on campaigns. Making use of the content analysis method in the form of symbol coding, he lists symbols and messages in those newspapers systematically and thereafter interprets them. In his conclusion, he states that the newspapers during the 1987 Election Campaign were not capable of carrying substantial political messages.

They focused primarily on the political figures instead. Three causal factors were identified. First, the form of the campaign itself (street parades and open-air mass meetings) would not enable the delivery of substantial political messages; second, the incapability of the speakers; and third, the incapability of the reporters. Accordingly, newspapers only carried slogans and on-the-spot reports, without substantial messages, thereby failing to play their role as a forum for political education. Suwardi's research also discovered that the editorial columns of all newspapers were relatively less controversial compared to opinion articles written by experts or observers. Suwardi associates this finding with the self-censorship developed by the editorial chief or editorial staff of each newspaper.

Even though this research explores quite extensively the newspaper coverage during the 1987 election campaign, and also the tendency for newspapers to favor the ruling party (Golkar), it never strongly suggests possible reforms of the election campaign mechanism. In addition, it does not clearly suggest that reform should be undertaken in Indonesia's media industry structure, in order to provide a fairer and higher quality political education.


Some analysts might have expected that political communication research in Indonesia would have evolved in a new direction, when a study was conducted (by Lesmana, 1997) comparing the ways in which the news concerning the July 27 Incident was published in a weekly magazine and in a cyber news magazine (this research is put under category 1, access to, & freedom of, alternative media). The July 27 Incident refers to a bloody attack taking place in 1996 on attendees at a forum of expression at the PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) headquarter in Jakarta, allegedly carried out by members of the Armed Forces and vigilantes, under orders of the Soeharto Regime. The action was a conspiracy by the regime and a faction of PDI that was loyal to Soeharto, led by Suryadi, against the majority of PDI, led by Megawati

Soekarnoputri, the daughter of the Indonesia's first president. Megawati appeared to be a rising political star at that time. Any rising political star, moreover bringing a famous name like Soekarno, would certainly be regarded a serious threat by Soeharto. This study indeed showed that the cyber news magazine (*Tempo Interaktif*) was much more transparent in its reports -- described by the researcher as a "mirror" of that event -- than the weekly (printed) magazine. The latter, *Gatra*, still presented its news as "the neutral Government partner." Therefore, its criticism of the regime pertaining that event was couched in very soft or implicit terms. The editors reasoned that implicit criticism would ultimately be taken into consideration by the Government. In addition, findings of this research showed that *Tempo Interaktif*, the cyber news magazine, tended to focus more on the political and social aspects of that bloody event, while *Gatra* chose to emphasize more on the legal aspects. For the news sources, *Gatra* simply interviewed sources from the armed forces. This was certainly the safest choice for the editors and owners amidst that heated security situation. *Tempo Interaktif*, on the other hand, relied more on sources from non-Government organizations. Unfortunately, even though the cyber news magazine would never have to face the revocation of a license, a fate that the printed weekly could suffer, *Tempo Interaktif* was still not capable of presenting accurate data on the casualties of the July 27 Incident. In other words, *Tempo Interaktif* did not go as far as it could have in making the most of its unique, and expected, role as cyber media.

With the exception of this new hope for a freer press, which might have been made possible thanks to the Internet, an opportunity which unfortunately was not fully taken advantage of, in general we can conclude that during the Soeharto Era the results of interplay among elements in the Media Performance Model showed the dominance of the Government over other elements, i.e. Market, Civil Society, and Media. Of course it is also fair to say that between the

Government and the Market there was an overlapping of interests. On the one hand, the Government received guarantees that the media owners watch closely so that their media performance would only follow the Government line. On the other hand, Soeharto's cronies, or loyalists of the Government, who were granted licenses, had access to the media market and in general treated the media industry in the same way as other business commodities (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Media Performance model: Visualising Tendencies in the Power Relations in Three Eras



6. The May 1998 Revolution

Without a comprehensive exploration, Indonesia's May 1998 Revolution that successfully toppled Soeharto, may simply be attributed to the Internet as its significant driving motor (compared with the audio-tape during the Iranian Revolution and with the fax machine during the Chinese student movement around Tiananmen Square, see Hidayat, 2002, p. 157). On the other hand, some analysts postulate that the *prima causa* of Indonesia's May 1998 Revolution

was the economic crisis, or to be more specific: the capital mobility (see Basri & Iswara, 2000, p. 27-45).

Of the data in our research collection at the four main universities, Ishadi's dissertation (2002) could be included in the critical research category using historical narrative. According to his research, the motives of establishing TV stations in Indonesia were heavily political. Accordingly, those stations would be seen and treated as ideological state apparatuses. When the first commercial TV station, RCTI, was created in 1987, it brought with it a new function, namely to make a profit in line with the open-market economic policy developed by Soeharto. However, the Government control of the media was still very much in place. These two functions might not have created problems for the TV station owner, but it placed the newsroom journalists in an uncomfortable position. In the meantime, competition became tougher, with the creation of four additional commercial TV stations. The need to achieve high ratings, and therefore a great deal of advertisement, in fact required the newsroom personnel to take seriously the preferences of their audience. One of the outcomes was a conflict between what the audience wanted and what the TV journalists and editors were allowed to deliver. The audience expected more direct and transparent news, including subjects that were forbidden by the Government. Under these circumstances, the interplay between the structure, represented by the interests of the media owners, and the actions of TV journalists and editors crystallized. Of course the degree of those interplays differed from one TV newsrooms to the next. According to Ishadi's research, some of the journalists could be included in the so-called "critical supporters" category, while other could even be labeled as "spoilors" of the Soeharto Regime.

In early May 1998, those interplay were colored (if not exacerbated) by the mounting economic crisis, political crisis, student and activist demonstrations, and conflicting opinions among the elite. In addition, the pressures on the Government from international

institutions, such as the IMF (International Monetary Fund), urging the Government to seriously tackle the economic crisis, had mounted to a climax. At the same time, newsroom personnel were surprised that the ratings for TV news programs significantly increased; they could compete on an equal footing with popular entertainment programs. Certainly the fear that the Government could at any time impose severe sanctions on the TV stations still haunted the media owners, as well as journalists and editors. However, that anxiety was countered by the fear that any TV station that did not broadcast transparent and daring news would be left behind. On top of that, any station wanted to avoid at any price to run the risk would be called a “coward” by students and activists, during their demonstrations across the country. According to Ishadi, because of the above-mentioned interplay between structures and agencies in the television newsrooms, by mid-May 1998, almost all of the journalists and editors could have been included in the “spoiler” category. He considers that the role of TV personnel as “spoilers” was a relatively dominant cause of the May 1998 Revolution. While doing so, he acknowledges that there were other interplay between structures and agencies in Market, Civil Society, and Government itself that together contributed to the revolution process.

Ishadi’s research was developed as a part of a larger research project on the “Press in the May Revolution,” conducted by a research team of the Graduate School of Communication, University of Indonesia, which was carefully designed to use the historical narrative. Interestingly, the inquiries on what exactly happened in the TV newsrooms during May 1998 were not only assigned to Ishadi but also to another professional TV news manager, Sumita Tobing of SCTV (see “Interactions in the TV Newsrooms” in Hidayat et al., 2000, p. 241-249). In 1994, Tobing was asked by the SCTV management to develop a TV newsroom, due to the fact that since 1990 SCTV only relayed news programs from RCTI. She never gathered complete information about the business holdings of SCTV’s shareholders. Later in the year, she was surprised to receive a phone call from a director of SCTV

criticizing a newscast by SCTV. The broadcast concerned a real estate company that did not pay any remuneration to a landowner when the company took over his land. As a matter of fact, the owners of that real estate company were both the main shareholders of SCTV. She was then pressured to fabricate another story to counter the previous news.

Suddenly, on May 12, 1998, the movement pioneered by students and activists was accelerated by the bloody quelling of a student demonstration at TrisaktiUniversity in West Jakarta. Four students were killed and many injured by unidentified troops and police. This violent action provoked reactions across the country. Starting the next day, mass riots including shop looting, car and shop burnings, as well as rapes took place in Jakarta and several other cities. In Tobing's exposition, until May 16, the Government still tried to control the TV news programs by briefing the journalists and editors at the SCTV newsrooms. According to the Government, the opposition figures could only be interviewed if they did not provoke people (there was no further explanation available at that time about what this criterion really meant). On May 17, SCTV news producer Bosco invited an opposition figure, Sarwono Kusumaatmaja, to appear at noon on a live news program. During his interview, Sarwono explicitly called for Soeharto to step down. Tobing, who came to the office later that day, surprisingly found a letter on her desk stating that she was fired, signed by Gontha, the assistant director (also a share holder) who then directly put himself in charge of the SCTV newsroom!

Tobing's analysis was confirmed by research conducted by Almard (1999). According to his research, even on the day when TrisaktiUniversity students were killed, open arguments about what the journalists and editors could do and what not took place in the newsrooms of RCTI and SCTV; these arguments involved the owners, management staff, as well as newsroom personnel. Also on May 13, or a day after the killing of the four students, the main policy in those newsrooms was merely to present the events, without any expression

of support for the student and activist movements. It was from May 14 onward that the journalists and editors gradually began to openly show their support for the movement through their reporting. On May 18, students and activists entered the Parliament compound and forced the legislators to ask Soeharto to step down.

Thus, Tobing's exposition and findings, as supported by Almard, did not confirm Ishadi's theory that the TV newsroom personnel played a leading role in driving the May 1998 Revolution to its culmination. They were also supported by McCargo's findings (1999), which state that evidence that the media led or initiated political transition is patchy. McCargo further generalizes that the role of the media in political transitions tends to be a supporting one. He also acknowledges that in many Southeast Asian cases, the picture of media as a political actor, and the conflict in which it is involved, is exceedingly ambiguous, and the issues at stake are both complex and subtle. During the May 1998 Revolution, the state-owned TV station, TVRI, never reported the student demonstrations until they occupied the parliament building. Meanwhile students had temporarily occupied several local branches of RRI, in order to force the state-owned radio to air their demands (Abidin, 2000). This again confirms McCargo's conclusion that the electronic media typically proves easier for the state to control and in many cases television appears to be the last media agency to support political transitions.

In addition to the examination of the TV newsrooms, the research project, "Press in the May Revolution," also investigated the processes taking place in local media, rumor, cyber media, as well as underground media. Local media in Indonesia were mainly print media and radio stations, as all commercial TV stations were centered in Jakarta and the local branches of TVRI only produced relatively insignificant programs. In May 1998, newsrooms of local media were characterized by the same open arguments between the owners and

journalists as those heard in Jakarta. What is interesting to note is the fact that during the Reform movement local radio and print media personnel generally referred to television news programming, particularly the newscasts on commercial stations, as a benchmark for evaluating both the subjects and the depth of the news coverage (Gazali, 2002, p. 138). So, this case represents an exception to McCargo's findings, in that national commercial TV stations became an agent of change first, and then the local print media and radio stations followed their lead.

At the macro level, the research project, "Press in the May Revolution," concludes that the collapse of the Soeharto Regime appears to be the product of internal contradictions within the political, economic, and mass media structures.⁶ On the one hand, Soeharto had to integrate the economy more deeply with the global capitalist system to strengthen the economy. This was strategically significant for the regime's survival, since economic prosperity had been its main source of legitimacy. On the other hand, the economy's proliferating links to global capital markets had made the regime more vulnerable to external pressures and changes, among others to capital mobility due to "the changes in risk perceptions by the parties involved" (de Koning, as quoted in Hidayat, 2002, p. 171). This research also found that under these circumstances the phenomenon of rumor indeed mattered.⁷ Rumor that the seventy-six-year-old President Soeharto was ill, for instance, sent the Jakarta Stock Exchange's main index plunging 20% in mid-December 1997. The rumors then spread from the financial markets into the street. A rumor that a coup was in progress resulted in a collapse of Indonesia's currency, the Rupiah, and sent Jakarta's rich and poor on a buying spree, emptying supermarket shelves of basic commodities, two times in as many weeks (see Christopher Torchia, Associated Press, January 9, 1998). People also queued at banks and moneychangers in order to buy U.S. Dollars, saying they feared losing their Rupiah savings (Hidayat, 2002, p.172).

While the formal or conventional media (print media, TV, and radio) in general waited until the stage when they could not help but report the news about the revolution, the “Press in the May Revolution” research project shows that along with the rumors, the news circulating through the Internet (see Winters, 2002) and the underground media, i.e. campus and student media, pro-democracy non-Governmental organization (NGO) media, and the underground media, targeted at the general public (see Menayang et al., 2002) played significant roles much earlier in that revolution.

Winters (2002, p. 118) concludes:

This combination of an activist tradition among youth in Indonesia and high levels of Internet penetration among the same segment of Indonesian society provided a particularly potent political mixture for mounting a sustained and coordinated reformist movement in the late 1990s. Although fractured in many ways, the Indonesian student movement made excellent use of a wide range of information sources and technologies for analysis, networking and coordination. The explosion of political activism fuelled by the Internet and global media coverage caught the Soeharto Regime off guard.

According to Menayang et al. (2002), various underground media that were emerging and gaining resonance with the public, particularly in the months that preceded Soeharto’s downfall, are in fact a sort of social movement. Their selection and treatment of issues were necessarily carried out differently from the mainstream media, with the purpose of supporting their common goal -- to challenge the status quo. This research provides two explanations regarding the influence of the underground media. First, during the period when the Soeharto Regime was on its way out, the underground movement’s

ideology (carried by the underground media) defeated the establishment's ideology (voiced by the mainstream media), as shown in equivalent news frames and content of both media (p.153). Second, ideologically, there was no significant difference between those working in the authorized press and those working underground. The cause of the grievances was considered to be the same by both groups; however, one group decided to take action, while the other did not. And "only when the Soeharto Regime almost fell, and repression of the press was gradually lifted, did both types of media become similar in terms of the openness of their reports about the common cause of grievances" (p.154).

Again, in most aspects, the above findings are parallel with McCargo's assumptions (1999) that classify the Soeharto Regime as "semi authoritarian," based on strong support from the military; and that the regime derived much of its legitimacy from relatively successful economic development.⁸ McCargo also considers that Soeharto was forced out by a combination of international and domestic political and economic forces. What happened with the press at various junctures during the final years of the Soeharto Regime, according to McCargo, shows that it performed each of the three alternative modes of agency: stability, restraint, and change. McCargo (1999, p. 25) illustrates:

Central to Soeharto's demise was his preoccupation with the maintenance of absolute sovereign authority, his unwillingness and inability to coexist either with higher powers (such as the IMF), or with subordinate powers, such as more outspoken press reflecting divisions in his regime, and in Indonesian society. By refusing to allow the Indonesian press to evolve from serving as an agent of stability to functioning as an agent of restraint, Soeharto may actually have destabilized the New Order.

In McCargo's eyes, the kind of restraining influence practiced by *Tempo*, *Editor* and *DeTik* -- alerting both rulers and readers to important tensions within the elite -- actually served valuable purposes for the regime (for an overview of this kind of interaction, see Sen & Hill, 2000).

In conclusion, we can say that during the May 1998 Revolution, the Media Performance Model shows how the Civil Society and the (more open to global) Market could fight back or corrode the Government control or legitimacy in astonishing ways. The latent performances of alternative Media (Internet) and underground Media, together with rumors, helped enable the Civil Society and Market bring those impacts to bear on the Soeharto Regime. Of course, finally, other (conventional) media could not help but support the revolution (see Figure 2 Part B) that reached its peak with Soeharto's downfall on May 21. He was succeeded by B.J. Habibie.

7. Indonesia During the Reform Era

Learning from the causes and events of the May 1998 Revolution, analysts might predict that the Media Performance Model during the Reform Era would be more or less similar to that during the May Revolution. This is due to the overthrow of the Soeharto Regime, which was not only a major achievement, but also promised to create a new atmosphere, that would allow more freedom for media performance and be more conducive to political communication practices and research.

As reflected in its name, the *Reformasi* (Reformation) continues to be the buzzword of the Post-Soeharto Era. The subsequent administrations--under massive internal and external pressures for reformation -- gradually freed the market, the society and the media

from state intervention. The market was increasingly liberalized through a series of “jungle clearing operations” in order to end a web of politically well-connected business privileges and monopolies that surrounded Soeharto’s inner circle. It certainly opened up possibilities for diversity of ownership in the media industry. The newly liberated civil society ⁹ also expressed itself in the rise of non-Governmental organizations (NGOs), advocacy groups, voluntary social and cultural organizations, independent labor unions, a more independent press council, and some forty new journalist associations. But on the other side of the coin, the rise of civil society can also encourage the spawning of dangerous hate groups --promoting, organizing, and executing violence (see e.g., Chambers & Kopstein, 2001). This phenomenon has appeared in the rise of violence in Indonesia during the Reform Era (see Tadjoeeddin, 2002).

Focusing on the media sector, the process of liberalization has included a series of deregulations, and more importantly, the liquidation of the Information Ministry. The Information Ministry was one of the central features of Soeharto’s authoritarian corporatism, responsible for a long record of press bans. A year after the resignation of Soeharto, the House of Representatives passed a new, liberating Press Law (1999) that, among other things, eliminated licensing requirements, revoked the Government’s ability to ban publications, guaranteed freedom of the press, and even imposed a stiff penalty of two years’ prison on “anyone who acts against the law by deliberately taking actions which could obstruct the work of the press.” Since a publishing license was no longer required by the new Government, it is estimated that after Soeharto’s fall in 1998, the number of newspapers soared from 300 to around 1,000, and the number of radio stations increased from 700 to more than 1,000 (Mangahas, in Johannan and Gomez, 2001, p.125). The new law also conforms with the spirit of global neo-liberalism by permitting foreigners to own up to forty-nine percent of shares in media agencies.

While a new Broadcasting Bill was being drawn up by the Parliament, five new private television companies entered the media market, competing with the five television companies that had been in the market since the early 1990s. Indonesia's media sector was then free to disseminate political information and function as a venue for the discussion of political issues. Jonathan Turner, the Reuters Bureau Chief in Jakarta, agrees that, "Indonesia has become one of the world's most open communities in as much as you can pretty well write what you want without fear of official sanction" (quoted in Goodman, 2000).

The liberalization, in turn, plunged the media into a fierce competition for sales and ratings. In the newspaper sector, for example, it is estimated that out of 1000 newspaper which emerged during the seventeen-month Habibie presidency, only some 600 to 700 remained in the market when Abdurrahman Wahid was inaugurated President in October 1999 (Mangahas, in Johannan and Gomez, 2001, p. 125), or according to AJI (2000) only about 705 publications were still in business, of which a mere fifteen percent were believed to be in good shape financially.

8. Research Interests During the Reform Era

As shown in the previous analysis, the departure of the Soeharto Regime resulted in a more open and democratic, yet weak, Government, and a relatively stronger civil society. As a result, the racial, ethnic, class, and sectarian-related tensions and animosities, most of which had been buried for many years, were able to rise up and color the Reform Era. This situation was worsened by both partisan media and media that treated news merely as a commodity due to the fierce competition for sales, ratings, and advertisings, mainly by capitalizing on sensationalism. This explanation is echoed by a number of researchers in the academic environment who are

concerned about democratic media system, media reality construction, political conflicts with violence, and religious issues/influences in political communication.

A study by Paidi (2002) attempts to examine the freedom of press for local newspapers published in Jayapura, the capital city of West Papua (category 1 in Table 1). This province, together with Aceh and Maluku, has long been recognized for its latent or manifest appeals for separation from Indonesia. Paidi's research found that in general Papuans are genuinely interested in and search for news items from local newspapers concerning the secession issue. As a matter of fact, the news items about the potential independence of West Papua from Indonesia seemed to be more ubiquitous in the newspapers published in Jayapura during the Reform Era than during the Soeharto Era. The gatekeepers in each local newspaper agency, according to the findings of this research, deliberately selected and emphasized news items about secession. Through statistical analysis, Paidi further discovered that the variable attitude about the independence of West Papua alone has a positive correlation with the favorable opinion of the Papuans toward secession. Yet after being exposed to local newspapers contents that are factual and objective, both the attitude and opinion of Papuans in favor of separation from Indonesia increased significantly. This study concludes that, on the one hand, having greater freedom was substantially beneficial for the local press in West Papua, while on the other hand it had a potential danger of putting the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia at risk.

A dissertation by Rusadi (2002) fits the type of research needed to examine the structure of media industry & power relations (also in category 1), and at the same time explores the context of "bad elements" in civil society. This study examined the negative aspects of capitalism in the newspaper institution (*Kompas*, *Media Indonesia*, and *Republika* daily). Rusady analyzed the social riots and the power

relationships that were being developed and reproduced at that time to serve the profit motives of the media. The social riots chosen for this study case were: the Tasikmalaya Riot, the Semanggi II Incident, the Cibadak Mall Incident, the Glodak Plaza Incident, fighting among members of different communities, and fighting among students. This research found that the social riots were developed textually in the newspapers as conflicts between powers of the majority and minority religions, between the powers of regime's legitimation supporters and delegitimation supporters, between powers of the state and the masses, between powers of the up-economy class and the low-economy class, and between powers of the military and civilians. All of those power conflicts were accumulated to give the media high selling points. Or in short, the media were inclined to survive and maximize their profits by selling these social uncertainties and disharmonies as commodities!

Among the "media reality construction" studies (category 2), a study by Harahap (2000) was developed quite well and critically -- under the title "Realities of Farmers and Their Organizations in the Media: A Study of State Hegemony in the Media Discourse." This study examines how eight Jakarta-based media (six dailies, one weekly magazine, and TVRI) as well as six local newspapers, portrayed activities of several farmer organizations. It employs content analysis to see how ideology representation is used when covering three themes or events: farmer protests, the establishment and congresses of farmer organizations, and land disputes. Its findings show that in almost all the exposure, the farmers and their organizations were generally portrayed in violent actions, such as staging protests by blocking roads and forcefully (re)entering land under dispute. In contrast, the violence committed by other parties, such as shootings of farmers by military personnel seemed to be regarded as procedural misconduct only, or as acts of self-defense against the attacks of angry farmers.

Only a very few media have paid attention to the establishment and actions of the new farmer organizations; they have only featured the long-standing farmer organization developed during the Soeharto era, i.e. the Association of Indonesian Farmers' Cooperative (HKTI, *Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia*). Among the few, the coverage by *Waspada* and *Mimbar Umum* daily, both local newspapers, is considered quite intensive and objective. During the protest by the farmer organizations in front of the Parliament Building, according to Harahap's findings, the *Jakarta Post* daily also gave the incident a proportional and objective reporting. Unfortunately, in the case of land disputes, the media never seemed to take any progressive steps to deconstruct the old image of farmers and their organizations in the media (under the influence of the state hegemony of the Soeharto Era), such as their being easily provoked into those disputes by third parties, or even possessed by the spirit of Communism.

A research by Zen (2001) is quite unique among those studies examining religious issues/influences in political communication (category 5), which generally try to see how various media treat political issues that mix with religious issues in their news content in accordance with their religious alliances. Zen's study employs critical discourse and framing analysis to explore the historical contexts of political communication and conflict within the largest Muslim group in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). It also compares the everyday life of this community with the way it was portrayed in several media. The findings of this research show that in general the media pictured the NU members as village people with strong feudalistic and primordial attitudes. Every time NU held its large and special religious meeting (called "istighotsah"), the media tended to portray the meeting not as a religious ritual, but as a political forum for NU leaders, with some outsiders -- usually influential figures -- as honorary guests. Since NU had already vowed to return to "khittah" (their previous stance, that they would not get involved in political practices), NU

should have kept a distance from any political parties, especially the PKB (National Awakening Party, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa). This party was in fact established by some of NU top leaders, including Abdurrahman Wahid (the then president-to-be), as a breakthrough so that NU members, who were interested in political practices, could channel their activities without officially involving the NU name. The problem is that other NU leaders also established political parties, such as the PKU (Muslim Community Awakening Party), etc. Zen's research found that the media tended to only interview certain prominent figures of NU who were active in PKB (which proved to be the most successful among the parties related to the NU), but rarely asked for comments from NU figures active in other parties. This resulted in conflicts between community members. We have to note that the research also confirmed that the feudalistic practices (attributed by the media to this community) troubled the NU members themselves, especially the young generation. Zen's research also recorded the expectations of this young generation: that NU *ulama* (religious teachers or leaders) would gradually abandon those feudalistic attitudes. With this summary, we can see how political communication studies can be conducted creatively at the community level. It might tend to reshape or invent institutions, or "ritual" performance, to meet the collective needs of the community.

Another category of research, that has consistently received much attention, is analysis of media effects (category 2). One such study examines how political realities presented by *Kompas*, *Republika*, and *Media Indonesia* dailies impacted President Abdurrahman Wahid's proposal to revoke the People's Consultative Assembly Decree No. XXV/MPRS/1966. This decree dealt with an issue that many Indonesians still consider controversial, i.e. the banning of Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI). The ban was associated with the 1966 attempted "coup d'état" (Soeharto's description) launched by some units under the PKI, an event that is far

from being clearly understood. Even though there were some different viewpoints among the three newspapers, as seen in their articles, this research concludes that all three tried to send the message that it was not the right time for Abdurrahman Wahid to continue with his proposed action. They all reminded the President about the critical conflicts he was having with Parliament at that time. According to this research, Abdurrahman Wahid finally listened to this message. The media had a profound impact in this case: the President did not take any decision by himself but instead sent his suggestion to the Assembly for discussion.

The sudden increase in the number of political parties after the fall of Soeharto resulted in a rise in the number of studies regarding effective campaign strategies (category 4). These have included issues such as how the public relations department of a political party should be developed and how this department should deal with given political issues. Examples of this type of study include “Public Relations Management of Nation Awakening Party in the 1999 Election” (Iskandar, 2001) and “Political Campaign of the National Mandate Party in the 1999 Election” (Kulsum, 2002).

The number of gender studies also increased during the Reform Era. Proof of this increase, and its implications in political communication, may be seen in a dissertation by Atmonobudi (2004). While other research projects tended to examine how various media portray a woman’s career or opinion in the context of a patriarchal society such as Indonesia, this study with its critical approach, examines the ways in which middle-class housewives assign meaning to the political career of President Megawati. The results are then compared with meanings assigned by the contents of *Kompas* daily from January 1993 to the end of 2001, especially concerning whether it is appropriate for Megawati as a woman fill the post of Indonesia’s President; Megawati’s intellectual capacity and emotions; and

Megawati's profile that is not considered outstanding (at least compared with her father, Soekarno, who was considered to be a brilliant political thinker). Atmonobudi concludes that while *Kompas* did not express a clear opinion regarding the appropriateness of a woman President, most informants did "the negotiating reading" over the meaning provided by the media. According to the housewives supporting a woman for the presidency, it is already an accomplished fact that Indonesia has a female President. However, some housewives seriously questioned whether a woman President could carry out the domestic roles of a woman, such as childrearing, given the heavy duties of the Presidency. Some worried that a woman like Megawati could be easily controlled by other people, especially male politicians surrounding her. It is important to note that informants of Chinese descent gave "the critique of silence," by saying that no matter who becomes Indonesia's President, regardless of gender, the fate of Chinese Indonesian will never improve. They will still be regarded second-class citizens, who will never be viewed as appropriate even for the lowest political position such as *Lurah* (head of several villages or communities).

Concerning the intellectual capacity and emotions of Megawati, the Muslim housewives who were born during the Soeharto Era assigned the same meaning as that presented by the media: that Megawati is not very intellectual and cannot handle her emotions well. Megawati tends to react emotionally to criticism on unimportant issues, when there is no need to reply at all. Some Christian background housewives who were born before the Soeharto Era held the opposite opinion. As to Megawati's profile, there was strong agreement; all informants agreed with the media that the Indonesian people did not consider Megawati to possess a high profile, especially when compared with the charisma of her father or the success of her husband, Taufik Kemas.

A dissertation by Gayatri (2002) employs critical discourse analysis to examine how three newspapers construct realities concerning Soeharto's leadership. This study might simply have fallen into the group of studies comparing media reality constructions, if Gayatri had not chosen a relatively unique context together with that comparison. In this study, Soeharto's leadership is analyzed in the specific context of Javanese culture (category 5, ethnicity issue in political communication). According to Gayatri's findings, the realities of Soeharto's leadership presented in newspapers are primarily based on his speeches and quotations. Thus, they resulted in a myth that Soeharto's leadership style was Javanese, because he frequently stated his opinions or attitudes using Javanese terminology. He also often stressed Javanese principles of leadership as an example to be followed by all Indonesians. In fact, this research demonstrates that Soeharto's words and actions were consistent with the traditional Javanese leadership style only during the first of four stages of his *hanggayuh kasampurnaning hoerip* (a Javanese concept referring to stages in a person's life during which he accomplishes his vision and mission). In the second period, *pengamalan* (putting into practice what had been said), and the third period, *pematangan* (maturation of the leader and fulfillment of his vision), as well as the final, climactic period, Soeharto's words were in contradiction to his actions. In other words, Soeharto's actions no longer reflected the values of a Javanese leader. The weakness of the media was that they took Soeharto's words at face value, never evaluating his actions in terms of Javanese leadership principles. The media portrayed Soeharto's leadership style as Javanese up until his downfall; this tended to bring the original teachings of Javanese leadership into disrepute.

There is also a research project conducted in the context of Sundanese ethnicity. The subject is the effectiveness of traditional leadership by the utilization of religion and magic (Djuhana, 2002). This study employs an ethnographic method in collecting data and

describing the findings. Its object is the “*golokmerah* leadership” (red machete leadership) known to have existed in the village of Panyingkiran, West Java, since the Dutch Colonial Era. The research describes red machete leadership, in the first place, as being related to magic, which is contrary to effective leadership according to Muslim teachings. According to Islam, leadership must be based on religious teachings only. However in practice, the Muslim *ulama* (leaders) also have long used magic. For example, in case that they thought their roles were treated by other parties, such as people who were categorized as “intellectual” in that area who can give some alternative views differing from the Muslim leaders’ mainstream views. The magic used by these religious leaders was only known to a very limited circle. On the other hand, the red machete leaders also used certain Islamic terminology to maintain or call on their magical powers. Thus, at the same time they employed magic, they justified themselves by using religious terminology. Djuhana concludes that for the people living in that area, Islam could be seen as magic as well as religion, since the religion provided the leaders spiritual teaching while magic gave them practical powers. Their leadership styles depended on how they balanced these two contradictory-but-complementary aspects of leadership. As Indonesia is rich in the plurality of ethnicities and cultures, this line of research is promising, and might contribute to enriching the unique identity of political communication research in Indonesia.

Finally, we have to note that from early 2000 to the end of 2003, a concerted research effort was launched to create a more democratic climate in the broadcasting landscape in Indonesia. It is not easy to say which parties initiated this effort, but it then gained more and more support from various groups working for a freer and equal communication system, and has become an effort belonging to all those parties. The area of promoting diversity of ownership and plurality of contents of broadcasting was jointly pioneered by the

Graduate School of Communication, University of Indonesia, together with all state and local universities, as well as a large number of non-Government activists and community leaders in thirteen provinces across Indonesia.

There were at least three motives behind this joint research effort. Firstly, the liberalization of the media industry in the post-Soeharto era, and the domination of market pressures over the media industry, quickly put Indonesia into the so-called “fallacy of the two-model choice” (Bagdikian, 1997, p.248). This fallacy holds that there are only two choices available: the state-controlled media (as during the Soeharto Era) and the uncontrolled media, characterized by libertarian media content -- such as bloody crime reporting, programs focusing on supernatural or magic, celebrity gossip shows, imported and Indonesian version of *telenovela*, and other programs produced or bought for the rating consideration only. Secondly, the broadcasting field was in urgent need of a new broadcasting law (replacing the suppressive Broadcasting Law No. 24/1997) and an independent regulatory body to oversee its implementation. Thirdly, in line with the first and the second reasons, the Broadcasting Law should thus recognize the existence of other types of broadcasting in addition to the ten Jakarta-based TV stations, i.e. national public TV, local public TV, local commercial TV, and community TV, as well as local public radio and community radio stations.

This joint effort finally contributed to the passage of the new Broadcasting Law No. 32/2002 in December 2002, and the establishment of the first Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia, KPI) in December 2003 (see Gazali, 2003; Gazali et al., 2003). However, some parties, especially the existing commercial TV station owners, still consider that the new Broadcasting Law only revives the spirit of the Soeharto Era by establishing the KPI in place of the Ministry of Information (*Kompas*, September 18, 2002).

These parties apparently either do not have a clear picture of the roles expected of an independent regulatory body such as the KPI, or they are threatened by the fact that Indonesia currently has approximately 1000 community radio stations, twenty-three local commercial TV stations, and one local public TV station.

Another positive sign is that efforts by a coalition of seventeen NGOs have resulted in a draft Freedom of Obtain Information Act (FOIA). In February 2001, a second draft was released and presented to the Parliament. Basorie (2001: p. 81) writes:

The draft FOIA covers six principles: (1) the right of every person to obtain information; (2) the obligation of public administrators to provide and serve requests for information in a quick, low-cost and simple manner; (3) tightly restricted exemptions; (4) the obligation of public agencies to streamline their information service and documentation system; (5) legal sanctions and penalties for parties that obstruct public access to information; and (6) the public right to exercise legal recourse if the right to obtain access to information has been violated.

9. The 2004 Election

As predicted earlier, the Media Performance Model in the Reform Era might not be extremely different from that which existed during the May 1998 Revolution (see Figure 2 Part C). Certainly, the Market appears to be stronger and is feared as the dominant power capable of determining which media can exist and dictate the style and content of programming. The interplay between Media and Civil Society could be seen in three directions. First, due to the freer climate, the elements of Civil Society are able to present their views

openly in the media. However, in some cases, they have attempted to force the media to carry their views and beliefs through threatening the journalists (it refers to what could then be categorized as a “bad element in civil society”). Second, the media has not played significant roles in supporting Civil Society, because many members of the media are still heady with the freedoms they are enjoying. The result is often sensational and superficial reporting (Basorie, 2001, p.64) or even instances of malpractice and excess (Dharma et al., 2003). Third, media have tried their best to enhance the Civil Society in Indonesia. The second and third directions might be related to McCargo’s observation (1999, p.28) that the “media practitioners are inclined to overstate their own importance, communication specialists are inclined to depoliticise media activity, and political scientists tend to discount the media’s role.”

Amidst those circumstances, approaching the 2004 Election, a heavy responsibility was placed on the shoulders of the Indonesian media. They were, directly or indirectly, entrusted with the task of informing the public about the upcoming election, which was described by King (2004, p.1) as “a series of elections that are some of the most complex and challenging to have been faced by any democracy, let alone an emerging democracy such as Indonesia’s”. It consists of three new election systems. The first system is a single non-transferable election (SNTV) system for the new Regional Representative Council (DPD, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah). This council is equivalent to a Senate in some countries. The candidates running for this Council must sever any attachment to political parties. The second system is the so-called “open-list proportional representation system” for the national legislature (DPR) and regional legislatures (DPRD). Both elections were held on April 5. These elections represent the first time in Indonesian history that citizens can vote directly for a candidate. In fact, the Election Law requires voters to select both a party symbol and a candidate in order to be counted as a valid vote.

Voting only for the candidate will be considered invalid. A candidate who does well (receives say 200,000 votes), but still not enough to pass the threshold for a seat in a certain council (say 220,000 votes), must give up the seat to a candidate whose name appears higher on the party's preference list, even though that candidate receives less votes (say 10,000). Democracy activists fear that many parties have already worked the system to ensure their hacks are elected (see *Economist*, May 4, 2003). The third system is the election for the Presidency on July 5, also the first time in Indonesian history that an Indonesian President is elected directly by the electorate. If no candidate receives a majority of the votes in addition to a threshold in some provinces, a second round will be held between the top two candidates on September 20. Pre-election surveys indicate that a huge, last minute effort is needed to educate the Indonesian public, not only about new election processes, but also about the new and revised institutions being created (quoted in King, 2004).

From what may be observed during the six months prior to the election, it is quite fair to say that the Indonesian media has not been able to carry out their task very well. What has appeared to be a priority for the media has been how to grab the largest share of the money that will be spent by the political parties to buy media space for political ads during the campaign period. The total amount of campaign advertising, according to some sources, ranges from three billion Rupiah (data from an interview by the first author¹⁰ with the Chairman of the Indonesian Advertising Companies Association) to thirteen billion Rupiah (according to a businessman, quoted in *Fajar Daily*, January 12, 2004). The latter figure might include expenditures for promotion outside TV, radio and newspapers, such as T-shirts, umbrellas, banners, posters, and other paraphernalia with political party symbols and slogans. In addition to political ads, some parties have also paid for access to TV programs, such as talk shows; the KPI has alleged that some stations have sold time slots for very high sums.

For TV producers, the main challenge is to design programs that have some relationship to the election and at the same time can ensure a high rating. In this sense, the producers and advertisers consider that spending a lot of time educating the electorate about the new election system would not be very interesting to most audiences. Instead of doing so, some TV stations resorted to polling through SMS (short message services). The polls asked people to select their favorite candidate for President. Of course the stations were criticized immediately, since they didn't employ any standard scientific polling method, and could easily mislead the audience (see Hidayat, *Kompas*, Jan. 6, 2004, Qodari, *Kompas*, Jan. 19, 2004). Even though some media personnel acknowledged those problems, most of them kept conducting this type of poll.

Meanwhile, activists fostering the production and distribution of Public Service Announcements (PSA), in an effort to educate people about the election, frequently expressed their disappointment with the attitudes of all TV stations, which only wanted to carry the PSA as long as it brought with it an economic value. Agus Pambagyo, of the Foundation for the Nation Youth Vision (Yayasan Visi Anak Bangsa), in an email interview said, "We have to pay the full-rate for PSA similar to other commercial ads. Sometime we try to develop a joint program with some TV stations, such as holding a competition to compose songs related to the election. But the chance is really limited!"

This is not to say that the Indonesian media did not contribute anything to the political education process, or provide a variety of information that the people might need in relation to the 2004 Election. A journalist from *Kompas* daily, Nasrullah Nara, in an email interview with the first author stated:

In general, all media have tried to do their best in presenting the recent stages of political dynamics

approaching the election, both in the form of straight informative news and in-depth exploratory articles. Much more spaces are now opened for the public to channel their comments about the election process via comments from the readers, letters to editors, or call-ins for broadcast media. To the best of my knowledge, some media also give free space for the PSA to enlighten people about the new election system. But, unfortunately, there are a few media, by disguising matters, appear to mislead the public by blatantly taking sides with certain political parties or figures! A commercial TV station has even shown one particular presidential candidate conducting campaigns across Indonesia in most of its news from early morning to late night. It is hard to believe that it even broadcast live a certain party's last round campaign in Jakarta! This partisanship might spread a bad image to other media too!

The station in question, Metro TV, has been widely criticized for being blatantly partial in its coverage of the political campaign of its owner, Surya Paloh. Surya, one of the six presidential aspirants, clashed with party leader and presidential contender Akbar Tandjung over some of the latter's party policies. Inside sources told the *Strait Times* (March 18, 2004) that in recent meetings, editors have implied that Metro TV would not run reports on Akbar's campaign, unless they involved protests against him. In the same *Strait Times'* report, one of the station's senior journalists showed his discontent, "A lot of news items, which we thought should be priorities, got bumped off for reports on Surya's campaign!" Another senior newscaster at Metro TV, after a live interview on Press Day (with the first author, February 9, 2004), also told that they felt uncomfortable doing unbalanced reporting in favor of the owner of that TV station.

Media observers agree that the Indonesian media has made some progress approaching and during the 2004 Election. Agus Sudibyo of the Institute of Information Flow, in an email interview (with the first author) agrees that, except for the Metro TV case, TV stations gave a relatively fair coverage for all political parties. Of course, it is understandable that they pay a bit more attention to the larger political parties. However, Agus Sudibyo also added:

On the other hand, only very few spaces were dedicated to educating and informing the public about the complicated new election system. TV stations are more concerned with the debate among the political elites. In short, it can be said that while the expectations for the role of the media before the complex 2004 Election was significantly high, the attention and capabilities of the media on average have not increased to the same level. What makes it worse, only very few communication scholars have paid attention to these matters.

The main media targeted for observation by relevant parties during the 2004 election were first television and then radio. According to Andreas Harsono, Chairman of the PANTAU Foundation (in an interview with ABC, March 25, 2004), ninety percent of Indonesian voters get their political news from TV; hence, controlling a television station is very strategic in winning voters. The News Director of one of the largest television stations in Indonesia, RTCI, was replaced by order of the ruling party. This party was also reportedly behind a recent reshuffle of the top management of the state-owned TVRI (The *Strait Times*, March 18, 2004).

Outside the broadcasting arena, several publications and Internet sites with close links to parties or presidential contenders have emerged over the past few months. One example is *Mega Demokrat*, which was established in late 2003 by Taufik Kiemas, President Megawati Soekarnoputri's husband. With a circulation of 15,000, the

biweekly tabloid has been providing the latest news about the President and her party, PDI-P. The People's Mandate Party (led by Amien Rais) also established its own publication in August 2003 under the name, "The People's Mandate Media" (MAR). But since January 2004, this publication has been put on hold, as many of its staff members and supporters are embarking on political campaigns; however, its online version continues to be updated on the regular basis.

Analysts have predicted that such websites would not make much of an impact, since they are in general very segmented. According to data from the World Development Report 2000/2001, the number of Internet hosts per 10,000 people in Indonesia was only 1 (quoted in Basorie, 2001, p.64). What is more significant to observe, according to Andreas Harsono (in the interview with ABC, March 25, 2004), is a change in the way politicians and business leaders try to influence the media. Harsono says:

They have developed friendships with the editors of those news organizations. These are friendly phone calls like: "Your reporter is doing this, doing that, I am not happy with that, it is not accurate, it is not proportional, it is not comprehensive, more like social pressure rather than direct business pressure."

Finally, in addition to the controversial polling via SMS, the utilization of SMS to distribute political messages, during the build-up to the 2004 Election, has not yet received the attention it deserves. According to a study by Asia Market Intelligence (quoted in *Kompas Cyber Media*, August, 12, 2002), 76 percent of the cellular phone users in seven Asian countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, India, and Indonesia) prefer to use SMS to send message rather than email. Data from the Vice President of Product

Development, Selular Indosat, Trias Kater Kartasasminta (quoted in *Kompas*, April 16, 2004) shows that in the two weeks approaching the voting day, the number of SMS sent every day, which is normally fourteen to fifteen millions SMS, increases by around twenty to twenty-five percent. Kartasasminta also noted some unique phenomena during those weeks, such as SMS sent from a cellular number to a huge number of receivers, let's say 10,000. In terms of economic value, it only costs a political party or candidate approximately 3.5 million Rupiah to send SMS, as opposed to the huge amount required for placing a political ad on TV, for instance.

Political SMS, according to Andi Mallarangeng (ABC, March 25, 2004), serves the public in several ways. For example, when Golkar and PDI-P were buying political ads, a lot of SMS ridiculing those advertisements were sent, among others making jokes about the style of Akbar Tanjung, the Chairman of Golkar, in those ads. However, some parties also take advantage of this popular technology to damage the reputation of other political parties or figures. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a strong presidential candidate from the newly-established Demokrat Party (PD, Partai Demokrat), needed to give a special press conference to deny accusations launched against him, mainly through SMS, and but also through anonymous letters and phone calls. There are five slanderous accusations surrounding him, i.e. he had converted to another religion (no longer a Muslim), that he has two wives, that the CIA supports his nomination for President, that he received funding from America and some notorious mafia figures in Jakarta, and that he has strong prejudices against Muslims and Chinese Indonesians.

10. Concluding Remarks

In the last two decades, Indonesia has faced three fascinating periods. Firstly, the Soeharto Era, categorized by some analysts as a

“semi-authoritarian” regime or a “corporate authoritarian” regime, which came into power in 1966. Using the Media Performance Model as a tool, we can see that during this period, the Soeharto Government became the center of interplay among the Media, the Market, the Civil Society, and the Government itself. Even though phenomena in this era were potentially interesting topics for political communication research, they could not be explored to the fullest extent due to the constraints imposed by the regime in power. Moreover, the political communication major had just been introduced in a very few departments of communication and politics at that time. The Government also ensured that no research interests would pose a threat to political stability as well as to the regime’s political legitimacy. During this era, the success of implementing open-market policies and maintaining political stability were both considered as key factors for achieving economic growth, and hence essential for reproducing the legitimacy of the Soeharto Regime.

Secondly, the May 1998 Revolution, that could be seen as the result of internal contradictions within Soeharto’s political, economic, and communication policies, exacerbated by international pressures. Approaching May 21, 1998, the interplay among elements in the society made the Soeharto Government increasingly vulnerable to, and eventually bow to, the performance of Civil Society, Market and Media. This revolution seemed to arrive and take place in a comparatively short time. Therefore, it has been extremely challenging (even until recently) for political communication researchers to attempt a comprehensive explanation of the event. If the experience with the 1966 Revolution (that brought Soeharto into power) is any indication, the May 1998 Revolution may go down in history with very little comprehensive research. It may be remembered that the 1966 Revolution has never been seriously and consistently explored for a more comprehensive and open-to-the-public exposition.

Thirdly, the Reform Era, after the departure of Soeharto, resulting in a more open and democratic, yet weak, Government, and a relatively stronger Civil Society, Market and Media. This period should have been a new and fertile ground for political communication research. And the researchers indeed have risen to the occasion and have tried to answer this challenge. The data collection at the four main universities in Indonesia shows the increase in quantity of research, as well as in research interests in certain subjects. These subjects include the following: media law and freedom of press, structure of media industry and power relations surrounding it, religious issues or influences in political communication, political conflict with violence, as well as studies on elections and campaigns due to the rise of a great number of political parties.

Two important phenomena are noteworthy, along with those increases, i.e. the fact that research on the May 1998 Revolution and during the Reform Era started to employ a multi-disciplinary approach, and the new way the researchers picture the interplay between structure and agency in the media industry. During the Soeharto Era, almost all of the studies used only either communication or political theories. Since then, researchers have made use of a significant number of theories from other fields, such as concepts from sociology, political economy of media industry, etc. If, during the Soeharto Era, the most researchers assumed that the journalists could be easily controlled by the political and economic structures, now most researchers have opened their minds to the interplay between structure and agency, as well as to the power relations analysis among the Government, Market, Civil Society and Media at a (more) macro level.

From the data collection, we also learn that research at the community level, such as on political socialization and the selective exposure in the media and content choices among community

members, deserves much more attention in the near future. As Indonesia is rich in terms of plurality of religions, ethnicities, and cultures, this line of research -- comparing these matters among communities with different backgrounds -- is certainly promising. Along with research on efforts using mediated and non-mediated political communication in conflict-resolution management, which was still hard to find until recently, they might contribute toward enriching the unique identity of political communication research in Indonesia.

Finally, it is important to note that even though the Reform Era indeed provides an opportunity to open up what was previously considered taboo in political communication, there is still no sign that researchers are enthusiastic about exploring this opportunity. The only study in our data collection on Soekarno's thinking, for example, does not provide any new dimension for discussion. A fresh historical narrative and critical analysis on the social and political roles of the Armed Forces in the transition era is also still waiting to be developed. In other words, studies concerning concepts and practices surrounding the Government deserve further exploration. Likewise, the power relations between the media and other elements around the 2004 Election clearly shows that Indonesia's media have just started to learn how to place themselves in a (more) macro interplay with other interest groups beyond their routine institutions and practices. What is more, the concepts and practices surrounding that election -- the first direct election in the Indonesia's history -- have also received very little attention from political communication scholars.

Again, we have to see the delay in responding appropriately and creatively to the newly and suddenly open challenges in political communication research in Indonesia as part of a larger picture, where this field seems to be just waking up, and thus in need of more effort at keeping abreast with developments taking place in other academic centers. Developing more cooperation with researchers from other

countries -- until now only a handful of cooperative efforts are recorded -- could constitute a breakthrough. In that way, political communication researchers in Indonesia could share and learn how to effectively envision this field, given its unique characteristics and elaborate methods, which would enrich their research. Creative research methods, using the Internet for example, are still far from a reality in Indonesia.

However, all these shortcomings might still be compensated for by the fact that not only academicians, but also a great number of activists in non-Government organizations, together with media practitioners, have jointly undertaken action-research efforts, placing citizens where they should be, as active information gatherers and processors. These efforts are very important in enhancing the relatively equal interplay among Media, Civil Society, Market and Government (in the Media Performance Model). This endeavor still has a long way to go, but it has, to a certain extent, contributed to the changing media landscape in Indonesia, with the passage of the new Broadcasting Law, mushrooming local, public, and community media, the establishment of Indonesia's first Broadcasting Commission (KPI), as well as the submission of the draft version of the Freedom to Obtain Information Act (FOIA) to Parliament. Together with all the research at the micro and meso levels -- such as analyses of media content, production and consumption of media content related to political communication, and its potential effects -- this effort is clearly in line with the direction for the future pointed out by Chaffee (2001) envisioning the politics of communication.

Bab 6

Findings on the Directions of Media Responsibility and Accountability via the Media Performance Model in Order to Comprehend the Field of Political Communication in Indonesia

The findings put forward in this dissertation highlight the following important elements as a response to the research questions raised in the introduction: (1) a model designed to explain political communication in the Indonesian context, embracing the two faces of political communication (i.e. the politics of communication and the communication of politics); (2) the Media Performance Model derived from the Model of Political Communication and designed to fit the specific context of mediated political communication comprising four factors (i.e. the Government, Market, Civil Society, and the Media); (3) the concepts of Media Responsibility and Media Accountability which help show clearly the directions of the interplay taking place in the Media Performance Model, especially putting emphasis on citizens as active information gatherers and processors; (4) a variety of directions of interplay among the Government, Market, Civil Society and the Media over the last 20 years in Indonesia, divided into three eras (i.e. the Soeharto Era, better known as the “New Order Era,” the May 1998 Revolution, and the Reform Era afterwards); (5) two alternatives are promoted and developed concerning the form, the institutional aspects and the concrete mechanisms of Indonesian Media Accountability (i.e. the LCF (Local Consultative Forum) and the Supervisory Body, that is endorsed in the Broadcasting Law No. 32/2002).*


The Communication Department, University of Indonesia, thanks all the activists and institutions who made this action research possible (among others, ISKI, MPPI, KTVPI, Internews/MLPC, KREASI, ISAI, etc.). Plans, reports, and other potential resources were exchanged with these organizations. A substantial portion of this research and joint local productions were made available by funds from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Indonesian Mission, disbursed through IFES (International Foundation for Election System), the Indonesian Office, and local NGOs involved in LCFs.

1. Model of the Political Communication Field

For academic significance, the research in this dissertation has produced and provided details for what is intended to be a map of political communication studies, a “Political Communication Field Model.” In addition to serving as a structuring tool for this dissertation, this model is expected to have some heuristic value for other scholars: as a subject for discussion, as a model for research in other countries, and as an object of comparison with other models, as scholars aim at clarifying the comprehensive and challenging future of the political communication field.

This model demonstrates that this field has certainly made significant and rapid progress in recent years, especially for particular types of research: behavioral and media effects studies and campaign studies. These areas may be regarded as icons of political communication. Since the Model is expected to be relatively comprehensive in describing the political communication field, it asserts the inclusion of behavioral studies, campaign studies and political/civic socialization studies on non-mediated messages or interactions. Most of them are (but are not limited to) interpersonal and group communication. In this way, this model enlarges the range of issues in the field of political communication. For instance, analysis may not only be confined to the study of popular opinion regarding political communication, but also to citizen action. Moreover, media forms not typically included in political communication research, such as movies, popular songs, television shows, radio programs, and even rumors, should be also seen as viable expressions of political communication.

Figure 6: A Political Communication Field Model



In the same spirit, this model embraces the twentieth-century political scientists' approach, considering politics in terms of group competition for scarce resources. One such approach concludes that the essence of politics is action – not the action of individuals, because they are rarely effective in politics, but the action of groups. It defines groups by their interests. Accordingly, this model visualises a specific arena to analyse various institutions and processes taking place around them, the so-called “interaction of interest groups.” That specific arena comprises governmental institutions, economics, culture, religion, etc.

Political communication in this modern age consists primarily of mediated political communication. Accordingly, studies on media reality construction become interesting and important. These include analyses on agenda-setting and interaction in the newsroom. Three chapters in this dissertation describe the intense, dynamic interactions in the newsrooms of radio and TV stations as well as newspapers across Indonesia when approaching the peak of the May 1998 Revolution.

All of the above-mentioned arenas address primarily (although not exclusively) parts of what Chaffee (2001) calls “communication of politics” (p. 243). Another inseparable part of political communication which, according to Chaffee, needs much more inventive efforts, has to do more with the “politics of communication.” For this part, the Model of the Political Communication Field, attributes a special place to citizens (both as individuals and groups) as active information gatherers and processors at all levels, such as the community, the family, peer groups, school, etc. The Model of the Political Communication Field reminds us that some areas need to be explored as much as the already popular domains, such as uses and gratifications studies with the emphasis on the active role of citizen in

terms of selective exposure, media type and content choice, and citizens' feedback to media contents.

To ensure that citizens play the role of active information gatherers and processors, the Model of the Political Communication Field requires three necessary conditions (hence areas of studies): i.e. diversity of ownership, variety of media, and plurality of media content. Otherwise, in reality, citizens will be trapped into "the fallacy of the two-model choice" (Bagdikian, 1997, p. 248), as if they only have a choice between two systems. The first system allows only very few media to operate under heavy government control; the Media thus become propaganda tools or ideological state apparatuses. The second system frees individuals and companies to found and develop as much media as possible under the "market principle": the media here produce or buy programs for rating considerations only. Although extreme cases, both systems eventually fall into the trap of hegemony of tastes and goals. The policy of ensuring diversity of ownership, variety of media (such as commercial, public and community media), and plurality of contents will provide the (active) citizens not only with different levels of access to use media contents, but also with the chance to assess and develop media types/genres/output which will be well suited to their needs and contexts of life.

2. The Media Performance Model

The position of citizens as active information gatherers and processors as well as the institutions and processes which include interaction of interest groups in politics, economics, etc, will then relate the Model of the Political Communication Field to another model, which is designed to reduce that larger model to its essence, the so-called "Media Performance Model" (see Figure 1). This

(relatively simple) model takes the form of a triangle, built up by four power entities, i.e. the Government, Market, Civil Society, and the Media positioned at the center of the triangle. Within each factor, there is a constant interplay between structure (e.g., defined as resources and regulations) and agency (in general referring to social actions carried out by social actors), which constrain as well as facilitate, impose limits on, as well as offer opportunities to, each other.

The results of the interplay within each factor will inevitably have an impact upon the interplay or power relations among those four elements and vice versa. Researchers could take a certain period in history as an object to be examined using this Media Performance Model. They could then mark the resulting tendencies in a certain era and relate them to other research interests (as explored quite extensively in the first chapter on the three eras in Indonesia, i.e. the Soeharto Era, the May 1998 Revolution, and the Reform Era). One should keep in mind that even though any effort to analyse a certain era would seem to freeze those internal and external interplays for a while or seem to reduce them into a kind of a still-photo, the result should always be placed into an historical narrative. This means that the researcher needs to be highly alert when attempting to structure events into a meaningful and related order, and attempting to organize some well-connected concepts that enable him or her to assess the past, the present, and the future.

3. Media Responsibility and Accountability

Regarding those interconnected concepts, it should be clear that although each chapter in this dissertation has its own theoretical framework and exploration of concepts, the Media Responsibility and

Media Accountability concepts are nevertheless put forward together with the Model of the Political Communication Field and the Media Performance Model as unifying units in the overall theoretical framework of the dissertation. These concepts of Media Responsibility and Accountability are expected to enable any researcher to clearly see the directions of interplay among the factors in the Media Performance Model. Media Responsibility deals with the social needs the public should expect media and journalists to respond to. Therefore, it helps to investigate how the media and media professionals work to meet those expectations. Media Accountability describes how society might call on media and journalists to account for the fulfillment of their responsibility. Hence, it helps to examine how the Government and most importantly Civil Society (elements) work to exercise their rights and duties.

3.a. During the Soeharto Era

The first chapter, “Political Communication in Indonesia: Revisiting the Media Performance Model,” shows on the one hand that during the Soeharto Era (1966 to 1998, better known as the “New Order Era”) the regime in power put in place a systematic and comprehensive strategy to control the freedom of expression and academic exercise. The Government wanted to ensure that no media performance and research interest posed a threat to political stability. On the other hand, the media industry was shaped markedly by the dynamics of Soeharto’s market economy. The rapid economic growth during the Soeharto period created a new middle class with relatively higher education and income levels as large audiences with purchasing power. In addition, the expansion of the economy also led to the growth of the advertising industry and of advertising expenditures, which encouraged the massive arrivals of transnational advertising agencies during the 1970s. It then resulted in the transformation of the

Indonesian press from the “political press” during Soekarno’s Guided Democracy (which defined the press as a “tool of the Revolution” responsible for energizing and mobilizing public opinion) into the “industrial press.” In this industrial context, a number of parties were tempted by business opportunities offered by the media sector. That the Soeharto Era was characterized by overlapping interests between the Government and the Market is depicted in the Media Performance Model. The Government issued media licenses (required at that time) on the basis of political criteria, mainly to its cronies or loyalists. In return, the Government received guarantees that the media owners would closely monitor their media performance to ensure that it followed the Government line. The situation was exacerbated by the bribery of government officials by the business community in order to smooth the process of “grabbing” the license. Consequently, the media owners who were granted licenses in general treated the media industry just like any other business commodity and viewed bribery as an inevitable part of their investment.

In general, we can conclude that during the Soeharto Era the results of the interplay among elements in the Media Performance Model showed the dominance of the Government over other elements (see Figure 2 Part A). The overlapping of interests between the Government and the Market strengthened the control of the structure over the agency in the internal interplay within the media organization too. In a parallel way it weakened the potential establishment and performance of the Civil Society. The Media would never give significant space for any discourse (or news items) which inspired, or reported the establishment and performance of, voluntary associations that were independent of the state and commercial relations, working in the name of democracy and public interests.

The above-mentioned conditions explain why during the Soeharto Era, the media performance never demonstrated real Media Responsibilities (McQuail, 2000). The **assigned responsibilities**, i.e. the obligations established by law, which the Media had to meet, were kept at the highest level. Besides the printing license and the license for publishing print media, or the broadcasting license, journalists were required to join the one and only journalist organization allowed at the time. Chief editors had to attend courses on state ideology that were in fact part of an indoctrination process. These obligations were clearly not in pursuance of the freedom of expression but of the government interests.

The **contracted responsibilities** that should arise from self-regulated agreements between the press or broadcasters on the one hand and from society or politicians on the other hand with regard to the desired media conduct, were also forcefully exercised. For example, the so-called “telephone culture” meant that one call from a government official was enough to nip any potential revelation in the bud. The government also forbade press coverage of opposition leaders. These practices gradually damaged the **self-assigned responsibilities** indicating voluntary professional commitments to maintaining ethical standards and public goals. Together with **the denied responsibilities** (generally used to refute accusations of irresponsibility that are thought to be undeserved or inapplicable), Indonesian journalists tended more to “emphatetically” understand the state or power behaviors than to critically question them, as shown in research collected for the first chapter. Moreover, according to that research, Indonesian journalists were seen as spoiled, desperate, and too worried that the law would never side with the press.

In the context of **media accountability** (which has to do with compelling the media’s proper conduct in relation to their

responsibility), the weak Civil Society during the Soeharto Era could never equally respond to the domination of the Government in conjunction with the Market power. Even though political, market, and public accountability mechanisms seemed to ensure opportunities for citizens and voluntary associations to request the fulfillment of those accountabilities, in practice they never really materialized. As shown in the first chapter, audiences and researchers were keenly aware that the government and business interests exerted a huge influence over the Indonesian press. Such a constraining media structure produced a type of journalism that was very cautious, exercising self-censorship, avoiding direct criticism, and “similar to a snake, circling round and round without ever striking the target.”

As to **political accountability** during the Soeharto era, questions arise about fiduciary practices (i.e., having to do with the media operating as a public trust). For instance, the public was aware of the monopoly in the television landscape (as explored in the second chapter “In Search of Quality Measures for News Programming on Indonesian Television”), so that there would be no public trust reflected in the TV performance, but the public did not have a mechanism to compel proper conduct from the government. The public also knew that under the Soeharto regime journalism considered “harmful” for individuals, groups, organizations, and civil society was thoroughly disliked by the Government, as well as considered wrong for the essential needs of the political and judicial system. But there was no such mechanism to channel the public voice.

The main issues concerning **market accountability** during the Soeharto Era were relatively different between the print media and radio on the one hand and television on the other. In the television sector, until the first commercial station became operational, the public could never question the quality (in terms of value and pricing)

of the service provided. Even after the launch of the first five commercial stations, the public still had to pay the license fee for TVRI (Television of the Republic of Indonesia), but it could never check TVRI's management and technology aspects in terms of efficiency and innovation. As to the first five commercial TV stations, they started following the market system that appeared to work without conscious overall direction or control (reflecting the proverbial unseen hand) and without normative principles. The journalists described in the second chapter, both from the state-owned TVRI station and commercial stations, acknowledged the importance of viewing figures and program research. As a matter of fact the media market was as usual more likely to be influenced by politics and other ideological concerns than many other market sectors. The serious lack of professionalism at all levels of the news making process doubled the subordination of the Media to the Government and led, in most cases, to the overlapping of interests, whereas, in principle, the professional responsibility and accountability are supposed to complement or, better, compensate for the political or market dependency of media organizations.

The third case study, "The Soeharto Regime and Its Fall through the Eyes of the Local Media," showed that in Indonesia originally existed what is often referred to as "multi-level governance" as an indicator of the shared responsibility between the central and the provincial governments. Thus, **political accountability** included the legal framework for regulating the structure and functioning of broadcasting through national political and administrative institutions that were in turn shared by local institutions. What really happened in the field was that the local governmental institutions were only blindly loyal to the central government. They went even further by assigning one official to closely control one commercial radio station or newspaper. As a consequence, under this control, it was much more practical and safe for the local radio stations and print media to merely

confine themselves to the boundaries (i.e., what was still allowed to be published or broadcast). These boundaries were mainly set out by the commercial TV stations from Jakarta. This meant that the local media and staff were in the same dark conditions when it came to media responsibility and accountability as Jakarta's media and staff, both dominated by the overlapping interests of the government and the market. Moreover, since in Jakarta television appeared to be the last media agency to support the student and activist movements, the shift in the practice of responsibility and accountability in the local media usually came much later than in Jakarta.

Regarding **media accountability** of the state-owned TV and radio station (TVRI & RRI), the local citizenry never had an equal position or enough power to assess how TVRI and RRI discriminated their programs from those of the commercial sector, or to assess TVRI and RRI's internal pluralism as well as their contribution to a production climate that welcomed public participation. Lack of those accountabilities (as Marc Raboy explains in the CBC experience) would make the public interest poorly served in exchange for the interests of the state, the ruling government, or the media institution itself; Raboy calls it "administrative broadcasting," while William as well as d'Haenens and Saeyns use the term "paternalistic broadcasting."

3.b. The May 1998 Revolution

During the May 1998 Revolution, by means of the Media Performance Model, it can be shown how Civil Society and the (more open to the global) Market could fight back or corrode the Government control or legitimacy in astonishing ways. The latent performances of alternative media (the Internet) and underground media, together with rumors, helped enable Civil Society and Market

to have a clear impact on the Soeharto Regime. In the end other media could not help but support the Revolution (see Figure 2 Part B), which reached its peak with Soeharto's downfall on May 21, 1998. It is interesting to note that the May 1998 Revolution was an "ideal" momentum for the Media to put into practice their Media Responsibility, and for the public to compel the Media to carry out their responsibility. Research in the first, second, and third chapter showed that there was a serious and intense interplay in all newsrooms throughout Indonesia between the structure (represented by the interest of the media owners) and the agency (materialized through social actions of TV journalists and editors). Some journalists could be included in the so-called "critical supporters" category, while others could be labeled as "spoilors" of the Soeharto Regime. Of course the degree of those interplays differed from one TV newsroom to the next. These actions were actually the manifestation of **assigned, contracted, and self-assigned responsibilities**. They did not only take place in Jakarta but also in other areas.

Referred to as "interplay," the social actions displayed by the journalists and editors constituted responses to the social actions by Civil Society, which increasingly compelled the Media to carry out their Media Responsibility. The emergence of mushrooming alternative media and underground media, that struggled for the public interest, were not only a breach in the formal regulations stipulating how broadcasting companies and newspapers should be structured and how they should function, but also constituted a serious threat to the Media that did not carry out their **political responsibility**. The Media were also compelled to conduct their **market responsibility**: to the surprise of the newsroom professionals TV news programs ratings increased significantly and could even compete with popular entertainment programs.

The student action groups, which had frequently and temporarily occupied several local branches of the state-owned radio, RRI, in order to force it to air their demands, should be seen as an effort to compel the RRI to meet its **public responsibility**. The state-owned TV station, TVRI (which never reported the students demonstrations until millions of students and activists entered the Parliament compound in Jakarta and other cities across Indonesia) was forced by reality to finally start reporting the movement. In this way, the students and activists reminded the Media about their assignment (especially for a station funded by public money) of maintaining a more direct relationship with the citizenry, in addition to their relationship with the Market and the State. The endeavor to compel media professionals (not only those working in the state-owned media) to carry out their **professional accountability** was reflected in the statements voiced by students and activists in their protests in that any media (especially a TV station) wanting to avoid at any price to broadcast the news on the movement deserved to be called a “coward.”

Certainly we also have to mention that the collapse of the Soeharto Regime appears to be the product of internal contradictions within the political, economic, and mass media structures. On the one hand, Soeharto had to integrate the economy more deeply with the global capitalist system to strengthen the economy. This was strategically significant for the regime’s survival, since economic prosperity had been its main source of legitimacy. On the other hand, the economy’s proliferating links to global capital markets had made the regime more vulnerable to external pressures and changes, among others to capital mobility, as a direct consequence of the changes in risk perception by the parties involved. The “Press during the May Revolution” research (Hidayat et al., 2000) shows that under these circumstances the phenomenon of rumors indeed mattered. Again, it

could be seen as another effort to indirectly compel the Media to carry out their responsibility; otherwise the Media would lose ground in their competition against the rumors that further proved to negatively affect Indonesia's currency (the Rupiah) and forced people to queue and face empty supermarket shelves. It also clearly shows that in political communication as a research field, the media forms not typically included in political communication research (sometimes called "non-mediated communication") certainly deserve more attention, especially in a country like Indonesia whose society is famous for its so-called "high-context" culture. By way of an example, under the domination of Javanese culture, it is taboo to make personal matters related to the first family public in the media. As a result, rumor might be the only medium that fits this situation.

3.c. The Reform Era

"Reformasi" (Reformation) continues to be the buzzword of the Post-Soeharto Era. The subsequent administrations -- under massive internal and external pressures for reform -- gradually freed the market, the society and the media from state intervention. The Market was increasingly liberalized through a series of "jungle clearing operations" in order to end a web of politically well-connected business privileges and monopolies that surrounded Soeharto's inner circle. The newly liberated civil society also expressed itself through the rise of non-governmental organizations, independent labor unions, a more independent press council, and some forty new journalist associations. As to the media sector, the process of liberalization has included a series of deregulations, and more importantly, the liquidation of the Information Ministry, which was one of the central features of Soeharto's authoritarian corporatism, responsible for a long record of press bans. One year after the resignation of Soeharto, the

Parliament passed a new, liberating Press Law (1999) that, among other things, eliminated licensing requirements, revoked the government's ability to ban publications, guaranteed freedom of the press, and even imposed a stiff two-year prison penalty on anyone acting against the law by deliberately taking actions which could obstruct the work of the press. In short, from the interplay in the Media Performance Model it can be seen that the tendency that the Market, the Civil Society, and the Media would like to see less government interference in their arenas. Two questions still need to be addressed in this era: Firstly, whether the Market and Civil Society interact on an equal basis, and secondly, whether Civil Society interacts equally with the Media, meaning that the Media encourage the establishment and the development of Civil Society while at the same time the latter encourages citizens to be active information gatherers and processors, and ensures that the Media carry out their responsibility.

Some initial studies in the first and fourth chapter show similarities with the development of broadcasting in the United States: the Indonesian, as well as the American, public was easily trapped into "the fallacy of the two-model choice." The public is fed up with a system that is unashamedly filled with government propaganda and views the current libertarian program making as the only alternative. This has brought in programs such as bloody crime reporting, programs focusing on the supernatural or magic, celebrity gossip shows, imported and Indonesian versions of "telenovelas," and other programs produced or bought for rating considerations only. Each element in the Media Performance Model seems to aim at a different level of Media Accountability. The Parliament, as a legislative counterpart to the government, tried to draft the formal regulation stipulating how broadcasting companies should be structured and how they should function (**political accountability**), among others by fully

acknowledging public and community broadcasting in addition to commercial stations. This recognition became law on November 28, 2002. Most media owners and some significant parties among the media practitioners rejected this political accountability, and put forward full market accountability instead.

Civil society, described in the action research of the fourth chapter, made every effort to compel **political and public accountability**: i.e., requesting the Media to maintain a more direct relationship with citizens, in addition to their relationship with the Market and the State. The action research in the fourth chapter also illustrates that the public tends to choose community broadcasting in the first place, followed by the public broadcasting as the appropriate media to be held responsible **politically and publicly**.

The action research in the fourth chapter also strongly demonstrates that the paradigm of working **with** the people (introduced & suggested by Cohen & Uphoff, 1980), especially by listening to the local voices and never trying to persuade the informants to formulate their assessments according to any analysis model, proved well-suited to the local contexts in (so far) more than fifteen provinces across Indonesia.

The six findings and the thematization of the data as well as the answers to the questions raised in the action research of the fourth chapter were in line with the four general themes of the theoretical perspectives for community media (advanced by Jankowski, 2002), i.e. democratic theory, cultural identity, the community, and the operational environment. In the fourth chapter, the operational environment is visualized in a model based upon McQuail's Performance Model adapted to the Indonesian case and applied to public and community broadcasting.

The action research in the fourth chapter also shows an urgent need to address the forms, institutional aspects, and mechanisms for the public to exercise their rights and duties to compel the fulfillment of Media Responsibility. So far, there are two alternatives: First, the LCF (Local Consultative Forum) in which the locals could develop cooperation among multi stakeholders in planning and producing programs, as well as in evaluating media performance; Second, the Supervisory Body (*Dewan Pengawas*), already endorsed in the Broadcasting Law.

One of the problems voiced by the local media practitioners in the action research (described in the fourth chapter) was related to what Cees Hamelink calls “cultural synchronization,” which might become the central threat to cultural autonomy altogether. Cultural synchronization implies that the decisions regarding cultural development in a given country or community are made in accordance with the interests and needs of a powerful central nation and imposed with subtle albeit devastating effectiveness and without regard for the adaptive necessities of the dependent nation or community. Multi-level cultural synchronization is going on in accordance with the national tastes and modes of program making (including news) throughout Indonesia; as well as in accordance with the global tastes and modes of program making, especially from America and other Western countries.

Our continuous action-research efforts successfully promoted the establishment of Indonesia’s first Broadcasting Commission (KPI) on December 2003. This independent regulatory body’s mission is to monitor closely, on behalf of the public, the implementation of the responsibility of the media and compel the media to comply, where appropriate.

On the one hand, as an illustration of the still intense interplays, recent history shows that the State Ministry of Information and Communication (a part of the government's executive branch) has consistently tried to weaken the position and the authority of the KPI in such a way that it requires consultation with the State Ministry before making important decisions, especially when it comes to granting licenses. On the other hand, the KPI together with civil society elements have tried to block these State Ministry's efforts. At the same time, the KPI has invited the media practitioners from commercial, public, and community stations to discuss jointly the **assigned and contracted responsibilities** as well as the **political and public accountabilities** of each media type that could be adopted as regulations by the KPI later on. Media owners and practitioners of commercial stations have also produced a guidance document on their **self-assigned responsibilities**, which received some objections from the KPI and civil society elements.

4. Community Media

The community media practitioners are still attempting to formulate their vision of **their responsibilities**, their **public and professional accountability**. Their efforts have received support from academics and from civil society elements, as shown in the first National Conference on Community Broadcasting held by the Department of Communication, University of Indonesia, in January 2004.

The National Conference was attended by 34 representatives of community radio stations throughout Indonesia. The academics who attended the conference came from the Indonesian Communication Association (ISKI) and five main communication departments in

Indonesia. The elements of civil society attending the event represented, among others, the Press Council, the Indonesian Journalists Association, the Alliance of Independent Journalists, the Association of Local Television Stations, as well as the Press and Broadcasting Communities. Surprisingly some staff members from the Association of Private Television Stations and the Association of Commercial Radio Stations also participated in the conference. In general, it has always been widely believed that the commercial media sector does not support the community media since the latter could be seen as threats towards the commercial radio and TV stations, given the scarcity of frequencies as well as the fierce competition to generate advertising revenues. Their presence, although in very few numbers (only five people in total), showed that every institution has its own dynamic and that the attitudes of the individual members may differ from the general stance of the commercial media sector. From the government side, the State Ministry of Information and Communication failed to participate. Instead an official was sent to read the Minister's keynote speech, which turned out – as usual - to be very normative and generally emphasized the limitations and obligations of the community media rather than their rights as reflections of the citizen's media. Fortunately, another representative of the government side, i.e. the Director of Politics and Communication affairs of the Development Planning Agency (*Bappenas*) presented his office as a strong proponent of the community media for their merits in the new climate of democratization in Indonesia. The participation of five international speakers and observers also demonstrated the support from the international community concerned with the development of community media as the basis for decentralization and bottom-up communication in Indonesia's Reform Era. Two of them came from the Communication Department of Nijmegen University, one from the Dutch public broadcasting service, one represented the World Bank (the United States Agency for International Development),

and another represented the TIFA Foundation. In short, the solidarity and support shown were decidedly promising for the future of community media in Indonesia.

Nonetheless, the lack of concrete outcomes of this National Conference and following meetings show that it seemingly has been much more difficult for the community media pioneers and practitioners to define their media output, quality dimension, distinctiveness, and how to assure a truly community approach than their painstaking struggle for acknowledgement by the government! The Program Commission, established to discuss the future output of community media, could not come to an agreement except stating that news, current affairs, and cultural programs should be central program genres. Some Commission members emphasized that instructional programs or practical tips can help community members deal with their real problems in daily life (ranging from problems faced in the rice fields to the red tape at the local government bureaucracies). A few members asserted that entertainment, even though only in the form of “karaoke,” can significantly help lighten the burdens of daily life.

Regarding the quality dimension, the Program Commission unanimously agreed that the reliability of news and current affairs programs, the compatibility of cultural programs with authentic cultural values, as well as the contribution of the programs to the process of empowering the locals are paramount. This is in line with what they think of distinctiveness between the community media on the one hand and the commercial stations on the other, i.e. each community radio should install a so-called “Community Supervisory Board” that will monitor and assess the performance of the station in relation to the reliability of the news and current affairs, the compatibility of the cultural programs with the local cultural values, as well as the dynamic definition of empowerment of community

members. Some Commission members strongly suggested that the community media become self-supporting in terms of program supply: depending on outsourcing would make the community station too similar to their commercial counterparts.

The Managerial Commission expressed its concerns as to feasibility, specifically regarding steady financing and professional staffing. Most members did not agree with the suggestion to ask for some allocations of local government budgets since it might only lead to higher dependence on the local government. Instead they recommended further exploration of local advertising sources and other types of revenue. In short, this National Conference clearly illustrates the deductive approach of this dissertation: Departing from the general situation of recent political communication concerns, it flows into the specific case of Indonesian locals as active citizens who gather and process information, current affairs as well as culture through their own media. Notwithstanding the promising discourse and spirit, a serious question, inspired by Colle & Roman (2002) remains: "Can they make it happen?"

The following is an example: it will be very likely that other factors in the Media Performance Model, i.e. the Government and the Market forces, (fully or partially) reject the draft declaration signed by the community media initiators (and supported by elements of Civil Society). Hence the community media practitioners might feel abandoned. Hamelink (1994) already anticipates this phenomenon and reminds us that empowerment cannot be passively enjoyed, but instead has to be actively achieved and safeguarded. According to him, even under international law (most macro contexts), the individual has duties towards the community. People cannot expect others (the state or the media) always to defend their rights and liberties. If people do not actively engage in the battle for their empowerment, they should

not be surprised to find themselves one day totally disempowered. Uniquely, if we put Colle & Roman's question together with Hamelink's reminder, the answer then will (again) depend on how empowered the people become after an action-research is accomplished, so that they are capable of fighting for themselves in the near future.

5. Closing paragraph

Back to the political communication field, most of the conditions examined above (also described in full in the second, third, and fourth chapter) are more related to the politics of communication or to the issue "Who gets to say what to whom?" than to the communication of politics. Preferably both directions should be explored in parallel. In view of the most recent developments in Indonesia, i.e. the 2004 Elections, the field of political communication studies may wrongly be considered as merely concerned with the effectiveness of political campaigns. This dissertation aims to serve as a significant reference to show a comprehensive map of the political communication field, that includes (but is not limited to) the following 21 types of studies (as already mapped in Figure 6):

1. Studies on citizens as active information gatherers and processors;
2. Studies on institutions and processes taking place among them;
3. Studies on political/civic socialization among and by citizens;
4. Studies on political/civic socialization in institutions;
5. Studies on media reality construction and input from institutions;
6. Studies on press freedom;
7. Studies on diversity in media ownerships;
8. Studies on variety of media (types);
9. Studies on interactions in the newsroom and agenda setting;

10. Studies on plurality of contents;
11. Behavioral studies (after media exposure);
12. Media effect studies;
13. Studies on campaign and elections (using media);
14. Studies on political/civic socialization (through media);
15. Studies on development;
16. Studies on audience's feedback (political/civic socialization, using media);
17. Studies on media uses and gratifications or selective exposure on media choices and content choices;
18. Behavioral studies (without using media);
19. Studies on (non-mediated) campaigns and elections;
20. Studies on (non-mediated) political/civic socialization;
21. Studies on participatory development.

Only with this in mind, the goal of enhancing political participation and fostering development studies, which empower the citizen and civil society, can be achieved.

Last but not least, McLeod (2001), Chaffee (2001), Mutz (2001) and Iyengar (2001) indicate a new challenge in this field: How to apply the rise of the Internet, which is quite different from the traditional media and requires a different research approach, to political communication research? With this in view, combined with the urgency to explore more political communication at community levels, Jankowski (2002) reminds us that an area of particular theoretical importance is the emergence of "virtual" communities in the form of digital cities and other network facilities, and the relation of these virtual arenas with geographically based "organic" communities. In this context, Indonesia might still be a far cry from other countries whose citizens are much more attached to the Internet, but it does not necessarily mean that this direction should receive little attention.

Bab 7

Learning by Clicking: An Experiment with Social Media Democracy in Indonesia

Abstract

This article revisits the interplay taking place between the Government, Market, Civil Society, and Media in Indonesian contemporary political communication. Previous research showed a striking increase in the number of internet and social media users, as well as cases in the democratization process colored by the roles of social media. Some scholars pointed out the limitations of social media, among others the simplified narratives, larger media systems, and some techno-material aspects. Among the findings also was the phenomenon, “many clicks, little sticks”, meaning that only a few of the many clicks resulted in widespread activism in the vast social media environment. This article shows more recent and nuanced interpretations of actors in the interplay. The activists have continued their experiments providing two-way information, encouraging rapid interaction, creating much participation, and expanding role decentralization. In a spirit of “network of network”, they have been doing lots and lots of clicks, and have been learning by clicking at the same time.

Keywords: interplays, social media, democracy, experiment, network

1. Introduction

Perhaps Indonesia is now the most intriguing candidate for a live laboratory exploring the potential and empirical roles of the Internet and Social Media in the democratization process. Even, without a comprehensive exploration, Indonesia’s May 1998 Revolution that successfully toppled Soeharto, may simply be attributed to the Internet as its significant driving force (compared with

audio-tape during the Iranian Revolution and with the fax machine during the Chinese student movement around Tiananmen Square, see Hidayat, 2002:157).

Until now, various interesting cases involving social media color contemporary political communication in Indonesia. The most recent concerned the porn artist, Vicky Vette of Sweden, who kept trying to tempt President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (better known as President SBY). Within only several hours after President SBY launched his Twitter account on April 4, 2013, Vicky Vette had three times tweeted the President. First, she asked President SBY to follow her. Then, she asked the President to at least reply to her tweets. Finally, she tweeted: "Sad @SBYudhoyono hasn't followed me yet, maybe he doesn't like my movies...."

The world porn star might want to consider the fact that President SBY is a very latecomer to 'Twitterland' Indonesia. The President took office in 2004 and will finish his term in 2014. What is more, at first, the page of SBY's Twitter account copied the one belonging to U.S. President Obama. Certainly this appearance was changed later on. On July 5, 2013, President SBY launched his Facebook account. He chose the fan-page option. The palace spokesperson told the media that President SBY will soon launch his YouTube account.

In just four days, the President's Twitter account received 1,038,622 followers, and this number continues to grow exponentially. For his Facebook account, in one day only, there were more than 150,000 likes. But again, it is not something really unusual for Indonesia. According to the Indonesia Internet Service Provider Association (APJII), the number of Internet users in Indonesia in 2012 was 63 million (24.23 per cent of population), and predicted to be 82 million (2013), 107 million (2014), and 139 million or 50 per cent of the population (2015). ¹ At present, in terms of Facebook users, Indonesia is eighth in the world.

The *Citizen* (6/5/2013) describes the penetration rate of mobile phones as 67.7 per cent (versus 35 per cent in Singapore, 21 per cent in Malaysia). The number of smart phones grew by 25-30 per cent in 2012. Indonesia is the fourth largest market in the world for mobile phones.² By 2015, there are expected to be more active SIM cards in Indonesia than people. According to a Boston Consulting Group study (1/9/2010), 48 per cent of phone owners use it to access the Internet; 65 per cent of Internet use takes place at Internet cafes; 5 per cent of urban households have Internet access from home.³

The *Citizen* also notes that Indonesia has 38.8 million Facebook users, constituting the third-largest in the world. There are 29.4 million Twitter accounts in Indonesia, the fifth largest, just behind the United Kingdom; Jakarta is the number one city in the world for tweets. In addition, there are 5.2 million individual blogs county-wide.

In demographic terms, 67 million people (a quarter of the population) are eligible to vote for the first time in 2014. In addition, 17.1 per cent of the population is between 17 and 24 in age.² Data from the Ministry of Communication and Information (2012) showed that Facebook became the number one site in terms of receiving visitors in 2012. This Top Ten data also included Blogspot, YouTube, Kaskus, and Twitter.

Observing all these rapid developments, David Hill, an Indonesianist at Murdoch University (cited in the *Citizen*:2) states: “this is a highly technologically-engaged electorate and there’s a lot that Australian political parties could learn from their Indonesian counterparts”.

2. Theoretical Observations

The main objective of this article is to explore how political communication in Indonesia will (re)formulate its democracy, or at least some aspects of the democratization process, approaching the 2014 Election Year and onward? In light of its purpose, this study will include qualitative observations and interviews of the Elements

included in the title of one of the writer's previous publications, "Elements of Government, Market, Civil Society, and Media" (Gazali, 2004). Sometimes the term "Government" is interchangeable with "State". It represents the executive, legislative, and judicative branches of the Government. Some scholars also believe that even the political party which does not win the elections also has certain ways to influence the Government in practice. The term "Market" is occasionally substituted for "Commercial Interests", including media owners, investors, advertising income, etc. The term "Civil Society" refers to individuals and groups outside the Government and Market, as well as their interests. The "Civil Society" in a very general sense includes citizen and activists working for certain social movements.

We have to note that "activist" and "activism" have been conceptualized in a variety of ways. Some conceptualizations have emphasized *activity*. Diani (1992), for example, suggested that a defining activity of activism is its engagement with conflict, and Urietta (2005) cast activism in terms of the active participation of people advocating for a particular set of issues. Kim and Sriramesh (2009) defines activism as "the coordinated activity of a group that organizes voluntarily in an effort to solve problems that threaten the common interest of members of that group" (cited in Ganesh, 2012:74). Here, the author includes all those emphases within a specific context "in an effort to begin and enhance a social media democracy in Indonesia".

Media has a unique position among the Four Elements. Media content will show the results of certain interactions among those four elements at certain historical junctures.

At the same time, within each factor (according to Golding & Murdock, 1991:19; see also Cottle, 2004:5), there is a constant interplay between structure and agency, which constrains as well as facilitates, imposing limits on, as well as offering opportunities to, each other. The term "structure" may be seen as including resources and regulations (Giddens, 1984:17). The term "agency," in general, refers

to social actions carried out by social actors, either as individuals or as a group. It can also refer to social actions of human agents in a broader sense, not only individuals, but also including organized groups, organizations, and the state (Burns, 1986: 9). The results of interplay within each (f)actor will inevitably have an impact upon the interplay or power relations among those four elements and vice versa.

From all the Elements and the direction of their interactions, could be built a “Model of Political Communication Interplays”. In addition, as the results are generally seen in the media content, it could also be called “The Media Performance Model”. Some scholars might see it more as a “Model of Power Interplays”. In an ideal situation, all directions of these interactions could be relatively balanced and tend to form two-way traffic (see also McQuail, 1992; Hidayat & Sendjaja, 2002; Bardoeel & d’Haenens, 2004; Gazali in Willnat & Aw, 2009). Nevertheless, we have to note that a strong awareness of, and sensitivity to, external pressures and demands has been reported in many accounts of the media at work (McQuail, 1992:82).

The results of previous research examining what has been done in political communication research in Indonesia during and concerning three periods, i.e. the Soeharto Era (New Order Regime, especially from 1984 to April 1998), the May 1998 Revolution when the peak of the so-called “Indonesian Revolution” took place, and the Reform Era (from May 21, 1998, until end of 2004), are summarized in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Model of Government–Market–Civil Society–Media interactions as an analytical tool for describing the functioning of media in political communication.

This article will now apply that model to the Reformation Era (after 2004), with an increased focus on the “new media” (e.g., the Study area number 8 in the Political Communication Field by Gazali, 2004). McLeod, 2001; Chaffee, 2001; Mutz, 2001; Iyengar (2001) indicate a new challenge within that focus: How to apply the rise of the Internet, which is quite different from the traditional media and requires a different research approach, to political communication research?

At this point, the author will discuss what “new media democracy” or “social media democracy” means. One might question whether it even exists! Loader & Mercea, 2011 use the term together with “networking democracy”. The first wave of this enthusiasm can be traced back to Loader 1997; Tsagarousianou et al. 1998; Chaffee and colleagues in 2001, Benkler 2006; and Jenkins 2006. Leadbeater (2008) sees this latest generation of communication technologies as having inherent democracy capacities. In contrast to conventional media, social media has the potential to re-configure communicative power relations. By using social media, facilitating social networking, and enhancing “user-centered innovation” (von Hippel, 2005), citizens are said to be able to challenge the monopoly control of media production and dissemination by State and commercial institutions (Market). The openness of social media platforms facilitates the potential that Leadbeater (2008) called the “mass-collaboration” of individuals and groups, who become the source of innovations and ideas in democratic practices.

Hence, in general, this article attempts to define “social media democracy” in Indonesia as “a democracy in which some substantial parts of its processes are influenced quite significantly by the use of social media”. The writer who has continually been involved in the research-action paradigm indeed argues for the potential of a new kind of democracy in Indonesia due to the striking increase in the use of social media.

Gecko versus Crocodile 1 & 2

There were at least two famous cases that reflect this potential, entitled The Gecko versus Crocodile I and II. These cases concerned the rift between the national police and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). The Gecko referred to the KPK while Crocodile referred to Polri (the national police), a much older and larger institution. It started in June 2009 when the National Police chief of detectives, Susno Duaji, found that KPK had tapped his phone. At that time his unit was investigating a corruption case. Issues in social media revealed that Duaji demanded 10 billion rupiah from Boedi Sampoerna to clear the businessman's savings stuck in the troubled Bank Century. Later on, in a press conference, Duaji expressed his anger and launched the term “Gecko” & “Crocodile” for the first time. On September 9, the KPK announced that it was investigating Duaji's role in the Bank Century case. The National Police responded on September 15, by declaring KPK deputies Bibit Samad Riyanto and Chandra Hamzah suspects for abuse of power, and by imposing a travel ban on Anggoro. Both conventional media and social media began exploring the case by leaking information from many resources. On October 29, Police arrested Bibit and Chandra for abuse of power, later added with charges of extortion and bribery of businessmen they were investigating.

On the same day, Usman Yasin, an activist in Bengkulu started a movement in Facebook, entitled “The Movement of 1,000,000 Facebookers Supporting Bibit and Chandra”. Chain messages from social media in various forms accumulated, with rallies taking place in front of the KPK offices and campuses across the country. On November 3, The Police released Bibit and Chandra but did not drop the charges. Only nine days after launching the Movement of 1,000,000, the number of Facebookers Supporting Bibit and Chandra reached 1,002,030 supporters. On November 8, 5000 activists from various cities took to the streets and staged a victory rally in the central Jakarta area (Hotel Indonesia Circle). Some supporters sang popular

and satirical songs, while others did physical exercise under the theme “A Healthy Nation is Without Corruption”!

The Gecko versus Crocodile 2 case took place on July 30, 2013. The KPK confiscated documents in the Police Traffic Corps headquarters in South Jakarta, during an all-night raid. The raid ended in a standoff, with KPK investigators prevented from leaving the building by police officers. But finally all the documents were taken to the KPK office. The KPK then named two high level police officers, former Police Traffic Corps Chief Inspector Gen. Djoko Susilo and Corps Deputy Chief Brigade General Didik Purnomo, as suspects in a case involving the procurement of vehicle simulators. These actions had allegedly caused Rp 200 billion (US\$21.2 million) in state losses.

On the evening of October 5, dozens of police officers tried to enter the KPK headquarters to arrest Commissioner Novel Baswedan, a police officer seconded to the commission as an investigator. Novel, who was previously the Bengkulu Police detective unit chief, was charged with shooting and killing one robber and injuring five more in February 2004. Meanwhile, KPK Deputy Chief Bambang Widjojanto said Novel did not shoot the men and the case had been closed years ago.

The move was thought to be prompted by Novel's key role in the investigation of Inspector General Djoko Susilo, the first active-duty police general to be named a suspect. The police withdrew from the KPK headquarters only after hundreds of prominent anticorruption activists, among others Usman Hamid, Harris Azhar, Tama Satya Langkun, etc., intervened.

Limitations & Assumptions

On the other hand, the writer also realizes that virtual public spheres and civic commons, under certain conditions, may only result in limited success. Coleman & Blumler (2009) explains that it is not due to the deficiencies of the technologies but rather because of the

incongruency of the Habermasian model with the contemporary political and social culture of many societies.

Lim (2013) explores empirical cases in Indonesia. She offers a critical approach to the promise of social media activism by analyzing the complexity and dynamics of the relationship between social media and its users. Rather than viewing social media activism as the harbinger of social change or dismissing it as mere “slacktivism”, she provides a more nuanced argument by identifying the conditions under which participation in social media might lead to successful political activism. Lim states that in social media, networks are vast, content is overly abundant, attention spans are short, and conversations are parsed into diminutive sentences.

Lim (2013: 18) further finds that:

“social media activists have to embrace the principles of contemporary culture of consumption: light package, headline appetite and trailer vision. Beyond that, the activism must neither be associated with high-risk actions nor ideologies that challenge the dominant meta-narratives (such as nationalism and religiosity in Indonesia). Further, it also needs to be uncontested by powerful competing narratives endorsed in mainstream media. As such, social media activists are always in danger of being too fast, too thin and too many. While online activism may see many clicks, there are little sticks –while we may witness many clicks, there are very few causes that make for widespread activism in the vast online social media environment.”

These findings are meaningful and deserve serious attention. The present article goes further by assessing the Elements in its own model so as to find more recent and more nuanced interpretations of stakeholders in the model.

Learning from several qualitative action research projects in which the author has been involved, this research was then built on two assumptions. *First*, as the social media use has been increasing at a strikingly high rate in Indonesia, all Elements in the model would indeed react to, analyze, and experiment with this recent development. For comparison, in a context outside Indonesia, we can see how scholars of new media have investigated ways that activists use technology to engage in radical democracy (Pickard, 2006). On the other hand, Ganesh & Zoller (2012:67) show how “studies of organizational communication and public relations have also attempted to understand how activist organizing practices create opportunities for meaningful social change (Ganesh & Stohl, 2010), how they function as influential stakeholders (Weaver & Motion, 2005), and how organizations might effectively manage activists (Grunig, 1992; Smith & Ferguson, 2001)”.

Second, the activists would make the most of “network of network” (Mellucci, 1996) and “movement of movement” (Mertes, 2004) to encounter and cope with the limitations faced in enhancing social media democracy. Some scholars regard social movements as networks of relationships. Diani (1992) states that treating movements as networks also makes the relationship between movements and their spatial location most explicit. Contemporary social movements have developed historically in parallel with the emergence of a public sphere located in specific physical and cultural spaces, namely, in societies defined by national boundaries, specific infrastructures and common cultural traits (Tilly, 1978; Calhoun, 1992a; Emirbayer and Sheller, 1999; Tarrow, 1998). If one assumes that Indonesian activists could tackle the limitations in enhancing social media democracy, this research then should explain the progress taking place in the specific physical and cultural spaces for that “network of network”.

Adjusted to this context of research, what the “movements of movements” seeks to do is to challenge and remake the same forms and institutions that the literature takes as its parameters and axioms.

By its own bottom-up construction of alternative structures, media, and ways of being, it also poses an implicit challenge to the world as represented through academic eyes (Cox & Nilsen, 2007:426).

3. Research Questions

Based on the enthusiasm and limitations, as well as assumptions mentioned above, concerning the potentials of a kind of new democracy in Indonesia due to the striking increase in social media use, we can ask the following research questions to show the directions of social media using by the Elements in the Model of Political Communication Interplays in Indonesia:

- a) Based on their own experiences, how did actors in the Government, Market, Civil Society, and Media see the potential of social media to influence the practices of democracy in Indonesia? What processes occurred in their respective institutions when activists brought up issues related to democratization via social media? Or we can put this research question in a bit more intriguing form: who are convinced that social media matters in democracy?
- b) How would the interactions in newsrooms change given the rise of social media use? How would the possibility of conflict of interests between media owners and their conglomerates, and the issues brought up by activists through social media, occur nowadays?
- c) How did the actors in each Element respond when provided with the findings of previous research that social media activism is more likely to successfully mobilize mass support when its narratives are simple, associated with low risk actions and congruent with dominant meta-narratives, such as nationalism and religiosity? Maybe this question is most relevant to actors in Civil Society, but it is also open to actors in other Elements when they try to experiment with social media.

4. Methodology

The present research adopts the qualitative, grounded research approach that relies primarily on observation, records of statements made in private and public meetings, as well as personal interviews. The author has been involved in social movements with activists in Indonesia since 1992, and began to closely observe social media use in the days preceding Gecko versus Crocodile 1. All plans, meetings and statements made by activists, as well as the reactions from other Elements (Market, Government, and Media), have been recorded in detail.

The author then drew up all the concepts that need to be examined and outlined the research questions from January to March 2013. These initial research procedures are similar to those used by other scholars who researched the Indonesian media landscape (d'Haenens et al., 1999:139). These procedures include the following:

A list of concepts was drawn up to be used as a guide by the researcher during the interviews. All concepts needed to be dealt with. The order in which this was done as well as the actual questions to be asked were less important, and depended on the interviewee, the orientation and content of each answer. Underlying relationships between the concepts were sought, in order to come up with a clear understanding of the connections and interrelations among all concepts/categories. Based on these concepts, the goal was to elucidate the various answers of all the communicators interviewed, in order to establish a measured classification of the various categories.

The interviews were conducted from April to July 2013. The author determined the number of interviewees (called "sources") in each Element of the Model, to be included, based on the rolling information to be sought. In other words, the results from the first stage will determine the subsequent stages. As interviews took place

generally more than one time, they also included interviews via emails, phone calls, and other communication tools.

Most of the sources are high-level figures in their Elements. Except for one source living in Bengkulu, the sources live in Jakarta, the city with the largest level of social media use in Indonesia (even ranked number one in the world for tweets). They were also chosen due to their relevancy to the striking cases in recent social media democracy in Indonesia. Some are even called “influencers” in those cases.

The aim of the interviews was to get to know the interviewee, to probe into his or her reality: what meaning did the interviewee give to his or her journey in his or her everyday life? In order to do this, the researcher had to be able to place him or herself “in the shoes” of the interviewee, thereby gaining an understanding of the latter's thought processes.

The paradigm used as a point of departure is “working with the people”, based upon so-called “comprehensive people participation” (Cohen and Uphoff, 1980). By “people participation” is meant participation in assessing, decision-making, implementing, sharing the benefits, and in evaluating. Therefore, every session began with exploring the actors’ assessment of all relevant issues (i.e., starting from their access to and use of existing social media). In other words, starting with their closest environment. This procedure is very much in line with the spirit of the grounded research approach. This approach allows the researchers to reconstruct the interviewees’ perspective (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990).

5. Findings and Thematization of the Data

This research found major themes revealing essential similarities and differences with regard to the ways in which sources dealt with the research questions. Each theme will be presented and followed by a brief discussion. The themes are not listed in order of priority or significance.

The themes include the sources' perception regarding (1) who are convinced the social media matters and the reasons; (2) who are less convinced and the reasons; (3) interaction in the newsroom; (4) experiments with the limitations; (5) network and movement; and (6) new directions .

Theme 1: Who are convinced it matters

In order to examine the first assumption (that all Elements in Figure 1 would indeed react to, analyze, and experiment with the striking increase in the use of social media), all the sources were asked to openly share what they think of the effect of social media in relation to democracy in Indonesia. In general, all of them said that they believed that social media would have certain effects on democracy in Indonesia. Those who were heavy-users (including those categorized as “influencers” in phenomenal cases, such as Save KPK or Gecko versus Crocodile 1 & 2 case, and those who often joined demonstrations or performed their activities on the field, used the words “convinced” or “highly convinced”.

Two activists since the 1990s who were involved in the 1998 Revolution and Save KPK case, Sujiwo Tedjo (tweeps to 500,000 followers) and Fadjroel Rachman (tweeps to 212,464 followers), said that social media has a significant effect on democracy in Indonesia. Fadjroel mentioned a recent case that shows how social media even worked in “everyday democracy regarding the rights of ordinary people”.

Fadjroel created the #support FEBRY, resulting in Impact 12,110,448 and became the Top User by Impact. This hashtag refers to the case faced by Nur Febriani, a flight attendant for Sriwijaya Airlines. As usual, she warned the passengers to turn off their cellular phones when they were on board. At that time, the airplane was heading to Pangkal Pinang, the capital city of Bangka Belitung Province, from Jakarta on June 5, 2013. It turned out that an important government

official was on board, the head of the investment agency, and he was offended. As he was leaving the plane, he approached Febri and hit her with a roll of newspapers. Febri ran away but he chased her and she was hit again. As a result, she suffered got a bruise behind her ear. Febri told the police about the assault. The official's lawyer issued a statement saying that it was a trivial incident.

The tweet made by Fadjoel, among others stated: "This kind of person deserves to be thrown out of the plane." It reminded the public of the Prita case. In 2009, bloggers were outraged to learn that a nursing mother was jailed for sending an email complaint about the service in a certain hospital. They started protesting publicly in the blogosphere. The case was later diffused through social networking sites, especially Facebook. One of the social media activists came up with the idea of collecting Rp 500.- (a worthless coin) for Prita to pay the fine (for the full story, go to Caveat, 2009).

Some recurring reasons why the effects of social media on democracy in Indonesia are convincing, were stated by the Elements listed in Figure 1, are as follows:

- Social media is rapid and the news is easily updated. Conventional media seems to be left behind these days and is easily out-of-date.
- If the government does not listen to the activists in social media, sooner or later there will be a delegitimation of public trust. This is actually happening now.
- Increasing numbers of Legislators directly tweet, and upload in real time, all of the issues debated in parliament.
- Social media has become a part of respondents' lifestyles and a significant trend. When conducting their activities or engaging in advocacy on the field, many activists took pictures using their smartphones and shared them with their family, friends, and mass media. At the same time, they also shared the response they received from other parties with fellow activists.

- Although at the present some might feel such influence is not that significant, it will keep accumulating like an investment.

In addition, this research also recorded statements by very high-level figures in the Elements. Among others, Harry Tanoesudibyo, the owner of a media conglomerate declared to be the most-integrated media company in South East Asia. He has now been declared the Candidate for Vice President accompanying General Wiranto from the Hanura Party. Tanoesudibyo said,

Social media will influence Indonesian democracy significantly because in social media every element can freely interact without any boundary. In Indonesia, the penetration of the Internet was approximately thirty per cent, but it will grow extensively especially in the mobile internet sector. In the market these days, cellular phones are sold as smart phones that can be connected to the Internet. The Indonesian population is approximately 250 million. More than 50 percent are below 30 years of age. More than 50 percent of Internet users are between 17 to 27 years of age. It can be ensured that the growth of Internet users will significantly increase within the next few years. Jakarta is the city with the largest number of Facebook users in the world. Indonesia contributes 16 percent of the total messages through Twitter in the world every day. In conclusion, social media will play an important role in developing democracy and configuring culture in Indonesia.

The data he stated might be different from data from other sources. However, the way he put his words shows his full attention is directed toward social media.

For this research, the Parliament Spokesperson, Marzuki Alie, specifically stated that he has been paying attention to social media for a long time. Due to limited staff and time, he created a Facebook account. Originally there were three accounts, marzuki alie, marzuki alie1, and marzuki alie center. However, since they were hacked, he finally kept only one account, marzuki alie center. He also had a Twitter account, @MA_DPR, which was later renamed @marzukialie_MA. He also created a website, marzukialie.com. All of them were created not for building his image, but to obtain an honest and egalitary dialogue with every member of society. The latest information indicates that Marzuki Alie is one of the candidates for President who might be nominated by the Convention of the Democratic Party.

The Indonesian Government, specifically the Ministry of Communication and Informatics has also experimented extensively with social media. Gatot Dewa Broto, the Public Relations Director of the ministry stated that they paid a lot of attention to argumentative discourses in the social media. In February 2010, when the ministry was formulating the draft of the Multimedia Content Law, they received very stern criticisms through social media platforms by the parties impacted by the draft. Later they canceled it.

In another case, the ministry has continued the very controversial TV digitalization auction. There were only six auction winners as Multiplexer in Zone 4, covering the greater Jakarta and Banten Province. The other nineteen broadcasting license holders were forced to be content providers who leased to the auction winners. The auction was not very transparent, in terms of both the assessment criteria and the assessors. Every time the ministry was questioned about it, they answered that they would convey it if a lawsuit is submitted to the court. And indeed there was a lawsuit from the Local Television Association submitted to the Supreme Court. The result was that the Supreme Court asked for the auction result to be canceled. At

that time there were not enough issues about this case brought up by social media activists.

Theme 2: Who are less convinced it matters

If most activists who often joined demonstrations and most heavy social media users generally had a high conviction concerning the influence of social media on democracy, activists who spent most of their time doing research and teaching tended to be “less convinced”. Donny Gahral, an activist, researcher and a philosophy lecturer at the University of Indonesia, highlighted the substance of the democracy issue. According to him, democracy requires conversation quality with certain rationality standards. Meanwhile, most of the contents in social media tended to lead to “virtual gossip.” He also felt that there was a difference in the “news value” between the social media and in the conventional media. Fuad Fanani, a young activist from Muhammadiyah, one of the largest Moslem mass organizations in Indonesia, said that he was convinced, but his conviction was not strong enough. It was because the enemies of the activists also used paid accounts to fight advocacy. The spokesperson of KPK, for example, time after time, has been the victim of systematic attacks from anonymous accounts and many parties dealing with KPK.

This research also revealed experiences in which several parties could approach the owners of important social media accounts, for example, in issues related to the interest of a foreign consultant company. The owners of social accounts who seemed to be independent were able “to make peace with” the consultant or to draw up a business agreement.

Some recurring reasons to be less convinced regarding the effects of social media on democracy in Indonesia stated by the Elements of Figure 1 are as follows:

- Social media cannot stand on its own. Activists in social media highly depend on their own courage to bring the issues to the public.

- The strength of the market and capital owners' influence on the contents of conventional media, remain difficult to penetrate by social media.
- If there was a very critical issue related to the government in the social media, most conventional media still tend to play safe. If they publish it, it tends to be merely a courtesy in order that they were not be considered out-of-date. Except if there are some serious demonstrations following the issue later on, they will quickly publish.

Certainly, it will be interesting to examine the reactions inside the low enforcement institutions. The one always mentioned in any social media movement story in Indonesia is the KPK. Most sources working for the KPK were convinced that social media will gradually influence democracy in Indonesia, but with several remarks. Or to use the term by the Chairman of the KPK, Abraham Samad, "social media could have several influences to our democracy, but they are not that significant yet." The following remarks reflected their concerns,

- We have to keep in mind that as a matter of fact at present not every member of Indonesian society is "social media minded"
- The speed of social media should be compensated for with values, or else, we will be trapped in a "social media industry" in which once again the community is as trapped as the conventional media
- The conventional media in Indonesia, especially the television, is in the hands of certain parties. It might be an obstacle to spread the issues brought by social media activists if a conflict of interest occurs

Theme 3: Newsroom interaction

All reactions mentioned above have some significant relationships with the second research question: what about the interaction in the newsroom, both in conventional and online media?

Both media owners and journalists said that they were convinced that gradually social media will influence democracy in Indonesia. They also said that they paid a lot of attention to issues brought up by the activists in the social media. Considering the possibility of conflict of interests between media owners and their conglomerates, and the issues brought up by activists through social media, they admitted that such interdependencies would remain. Even, these interdependencies could apply beyond the newsroom. The most recent case showing the power of media owners and shareholders concerns the elimination of several activists and academicians in the fit-and-proper test (for Commissioners in the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission) in front of Parliament. Unfortunately, again, there were not enough issues about this case brought up by social media activists.

In addition, there were two cases related to news TV channels often mentioned to show such interdependencies. Regarding TV One, social media activists frequently gave criticisms concerning how they were not serious in discussing the unfinished Lapindo Mud Case, which has inflicted great financial loss on the people of East Java. The family of that TV station owner is the largest shareholder in the company performing drilling in Sidoarjo. Public opinion stated that it was a mistake in the drilling procedure that caused the tragedy. This TV station is also considered not to be critical to the Golkar Party because the family of its owner is the Chief of the party. The sources working with this TV channel argued that for TV stations, the most important thing is the news value, such as the freshness of the story, and whether all informants from each party (involved in a social media issue) are willing to appear on TV. They tried to say that the Lapindo Mud Case is no longer a fresh issue and that it was always very difficult to invite all parties voicing opinions in social media to the TV studio.

Some of them also added that retweeting does not always mean agreeing on the content. It is possible that it was meant to increase the provocation aspect. Several tweeps sounded really sharp in “tweet war” but in the real world they were joking with one another.

Regarding another news channel, Metro TV, social media activists once criticized the pressure it has put on its labor union. This TV station is also influenced by the interests of a new political party, i.e. the National Democratic Party, founded by the owner of the TV station. Resources working with this TV channel, on contrary, highlighted the fact that activists have not used social media optimally to fight against the conflict of interests with the owners of conventional media. "They should unite and be more solid", he said. He also stated that some social media activists seemed to avoid confrontations with the owners of conventional media, perhaps due to the consideration of future access to the media.

What about radio? Niken, a radio announcer in the largest radio network in Indonesia, believes that social media can play a significant role in leading public opinion, but it still cannot be declared as significantly influencing democracy in Indonesia. Concerning the possibility of the owner's intervention, Niken critically stated that journalists will always have to face two realities. First, there is almost no conventional media that is genuinely free from the interests of its owner or conglomerate. Second, journalists will never completely lose their idealism. Therefore, Niken believes that there is always a chance (fifty-fifty) for journalists to implement their idealism with certain methods, especially related to public interests (see also Gazali, 2002). This stance was also shared by Irwan Julianto, a senior journalist from Kompas, the largest printed media in Indonesia.

Kabul Budiono, the Director of RRI (Indonesian Public Radio) said that although public radio in Indonesia really pays attention to the voices of activists in social media, in democracy it should be noted who is speaking and for what reason he speaks. It means, whether or not it is beneficial for the state and public life in the large sense (for a comparison with previous research, see d'Haenens et al. in French & Richards, 2000). We have to keep in mind that in Indonesia recently

there have been some issues accusing some NGOs of working for the interests of foreign parties because they are their donors.

It is interesting to note that this research did not find support for the prediction that online journalists would be more convinced of the effects of social media on democracy than others. Both journalists from social and conventional media were concerned about the numerous fake accounts in social media and the booming number of journalists in online media. They also saw that there was an obstacle related to the interest of media owners if online media were built around a conglomerate with conventional media. They frankly said that issues brought up in social media are saleable issues because online media also depends on the number of hits from its readers.

Certainly there were some journalists who were pessimistic regarding the interaction in the newsroom. A news manager in the largest TV conglomerate in Indonesia was not convinced that journalists could “steal” the chance to publish social media issues conflicting with the interest of media owner. He said, “It was a problematical opportunity because in reality media owners were never inattentive to anything against their interests.” On the other hand, all media owners or shareholders in this research stated that they were always open to conflicting issues, and open to all forms of dialogue with the journalists as well.

From observations in the field, this research should state that in existing interdependencies among the owners and journalists, the trend “collaboration orientation towards dialogue” (Ganesh & Zoller, 2012:70) were more open than in previous research.

Theme 4: Experiments with limitations

The sources were also provided with the findings of previous research that Social media activism is more likely to successfully mobilize mass support when its narratives are simple, associated with low risk actions and congruent with dominant meta-narratives, such as

nationalism and religiosity. In general, they agreed about that. But many informants are quite optimistic that in the near future more and more people will take a stance on several risky issues, not only in the social media but also in public.

We have to note that during the research period, there were several attacks launched by the FPI (Islamic Defender Forum). They raided businesses selling alcoholic beverages or still having activities deemed not proper for the holy fasting month. In one case on July 18, 2013, around 50 FPI supporters attempted to raid several “entertainment” establishments (suspected brothels) in the Kendal district, Central Java. The men damaged several businesses before local residents turned on the hard-liners, forcing the FPI to retreat. As the FPI members attempted to flee the scene, one vehicle ran down a couple on a motorbike, killing the female passenger (a teacher) and injuring her husband as well two more local residents. President SBY quickly gave a Press Conference with a surprisingly strong comment. He stated explicitly that he learned from Twitter about numerous complaints on this matter. He then promised that firmer actions will be taken against any groups disturbing the security in public. President SBY also warned that this kind of action will surely give negative images to Muslim in general and Arabic countries as well (as almost all of the FPI members dress up in Arabic style).

The sources predicted that there will be quick interplays between stances and statements in social media and conventional media on the several risky issues, such as religiosity. Parallel with the President’s statement, more serious and strong statements of activists and parliament members emerged in social media as well as on TV stations. We also have to note that in the website for the petition Change.org (established in Indonesia in June 2012), there have been several petitions and a much support to the dissolution of FPI. One of them was initiated by activist Ratna Sarumpaet and has received 17,500 signatures. And the invitations to sign the petition have long been distributed via social media.

Change.org/id has increased the number of its members in Indonesia, and has become a medium to submit petitions related to public interests and injustice. Now, it has more than 225,000 members. The victory of Gecko versus Crocodile 2 was colored by the petition entitled "Leave the Corruption Case to KPK, and Stop Weakening KPK" initiated by Anita Wahid, the daughter of former President Abdurrachman Wahid. As one of the early signers of this petition, the author could feel the increasingly heated support for this petition in social media, as well as in demonstrations inside and outside KPK's office. It lasted from October 4, 2013 until the petition won when President SBY told the police to leave the case (involving the first active-duty police general to be named a suspect) to the KPK on October 8, 2013. Aside of this victory, there were many other petition successes, although the number of supporters was not as great. For example, the petition to Garuda Indonesia to eliminate the Form of Indemnity. This form was given to disabled people, releasing the legal burden of Garuda for everything that occurred in a flight. This petition was initiated by Cucu Saidah, in March 2013, with only 1,762 signatures/supporters.

In fact, one petition related to the terrible condition of road infrastructure in South Tangerang, initiated by Hasna Pradistyas, with only 241 supporters in November 2012. It finally received serious response from the mayor and governor, and then the infrastructure was repaired.

Another interesting petition victory was initiated by actress and activist Melanie Subono requesting the Committee III of Legislative Assembly not to approve Daming to be the Candidate for High Court Judge. During the fit and proper test in the Legislative Assembly in January 2013, Daming received a question related to rape. He turned it into a joke by saying: "Both the one who is being raped and the rapist are enjoying it." This petition was supported by 11,305 people. This case also received substantial attention from all of the national media. Finally, Committee III did not authorize Daming. In fact, Daming was

heavily bullied in the national media and had to cry for apology in public.

The variations of other petitions that have won or are in process include the following: The National Examination is considered to violate the National Education System Law and gives adverse consequences to students, to save the environment, the zoo, etc.

On other sensitive and long lasting issues, most informants urged that all relevant parties in the nation should seriously think about and revive the Civic Education syllabus as well as Education regarding the Constitution. According to them, the social media could help speed it up. But it would need echoing tones by credible public figures in neighborhoods as well as in the conventional media, especially television. We can see it in the regional government level, such as the government of the Jakarta Special Capital Territory. It is considered to be effective in using the social media. Moreover, it is only a continuation of such a great support from the social media to Joko Widodo and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama during their campaign process until they won the local election. The governor and vice governor are unique because Jokowi (the nickname of the governor) is a caring Javanese person, while Ahok (the nick name of the vice governor) is known to be direct and high tempered. Actually, Ahok is of Chinese decent, a minority group in Indonesia who rarely show their anger in public. However, Ahok shows it in many media interviews as well as in governmental meetings with a number of bureaucrats and third parties that are open to media. He also likes to upload those meetings. In the YouTube videos, Ahok often spoke straightforwardly and got angry in his defense of the constitution, the correct rules, and fought corruption and long-winded bureaucracy. The videos showing his anger on YouTube were viewed by up to millions of people. Most of them liked the video and supported him, parallel to support for Ahok outside the social media. This could also mean that there have been some changes in perceiving a Chinese-decent public official with direct and high temper.

In a meeting with the vice governor, Ahok mentioned his desire to keep uploading every meeting showing his anger. Based on the latest survey, the governor of the Special Capital Territory of Jakarta, Joko Widodo, is a candidate with the highest electability for President in the 2014 general election. Therefore, if he really runs for President and is elected, the vice governor Ahok will replace him as the Governor of the capital city of Indonesia.

Theme 5: Network & movement

This section will further explore the experiments of activists in handling the simplified narratives issue. Indirectly, this will also be relevant in facing larger media systems.

One of the experiments carried out seriously by Usman Hamid and his friends is sharing about how to create a message in social media, which indeed must be brief but continuous to convey the larger picture. Therefore, Usman frequently shares his four steps formula. First, the (initial) information should not be one way. Second, immediately encourage interaction. Third, create much participation. Fourth, role decentralization should be expanded.

In The Gecko versus Crocodile 1 case, both Usman Yasin and Usman Hamid had tried to open their networking to as many groups as possible in the social media. Usman Yasin was not a popular figure among activists, much less in public at that time. He started an anti-corruption coalition with local NGOs and youths in Bengkulu before launching the Movement of 1,000,000 Facebookers for Bibit-Chandra. He spent nine whole days to open transparently in the social media about who he was and why he initiated the movement as well as what the objectives were.

In the Gecko versus Crocodile 2 case, Usman Hamid and colleagues who already felt the rift heating up, chose to start a petition on Change.org to draw the attention of the social media users, the

public, and the media. It was followed by a series of rallies in the front of and inside of the KPK office in Kuningan. One of the most meaningful rallies was the hand-over of the petition signed by 15,035 people to the KPK Chairmen. This kind of moment turned into a media show, as the main actor was Anita Wahid, one of the daughters of former populist President, the late Abdurrachman Wahid. What is more, a lot of activists from various backgrounds, together with the KPK Commissioners, took turns delivering brave and spontaneous speeches to follow up. These were later broadcast live and recorded in all kinds of media.

Usman also gave another example that works in ordinary life. One day there was a need to raise funds to help the father of a university activist who was murdered in the Semanggi Incident (1999), Yun Hap. His father was only a shopkeeper and needed money for a prompt surgery (8/9/2012) with a total cost of 60 million rupiah. As this appeal took place so long (around 13 years) after the Incident involving Yun Hap, it might not be easy to begin a fundraising initiative. Usman chose to apply his four steps formula through social media. He began the message by raising a question, to avoid one-way information. Usman asked, "Do you still remember Yun Hap?" Then he reminded the public that Yun Hap's father needed money for the surgery. Third, he encouraged massive participation through invitation: "Why doesn't each of us donate Rp 60,000 and transfer it to the account of Yun Hap's family". Usman chose the number Rp 60,000 instead of saying that the required fund was Rp 60,000,000. Soon, role decentralization emerged. Many figures became the main actors who invited their activist friends and sympathizers. In less than one day, the sum of money collected reached far beyond the Rp 60,000,000 target.

This certainly was an issue among the activists and related to human-interest. Such experiments should be continued to cover more serious issues, such as human rights violations, evictions or attacks on a group considered to have different religious teachings, including the

violation of diversity of ownership principle and plurality of content in broadcasting sector.

Therefore, Usman took the initiative to establish Dinamo, an abbreviation of Digital National Movement. This movement is expected to be a place for mutual learning among those who are very advanced in social media but not closely associated with activism and those who are deeply involved in activism but do not have much knowledge about social media. The first meeting was successfully held on January 19, 2013, attended by 700 people although at that time Jakarta was facing a large flood.

Beny Susetyo launched his own experiment. He always tries to encourage important figures in conventional media to have alternative thoughts. For example, if the conventional media does not like a certain activist due to what he says in the social media, this Catholic priest presents a new activist name that can still be critical in conventional media. He also tries to encourage figures in conventional media to mutually find alternative young figures to be promoted in the Legislative Election and the 2014 Presidential Election.

Theme 6: New directions

Another development was the establishment of institutions like PoliticaWave.com. It is a medium to systematically monitor conversations in social media related to various political issues in the national and regional level. Through this medium, policy makers in the legislative, executive and judicative institutions will be able to obtain the latest information from the Indonesian people and it can be read in a real time mode. This institution collects “real time” data from various social media in Indonesia, including Facebook, Twitter, and the blogs in Detik, Kompas, Kaskus and many others. In total, millions of conversations every day are recorded and summarized in visual graphics that can be easily understood and followed up. This institution offers an analysis service to various conversations in social media by searching for certain key words – for example the name of a political

figure, a political issue or a political campaign – which will be processed into a relevant conversation summary and, politically, precious.

PoliticaWave has monitored nine regional election processes in Indonesia, namely the Regional Election in the Special Capital Territory of Jakarta (1st and 2nd round), the Regional Election in South Sulawesi, the Regional Election in North Sumatera, the Regional Election in West Java, the Regional Election in Central Java, the Regional Election in Bali, the Regional Election in South Sumatera, and the Regional Election in Bandung. Out of nine Regional Elections, it succeeded in predicting the result of seven based on conversations and public sentiment in social media. There were only two predictions in which results were not correct, namely the Regional Elections in North Sumatera and Bali (the difference was very small, under 1 per cent). This proves that social media has penetrated the middle as well as the lower class people because the prices of cellular phones have gone down. This also means an answer to the techno-material barriers for social media. From several discussions with PoliticaWave, we found that the combination of online and offline activities surrounding social media uses could partly explain those predictions. The family members, peer group members, friends, office and school colleagues who have not used social media yet, receive information, influences, and preferences from those using them.

Within the context of public interests, PoliticaWave also recorded public conversations in social media related to the increase of parking fees in the Special Capital Territory of Jakarta (October 5 to 22, 2012). The same was also applied to an incident that has shocked the international world, i.e. an attack and murder by the Indonesian Special Force (Kopassus) in Cebongan Prison (Yogyakarta) as revenge on a murdered friend (March 23 to April 3, 2013).

6. Conclusions

From the interplays portrayed in this study, we can see that all (f)actors in Indonesian contemporary political communication have been experimenting with social media. Certainly, they have different

interests, but almost all of them say that they are convinced about the gradual-but-significant influence of the social media on Indonesian democracy.




Figure 2. Interplay of recent 'Social Media Democracy' in Indonesia.

Figure 2 captures and summarizes those interactions. While seriously acknowledging the roles of social media, the Government still tries to work closely with the market in guarding both interests. One blatant example was the auction of the digitalization migration of TV stations. The Government kept moving with its policy, benefiting only a small number of media tycoons and ignoring suggestions from other angles, as well as the rights of local TV owners. The elimination of several activists and academicians in the fit-and-proper test (for Commissioners in the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission) in front of Parliament also shows the strong influence of media owners. The lack of social media role matters in those cases.

On another issue, such as the draft of multimedia content, the Government said it did listen to the voices brought in social media. This example actually was not a real contestation between the Government and the activists, as contesting issues in social media were raised mostly by the business entities that were potentially impacted by that draft.

The Market proves to seriously and systematically work with the Government as well as with the both Conventional and Social Media. The media owners and their conglomerates are never inattentive to anything against their interests. The journalists working for the media industry still feel that they never lost their idealism for public interests. However, in general when there are conflicting interests, the media owners and the journalists fall into the category of “collaboration orientation towards dialogue”.

In line with some previous research, the phenomena of indirect relations among conventional media, social media, and civil society also exist. Only if there is significant movement in social media and in the field (such as rallies and demonstrations), will conventional media and the market join the activists.

On the part of the activists, this research shows an “Agonism orientation towards dialogue”. It suggests that, we should not seek to enhance social relations at the expense of addressing social inequalities and exploitation (Rawlins, 2009), or should not privilege consensual dialogue as the best form of social change (Ganesh & Zoller 2012:84). So, some activists still develop good relations with the people in the newsrooms of conventional media in order to get support for issues they launch in social media, especially when they realize the sensitivity of the issues at stake to the media owners and conglomerates. But most activists are deeply convinced concerning the influence of social media such as Usman Hamid, who no longer seems to care about that kind of barrier. He believes that “the conglomerates of conventional media are nearly dead!”

On another serious ‘style’ barrier, it turns out that activists have long tried to tactically handle the need to embrace the principles of contemporary culture of consumption: light packaging, headline appetite and trailer vision. Yes, they did not always succeed. That is why they develop formulas in order to make the most of “network of network” and “movement of movement” (or we could call it now “network of movement” and “movement of network”). They then keep building synergy with other parts of Civil Society, among others in the Dinamo (Digital Nation Movement).

By describing all of these experiments, one can not say that the activists have coped with what Lim described as “many clicks, little sticks”. What we can clearly see is that activists have seriously tried to experiment with all the potentials of social media, from time to time, from case to case.

Concerning the clicking, in some cases it proved that not only “many clicks”, but also a small numbers of clicks in a movement like the one facilitated by change.org could also have a significant result. Conventional media may not have exposed the petition quite sufficiently. But some activists did send the chain messages to the target of the petition, pointing out that they had better fix that problem otherwise they will have as serious problem with the social media! And based on the most recent findings in the field, we can say that if the activists could keep working systematically and innovatively to face the unique realms of social media, Indonesia can keep moving gradually-but-significantly towards a so-called “social media democracy”. For now, they have been clicking and clicking and been learning by clicking at the same time.

Endnotes:

1. data from Internet Outlook 2013, by APJII, 12/12/2012

2. <http://www.thecitizen.org.au/media/indonesias-social-media-love-affair-promises-lively-2014-election-campaign>; retrieved 9/5/2013
3. https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/consumer_products_media_entertainment_internets_new_billion/Re; retrieved 9/5/2013

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